Jefferson Cnty. v. Dozier

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2025 CO 36

Jefferson County, Colorado, Petitioner
v.
Krista Dozier. Respondent

No. 23SC483

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc

June 9, 2025

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1726

Attorneys for Petitioner:

Jefferson County Attorney's Office

Kimberly S. Sorrells, Jefferson County Attorney

Eric T. Butler, Deputy County Attorney

Jason W. Soronson, Assistant County Attorney

Golden, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent:

Law Offices of Jonathan S. Willett

Jonathan S. Willett

Boulder, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Counties, Inc.:

Hall & Evans, L.L.C.

Andrew D. Ringel

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Denver, Colorado

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

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OPINION

HOOD JUSTICE

¶1 After slipping and falling on an unmarked puddle of water in the Jefferson County courthouse, Krista Dozier brought a tort action against Jefferson County (the "County"). The County moved to dismiss the case, claiming immunity under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act ("CGIA"), §§ 24-10-101 to -120, C.R.S. (2024). Dozier countered that the spill was a "dangerous condition" of a public building, an exception to CGIA immunity. The district court found that the County's response to the spill was reasonable, and so the dangerous-condition exception didn't apply. The court then granted the County's C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss Dozier's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A division of the court of appeals reversed, holding that (1) the reasonableness of the County's response wasn't relevant to the court's jurisdiction, and (2) the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception. Dozier v. Jefferson Cnty., No. 21CA1726, ¶¶ 14, 18-19 (May 25, 2023).

¶2 We now reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. We hold that when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of the existence of the facts necessary to establish a waiver of CGIA immunity. We further hold that a plaintiff must show that a public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the condition in question for the dangerous-condition exception to apply. Because the district

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court found that the County's response to the spill was reasonable, it correctly concluded that Dozier had failed to establish that the spill was a "dangerous condition" and that it lacked jurisdiction over her claims.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 In March 2019, an employee at the County courthouse noticed a puddle of water in a hallway and contacted facilities management. But before the spill was cleaned up, Dozier slipped on it and fell.

¶4 In 2021, Dozier brought a premises liability and negligence action against the County. The County moved to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from liability under the CGIA because the spill wasn't a "dangerous condition" of a public building. See § 24-10-106(1)(c), C.R.S. (2024). Specifically, the County maintained that its failure to warn of or to clean up the spill before the accident wasn't negligent because less than five minutes had elapsed between an employee learning of the spill and Dozier's fall. Dozier contended that the employee had known about the puddle for closer to twenty minutes.

¶5 The district court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993) (a "Trinity hearing"), to resolve the "genuine factual dispute" over how much time had elapsed between the County learning of the spill and Dozier falling. The district court found that the spill wasn't a "dangerous condition" because the

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County didn't "kn[ow] about it in enough time to correct it before Ms. Dozier fell." So, it granted the County's motion to dismiss.

¶6 A division of the court of appeals reversed, reasoning that the district court had conflated the issues of immunity and liability. Dozier, ¶¶ 12-14. In the division's view, whether the County acted reasonably after it learned of the spill wasn't "relevant to, let alone determinative of," the district court's jurisdiction; instead, the County's conduct related to the factual merits issue of causation. Id. at ¶ 14. Applying what it deemed "the appropriate legal standard," id. at ¶ 15, the division then determined that Dozier's allegations established the requisite "minimal causal connection" between her injuries and the County's failure to warn of or to clean up the spill, id. at ¶ 17 (citing Tidwell ex rel. Tidwell v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 86 (Colo. 2003)). Therefore, the division held, the County had waived CGIA immunity under the dangerous-condition exception. Id. at ¶ 19.

¶7 We granted the County's petition for review.^[1]

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II. Analysis

¶8 We begin by discussing the principles that govern interpretation of the CGIA. After explaining the standard of review, we examine the relevant CGIA provisions. We then consider the plaintiff's burden to prove that a public entity waived CGIA immunity and provide the framework for assessing whether a public entity has waived immunity under the dangerous-condition exception. Finally, we apply that framework.

