Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc., et al.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
ROGER DANIELS and TAMMY
LYNN WALLACE,
Plaintiffs,
-vs.OPTEK TECHNOLOGY, INC.,
JOHN DOE I, JOHN DOE II, JOHN
DOE III, XYZ CORPORATION I,
XYZ CORPORATION II, and XYZ
CORPORATION III,
Defendants.
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OPINION
Date Submitted: September 13, 2013
Date Decided: December 30, 2013
Upon Consideration of Plaintiffs’ Motion
For Leave to File Amended Complaint, GRANTED.
Ian C. Bifferato, Esquire, Richard S. Gebelein, Esquire, David W. deBruin,
Esquire, and J. Zachary Haupt, Esquire, Bifferato, LLC, 800 North King Street, 1st
Floor, Wilmington Delaware, 19801, Steven J. Phillips, Esquire, (argued) pro hac
vice and Nancy A. Perry, Esquire, pro hac vice, Levy, Phillips & Konigsberg, LLP,
800 Third Avenue, New York, New York, 10022, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
R. Stokes Nolte, Esquire, Reilly, Janiczek & McDevitt, P.C., 1013 Centre Road,
Suite 210, Wilmington, Delaware, 19805, Attorney for Defendant Optek
Technology, Inc.
RAPPOSELLI, J.
Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc.
CA. No. N10C-10-002
December 30, 2013
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint
(“Plaintiffs’ Motion”). Defendant Optek Technologies, Inc. (“Optek”) opposes
Plaintiffs’ Motion on grounds that (1) it falls outside the governing standard of
permitted amendments set out in Rule 15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
Superior Court of the State of Delaware (“Rule 15”), and (2) the disputed
amendments are precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. For the reasons set
forth below, this Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Motion is permissible under Rule 15
and not precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Therefore, Plaintiffs’
Motion is GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Roger Daniels (“Daniels”) is the son of Plaintiff Tammy Lynn
Wallace (“Wallace”). Wallace began her employment at Optek in March of 1983,
gave birth to Daniels on December 31, 1985, and ended her employment with
Optek in June of 1986. Daniels suffers from a variety of birth defects which
Plaintiffs allege were caused by exposure to hazardous chemicals during Wallace’s
employment at Optek.
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Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc.
CA. No. N10C-10-002
December 30, 2013
Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against Optek on October 1, 2010 (“Original
Complaint”). The Original Complaint (¶30) asserts a derivative theory of liability
as to Daniels as follows:
Tammy Wallace sustained an insult to her reproductive
system as a result of her employment at Optek that
caused injuries to Plaintiff Roger Daniels.
The Original Complaint also states that Daniels was harmed in utero during
the exposure period (¶1) and alleges Optek is directly liable to Daniels (¶18):
At all relevant times, Defendants failed to . . . comply with
reasonable standards and regulations to protect and
promote the health and safety . . . [of] those using or who
would foreseeably use or be harmed . . . including Tammy
Lynn Wallace and her offspring.
On June 21, 2013, pursuant to Superior Court Rule 15, Plaintiffs filed this
Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), which alleges
Daniels’ direct (not derivative) exposure as the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims. On July
1, 2013, Defendant filed an Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Complaint.
After additional filings were submitted by the parties, a hearing was held before
this Court on September 13, 2013.
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Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc.
CA. No. N10C-10-002
December 30, 2013
I.
Rule 15(a) Amended Pleading
Superior Court Civil Rule 15(a) generally “directs the liberal granting of
amendments when justice so requires.” 1 Rule 15 amendments may be denied if
sought in bad faith or if the non-moving party would be prejudiced by suffering an
increased burden.2 This Court has considered both arguments and finds that Optek
has failed to establish either as a basis to deny Plaintiffs’ Motion.
First, Optek argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion is a bad faith attempt to elude the
consequences of Peters v. Texas Instruments, Inc. and, as such, leave to amend
would not achieve justice pursuant to Rule 15. 3 In Peters, a minor plaintiff alleged
to have suffered birth defects as a result of his father’s exposure to hazardous
substances at his place of work. The Peters Court held that the minor plaintiff’s
claim was derivative of his father’s claim; the claim was barred and subject to the
exclusive remedies provided under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act. 4 Optek
argues that the Original Complaint limits Daniels to a derivative theory of liability,
1
Abdi v. NVR, Inc., 945 A.2d 1167 (Del. 2008).