A. Interpretive Principles

¶9 Resolving the issues presented in this case requires us to interpret the CGIA. In doing so, we recognize that, because the CGIA derogates Colorado's common law, we must strictly construe legislative grants of immunity and broadly construe exceptions, or waivers, to that immunity. Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 81. Our goal in interpreting statutes is to effectuate the legislature's intent. Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 799 (Colo. 2000). Accordingly, we construe the CGIA as a whole, "giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts." City & Cnty. of Denver v. Dennis, 2018 CO 37, ¶ 12, 418 P.3d 489, 494. Because we must respect the legislature's choice of language, we will not add or subtract words from the statute. Id. If the statutory language is unambiguous, we "give effect to its plain and ordinary meaning and look no further." Id. (quoting Smokebrush Found. v. City of Colo. Springs, 2018 CO 10, ¶ 18, 410 P.3d 1236, 1240). But if the

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language is ambiguous, "we may consider other aids to statutory construction," Hice v. Giron, 2024 CO 9, ¶ 10, 543 P.3d 385, 390 (quoting McBride v. People, 2022 CO 30, ¶ 23, 511 P.3d 613, 617), such as "[t]he consequences of a particular construction," § 2-4-203(1)(e), C.R.S. (2024).

B. Standard of Review

¶10 The CGIA generally immunizes public entities "from liability in all claims for injury that lie in tort or could lie in tort." § 24-10-106(1). However, the legislature has carved out exceptions that, when applicable, constitute a waiver of immunity and subject public entities to liability as if they were private persons. See §§ 24-10-106 to -107, C.R.S. (2024).

¶11 Whether CGIA immunity applies in a particular case is a jurisdictional issue governed by Rule 12(b)(1)'s standard of dismissal. Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, ¶ 13, 504 P.3d 287, 291. Under this standard, the plaintiff bears "the burden of proving jurisdictional facts adequate to support subject matter jurisdiction." City & Cnty. of Denver v. Crandall, 161 P.3d 627, 632 (Colo. 2007). If the jurisdictional facts are undisputed, the court may decide the issue of jurisdiction as a matter of law, without first holding a hearing. See Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86. But if the jurisdictional facts are disputed, the district court may hold an evidentiary hearing. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001).

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¶12 At the evidentiary hearing, a district court "may receive any competent evidence pertaining to" a factual attack on the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint. Trinity, 848 P.2d at 924. The court should afford the plaintiff the reasonable inferences from her undisputed evidence and, if the court finds that the plaintiff's allegations are true, it should also give the plaintiff the reasonable inferences from her disputed evidence. Dennis, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d at 494; Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86. The district court "is authorized to make appropriate factual findings" and must rely on these facts in deciding, as a matter of law, whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case. Medina, 35 P.3d at 452.

¶13 Thus, a district court's resolution of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss presents a mixed question of fact and law. Maphis, ¶ 14, 504 P.3d at 291. We defer to the district court's factual findings unless they're clearly erroneous, and we review the district court's conclusion regarding CGIA immunity de novo. Dennis, ¶ 12, 418 P.3d at 494.

C. A "Dangerous Condition" of a Public Building

¶14 A public entity waives CGIA immunity when the plaintiff's injuries resulted from "[a] dangerous condition of any public building." § 24-10-106(1)(c). Dozier argues that this exception applies here because her injuries resulted from an unmarked spill in the courthouse, which no one disputes is a public building.

¶15 The CGIA defines a "[d]angerous condition" as

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either a physical condition of a facility or the use thereof that constitutes an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public, which is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist and which condition is proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity or public employee in constructing or maintaining such facility.

§ 24-10-103(1.3), C.R.S. (2024) (emphasis added). We've interpreted this definition as creating a four-factor test. E.g., Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636, 644 (Colo. 1998). Accordingly, the dangerous-condition exception to CGIA immunity applies here if Dozier's injuries resulted from (1) the physical condition of the courthouse-i.e., the unmarked spill; (2) "which constitute[d] an unreasonable risk to the health or safety of the public"; (3) about which the County reasonably knew or should have known; and (4) which was proximately caused by the County's negligent act or omission in maintaining the courthouse. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. RE-1J v. Loveland ex rel. Loveland, 2017 CO 54, ¶ 16, 395 P.3d 751, 755.

¶16 The County argues that the reasonableness of its response is relevant to the fourth factor; namely, whether the spill was proximately caused by the County's negligent act or omission. Dozier counters that she need only show that the County had notice of the spill to prove that the dangerous-condition exception applies. Thus, the parties dispute only the fourth factor: proximate cause.

¶17 Before interpreting and applying the fourth factor of the "dangerous condition" test, we first clarify the burden the plaintiff must meet to prove that a public entity waived CGIA immunity.

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1. Burden of Proof

¶18 We've long held that the plaintiff's burden to prove that a public entity waived immunity is "relatively lenient." Dennis, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d at 494; Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 85-86; see also Trinity, 848 P.2d at 925. We haven't, however, articulated what this burden entails, particularly when the jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the claim, as they are here. We do so now.

¶19 We examine three options. First, we consider a prima facie showing. We've held that this evidentiary burden is appropriate when the district court relies only on documentary evidence and thus doesn't need to engage in factfinding to decide a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1192 (Colo. 2005). This burden is "light": The plaintiff need only "raise[] a reasonable inference that the court has jurisdiction," and the court accepts the plaintiff's undisputed allegations as true and resolves disputes arising from "the parties' competent evidence" in the plaintiff's favor. Id. This standard is inapplicable, however, when an evidentiary hearing is needed to resolve any factual disputes related to jurisdiction. See Ferrel v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 179 P.3d 178, 184 (Colo.App. 2007) (explaining that, "when the resolution of disputed facts is necessary to determine the court's jurisdiction, application of a prima facie standard is directly at odds with the very

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purpose of a Trinity hearing"); see also Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253, 1260-61 (Colo. 2003). So, we must press forward and consider other options.

¶20 Second, on the other end of the spectrum, we could simply require the plaintiff to prove an immunity exception by a preponderance of the evidence. After all, this is the standard that generally applies in civil actions. § 13-25-127(1), C.R.S. (2024). And we've applied this standard in both the personal and subject matter jurisdiction contexts when the jurisdictional facts were disputed and necessitated a hearing. See Archangel Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1192 (determining personal jurisdiction in a pretrial hearing); Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099, 1113 (Colo 2010) (determining subject matter jurisdiction in a pretrial hearing). But we've cautioned district courts to "be wary of finally deciding the jurisdictional question at an evidentiary hearing where the jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the case, because doing so could endanger the plaintiff's substantive right to a jury trial," and the court's findings "could later have a preclusive effect against a party." Archangel Diamond Corp., 123 P.3d at 1193 (citing Foster-Miller, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Can., 46 F.3d 138, 146 (1st Cir. 1995)). Instead, when faced with inextricably intertwined facts, "the court should only satisfy itself that it has the ability to hear the case." Dennis, ¶ 11, 418 P.3d at 494. So, the preponderance standard is less than ideal.

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¶21 Third, we could take guidance from federal precedent, which offers a middle ground-the likelihood standard-when disputed jurisdictional facts are "bound up with the claim on the merits." Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 146. This standard is more exacting than the prima facie showing, as it "involves factfinding rather than merely making a ruling of law regarding sufficiency of the evidence to present a fact question." Id. (quoting Boit v. Gar-Tec Prods., Inc., 967 F.2d 671, 678 (1st Cir. 1992)). But it's less demanding than the preponderance standard, as the court's findings are "limited to probable outcomes as opposed to definitive findings of fact." Id. In this way, it is like the first element of the preliminary injunction analysis, under which "the plaintiff must show a likelihood," or "a reasonable probability[,] of success on the merits." Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610, 621 (Colo. 2010) (first quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987); and then quoting Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 653-54 (Colo. 1982)).

¶22 Although this "likelihood standard" itself is hardly pervasive, it has friends. Several federal courts of appeals have relaxed the plaintiff's burden of proof when disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits under the federal analog to the CGIA, the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Third Circuit, for example, has instructed district courts to "demand 'less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be appropriate at a trial stage'" under these circumstances to "ensure that defendants are not allowed to use Rule 12(b)(1) to resolve the merits"

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before the plaintiff has been "given the benefit of discovery." CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000)).^[2]

¶23 The likelihood standard appropriately addresses the countervailing considerations we've discussed. Unlike the prima facie standard, it involves weighing evidence and making factual findings and "enhance[es] the courts' ability to weed out unfounded claims of jurisdiction" at the pleading stage, as the CGIA mandates. Foster-Miller, 46 F.3d at 146. On the other hand, by limiting these jurisdictional findings "to probable outcomes," plaintiffs are spared having to meet the preponderance standard-the burden of proof at trial-before completing discovery.