Martinez v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 2012 WL 4479164 (Del. Super. Sept. 21,
2012).
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Peters v. Texas Instruments Inc., 2011 WL 4686518 (Del. Super. Sept. 30, 2011).
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Id.
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Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc.
CA. No. N10C-10-002
December 30, 2013
and that Plaintiffs’ Motion is a bad faith tactic intended to avoid the inevitable
consequences of a Peters-based summary judgment analysis. 5
Rule 15 “bad faith” considerations are of the type alleged in Northpointe
Holdings LLC v. Nationwide Emerging Managers: amendments intended “to
further harass and drive up [defendants’] costs of litigating [a] baseless law suit.” 6
The bad faith alleged by Optek stems from its assumption that the Original
Complaint limits Daniels to a derivative theory of liability, and would thus be more
vulnerable in defending against a summary judgment action. Optek did not
establish that an amendment made in an attempt to avoid summary judgment
constitutes bad faith. Even if there was support for that legal position, Optek’s
argument would still not be persuasive since this Court finds that the Original
Complaint includes allegations of both direct and derivative claims and Plaintiffs’
Motion is merely a clarification of the same.
In determining whether a Rule 15 amendment would prejudice the nonmoving party by increasing its burden, this Court considers whether the nonmoving party has “identified any amendment in the [FAC] that would require
5
While the pertinent summary judgment motion is not before this Court, it should be noted that
the Peters decision distinguished the derivative action in that case from claims, as in this case,
involving direct damages to plaintiffs in utero.
6
Northpointe Holdings, LLC v. Nationwide Emerging, Managers, LLC, 2012 WL 2005453 (Del.
Super. May 24, 2012).
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Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc.
CA. No. N10C-10-002
December 30, 2013
additional discovery or depositions.” 7 Since the FAC rests on the same
occurrences as the Original Complaint, and the matter is still in its early stages
from a scheduling standpoint, this Court finds that Optek has not established an
increased burden sufficient to warrant denial of Plaintiffs’ Motion.
II. Judicial Estoppel
Optek further argues that Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied on the basis of
judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel “operates only where the litigant's [present
position] contradicts another position that the litigant previously took and that the
Court was successfully induced to adopt in a judicial ruling.” 8
Optek contends that judicial estoppel precludes the Court from granting
Plaintiffs' Motion because such a ruling would contradict the basis of the Court’s
prior decision on Optek’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In support of this
argument, Optek reiterates its position that the Original Complaint did not allege
direct claims as to Daniels and points to Plaintiffs’ Brief in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Plaintiffs’ Brief”) to argue that
Plaintiffs had previously implied that Daniels’ claims were solely derivative of his
mother’s.
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Id.
Motorola Inc. v. Amkor Tech., Inc., 958 A.2d 852, 859-60 (Del. 2008).
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Daniels v. Optek Technology, Inc.
CA. No. N10C-10-002
December 30, 2013
The Court is not persuaded by Optek’s judicial estoppel argument. First, as
previously stated, this Court finds that the Original Complaint alleged that Daniels
had both direct and derivative theories of liability. Second, Optek’s claim that
Plaintiffs’ Brief implies a derivative cause of action fails to establish that the Court
relied on that position as a basis for its ruling on Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment. The Court's decision did not depend on whether Daniels’ claims were
derivative or direct in nature. Rather, the Court denied Optek’s motion based on a
determination that the “time of discovery” exception applied to Daniels’ injuries
and that his claims were not time-barred.
CONCLUSION
Having considered Plaintiffs’ Motion, Optek’s Reply, and Plaintiffs’
Response, this Court finds that the amendments are permitted under Rule 15 and
do not implicate the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Leave to File Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Vivian L. Rapposelli
Judge Vivian L. Rapposelli
cc:
Prothonotary
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