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¶24 So, we hold that when a public entity asserts CGIA immunity and the disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits, the likelihood standard applies. We now return to the fourth factor of the "dangerous condition" test and consider whether the disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of Dozier's claim.

2. Fourth Factor of a "Dangerous Condition": Proximate Cause

¶25 The division concluded that Dozier needed to prove only that the County had notice of the spill to establish that the spill was a "dangerous condition." Dozier, ¶¶ 11-14. According to the division, by considering the reasonableness of the County's response, the district court essentially required Dozier to prove liability at the Trinity hearing. Id. at ¶ 14. We disagree.

¶26 While the division is correct that Dozier didn't need "to prove that the County was negligent and liable for her injuries," id. (emphasis added), as that inquiry is properly reserved for trial, the definition of "dangerous condition" plainly requires the plaintiff to prove that the "condition [wa]s proximately caused by the negligent act or omission of the public entity," § 24-10-103(1.3) (emphases added). Indeed, the definition goes on to state, "The mere existence of wind, water, snow, ice or temperature shall not, by itself, constitute a dangerous condition." Id. (emphasis added). So, Dozier was required to prove that the allegedly dangerous condition existed because of the County's negligent act or omission. Cf. Springer,

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13 P.3d at 801 ("In each . . . subsection [of section 24-10-106(1)], a public entity lacks immunity, not because it necessarily causes a dangerous condition, but because it is in a position to discover and correct the condition.").

¶27 It was therefore appropriate for the district court to rely on negligence principles, including the reasonableness of the County's response to the spill, to determine whether the County's failure to warn of or to clean up the spill was a negligent omission under the circumstances. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530, 533-34 (Colo. 1993) (stating the elements of a prima facie case for negligence, which include whether the defendant acted reasonably). The district court concluded that if the County wasn't afforded "a reasonable time under the circumstances to discover and correct the condition," its omission wasn't negligent, and the spill wasn't a "dangerous condition." See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Smith, 658 P.2d 255, 257 (Colo. 1983).

¶28 The division's reliance on Tidwell to conclude otherwise was misplaced. In Tidwell, we explained that "a waiver will exist where a plaintiff alleges facts proving a minimal causal connection between the injuries and the specified conduct." 83 P.3d at 86. But we weren't interpreting the definition of "dangerous condition" under section 24-10-103(1.3); instead, we were interpreting the phrase "resulting from" in section 24-10-106(1). Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 86 ("[U]nder subsection (1) of 24-10-106, [the plaintiff] was required to offer evidence proving

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that he suffered from 'injuries resulting from' conduct enumerated by subparts (a) through (f)."). And even if that interpretation were applicable here, it doesn't help Dozier because, before we may consider whether Dozier's injuries "result[ed] from" a "dangerous condition," she must first prove that the spill was a "dangerous condition."

¶29 We also reject Dozier's argument that the district court erred by relying on section 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) and (III)'s reasonable-time-to-act language in considering the "dangerous condition" test's fourth factor. See § 24-10-106(1)(d)(I) (waiving CGIA immunity for injuries resulting from certain "dangerous condition[s]" of public roads and sidewalks); § 24-10-106(1)(d)(III) (waiving CGIA immunity for injuries resulting from certain "dangerous condition[s] caused by an accumulation of snow and ice" on public walkways). As we've explained, the fourth factor incorporates prima facie negligence principles, of which reasonableness is the cornerstone. Further, the "dangerous condition" test explicitly includes consideration of reasonableness. § 24-10-103(1.3) ("[W]hich [condition] is known to exist or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to exist . . . ." (emphasis added)). Accordingly, neither we nor the district court improperly added language from section 24-10-106 to section 24-10-103; rather, we simply applied common-law principles to interpret a common-law term. See Allen v. People, 485 P.2d 886, 887-88 (Colo. 1971) ("[T]he

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common law may be used in aid of the meaning to be given statutory language, when such language is not defined in the statute.").

¶30 Although we resolve this case under the CGIA's plain language, we further note that the division's interpretation could lead to absurd results. If the reasonableness of a public entity's response were irrelevant, a plaintiff could overcome immunity and proceed to trial despite being injured by a condition only seconds after the public entity learned of it. Such a result is not only illogical, it's antithetical to the CGIA's purpose to "protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal burdens" that could arise from "unlimited liability." § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2024).

¶31 Finally, we conclude that the disputed jurisdictional facts are inextricably intertwined with the merits of Dozier's claim. Whether the County's failure to act was a negligent omission is at the heart of the merits. Under Colorado's premises liability statute, Dozier would have to prove that the County didn't exercise reasonable care to prevent her accident to prevail on her underlying claim. § 13-21-115(4)(c)(I), C.R.S. (2024); see also Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 326 (Colo. 2004).

¶32 Accordingly, to establish waiver under the CGIA's dangerous-condition exception, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it was likely that the public entity's negligent act or omission proximately caused the allegedly dangerous condition.

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And, as the district court acknowledged, the reasonableness of the public entity's response is relevant to that inquiry.

¶33 With this framework in mind, we consider whether Dozier proved the existence of a "dangerous condition."

D. Whether the County's Negligent Omission Proximately Caused the Spill

¶34 The district court found that only a few minutes had elapsed between the County learning of the spill and Dozier falling. But instead of relying on this finding, and without determining that the district court's finding was clearly erroneous, the division relied on Dozier's allegations to conclude that she had sufficiently established that the County's negligent maintenance of the courthouse proximately caused her injuries. Dozier, ¶ 18. This was error.

¶35 Because the district court's temporal finding is supported by the record, that finding isn't clearly erroneous. The employee who reported the spill, Kim Knight, testified that she learned of the spill at "about 12:10 [p.m.] or so" and called facilities. She further testified that she received an email from facilities management confirming her request at 12:12 p.m. and that Dozier was sitting on the floor when she went to lunch at 12:15 p.m.

¶36 While Dozier argues that the district court disregarded the "undisputed fact that 'another county employee,'" Debbie Platten, told Knight about the spill, she offered no evidence about when Platten learned of the spill, a fact as to which she

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bore the burden of proof. Knight testified that "[a]s soon as [Platten] walked in the door, she told [Knight] that there was a spill" approximately twenty feet from Knight's office door. Knight said that she didn't know how Platten learned of the spill. Even after drawing all reasonable inferences in Dozier's favor, as the district court must do when the evidence is undisputed, we can't conclude that the court's finding was clearly erroneous without some evidence of when or how Platten learned of the spill.

¶37 Moreover, accepting the district court's factual finding that only a few minutes had passed between the County learning of the spill and Dozier's fall, we agree with the district court's legal conclusion that the County didn't have a reasonable time to warn of or to clean up the spill before Dozier fell. See, e.g., Miller v. Crown Mart, Inc., 425 P.2d 690, 692-93 (Colo. 1967) (concluding as a matter of law that a store owner didn't have a reasonable time to discover and clean up popcorn kernels where they were only on the floor "for something less than five minutes" before the plaintiff fell).

¶38 Therefore, in this case with disputed jurisdictional facts that are inextricably intertwined with the merits, we conclude that Dozier failed to establish that it was likely that the County's failure to warn of or to clean up the spill was a negligent omission that proximately caused the condition. Accordingly, she failed to prove that the County waived immunity.

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III. Conclusion

¶39 We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, and we reinstate the district court's order dismissing Dozier's complaint.

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Notes:

^[1] We granted certiorari to review the following two issues:

1. Whether, for purposes of analyzing whether a waiver of immunity exists based on a "dangerous condition," the reasonableness of a public entity's response to a spill on its floors is a jurisdictional fact that must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.

2. Whether the court of appeals erred in determining that Plaintiff's contested allegations that her injury was proximately caused by the County's failure to maintain a public building sufficiently established that her injuries resulted from a dangerous condition.

^[2] Other federal circuit courts of appeals have concluded that a district court should assume jurisdiction exists and treat "'the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff's case' under either [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 12(b)(6), [a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,] or [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56[,] [a summary judgment motion]," to offer the plaintiff "'a greater level of protection.'" Montez v. Dep't of Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981)); accord Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2009); Augustine v. United States, 704 F.2d 1074, 1077 (9th Cir. 1983); Tippett v. United States, 108 F.3d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1997); Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1990). Although we've rejected this approach, Dennis, ¶ 9, 418 P.3d at 494 (concluding that "C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) is the correct standard of review" to resolve "immunity questions which implicate tort concepts"), we nevertheless find it compelling that these courts share our concerns with requiring the plaintiff to prove jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence when "issues of fact are central both to subject matter jurisdiction and the claim on the merits," Montez, 392 F.3d at 150.

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