Patillo v. State (Majority)

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Justia Opinion Summary

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of two counts of capital murder. Appellant also pled guilty to one count of possessing a controlled substance. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for each of the capital-murder convictions and twenty-five years’ imprisonment on the possession of a controlled substance conviction, with all sentences to run concurrently. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of Appellant’s recross-examination of a witness at trial.

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\l Cite as 2015 Ark. 441 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS N". CR-15-381 ADRIAN PATILLO opinion Delivered December 3,2015 APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT INO. CR-2012- 41,5-1) HONORABLE BERLIN C. JONES, STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE JUDGE AFFIRMED. COURTNEY HUDSON GOODSON, Associate Justice A jury empaneled in the Jefferson Counry Circuit Court convicted appellant Adrian Patillo of two counts of capital murder. Patillo also pled guilty to onc count of possessing a controlled substance. He received sentences of life imprisonnrent without parole for each of the capital-murder convictions and twenty-five years' inrprisonnrcnt on the conviction for possession of a controlled substance, with all sentences running conctrrrently. For reversal, Parillo arglles that the circuit court abused its discretior-r ir.r linriting thc scope of Patillo's recross-examination of a witness at trial. We disagrec and afTirr-n his cor-rvictions and sentenccs. The chargcs against Patillo arose out of an incident that occurred on May 26,2012, \ in Pine Bluf}, Arkansas. The rccord oftrial reflects that on thc day ofthe nturders, Patillo was :rt Marky Dee's, a local car wash and barbequc catering business owned by Marcus Thorns, onc of the victinrs. Marcus's brother, Odail, was also thcre, alongwith Tim Young, Edgar .-r Cite as 2015 Ark. 441 Goshen, Jr., and the second victim, Jennifer-lVainwright. Odail stated that when Patillo arrived at Marky Dee's on the night of the murders, he was high on d-gr and acting strange, and eventually Marcus told him he had to leave. Patillo became upset, and he then went to his uncle's house and took at a left. Patillo gun. While Patillo was gone,Jeremy Parker arrived Marky Dee's. A short time later, Patillo returned to Marky Dee's, went into the bathroom, came out with the gun, and shot Wainwright in the face. After he shot Wainwright, Patillo went to the Marky Dee's food-service truck where Young and Marcus were standing, and he shot Marcus in the chest. Odail, Young, Goshen, and Parker ran from the scene when Patillo began shooting. Odail and Goshen ran to a local deli, and a few minutes later, Patillo also arrived there, holding his leg and claiming he had been shot. The owners of the deli called the police, who arrived and transported Patillo to the hospital. Around the same time, the police also responded to reports of a shooting at Marky Dee's, and upon arriving at the business, rhey found Wainwright and Marcus dead. As part of the investigation of the nrtrrders, the police took a recorded statement fronr Parker. Parkcr also testified during the trial. He stated that he was at Marky Dee's at the tinre of tl-re shootings and witnessed Patillo exit thc bathroonr with a gun in his hand and sl-root Wainwright. Hc further stated that, lollowing the shootings, Odail ran in the direction of a field that was beside the business. On cross-examination, counsel for Patillo highlighted several inconsistcncies berween Parker's recorded statenrent and his testinrony at trial. In his rccorded statenlent, Parker indicated that following the shooting, Odai] had run tor,vard the lake, but ir-r his trial testimony, he said that Oclail had run toward the field. cR-15-381 Cite as 2015 Ark. 441 On redirect examination, the State asked a series ofquestions in which Parker clarified that he believed that the field and the lake were "almost in the same direction." In closing its redirect examination, the State asked, "In your opinion, is your statement consistent with what you said, what you testified to today, and what you said before? Or is it inconsistent?" Parker responded, "Consistent." Finally, the State asked, "In your mind, is there any difference in what you told the police and what you're saying today?" Parked replied, "No, ma'am." On recross-examination, counsel for Patillo began to again address the various inconsistencies berween Parker's recorded statement and his testimony at trial. The State objected, arguing that the questions on redirect had been confined to the issue of whether there was any inconsistency in Parker's statements that Odail ran toward the lake or toward the field, and that this line of questioning did not open up Parker's entire statement for recross-examination. Counsel for Patillo pointed out that the State had asked the broad question ofwhether Parker believed that his statenlent at trial was consistent with his recorded statenlent and had not qualified the question to refer only to the issue of the direction which Odail had run. Thc circuit court sustained the objection, noting that counsel could again address the inconsistencies during his closing statenlent. The jury ultimatcly convicted Parillo of two coltnts of capital murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment withottt parole on each count, and Patillo filcd this appeal. On appeal, Patillo's only argument is that the circuit court abused its discretion in linriting his questions on recross-examination of Parker because the State's qllestions on cR-i5-381 Cite as 2015 Ark. 441 redirect examination regarding the consistency of Parker's statenlent were broad enough to encompass Parker's entire statement. The State responds that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because the scope ofthe proseclltor's questions on redirect were confined to the issue of which direction Odail had run in following the shootings, and because Patillo was able to fully inquire about inconsistencies in Parker's statement on cross-examination. The scope and extent of recross-examination are within the discretion of the trial court. Rotlgers u. State,360 Ark. 24, 199 S.W.3d 625 (2004). This courr has stated that rhe use of cross-examination is an important tool in bringing the facts before the jury and that wide latitude should be afforded by the circuit colrrt. Woodntffu. State,313 Ark.585,856 S.W.2d 299 (1993). That being said, this court has also held that a circuit court nllrst deternrine when the matter has been suflicicntly developed and when the outer linrits of cross-exanrination have been reached, and we will not revcrse absent an abuse of discretion. Ne/sor u. State,257 Ark. 1,513 S.W.2d 496 (1974). Additionally, the circuit courr nray irnposc reasonable linrits on cross-exanrination based on collcerns abotrt harassr-nent, prejudice, waste oltinre, unnecessary duplication of testinrony, confusion of issncs, or interrogation that is rcpetitive or only nrarginally relevant. Edisotr u. Stntc,2015 Ark. 376, -S.\)f.3d -. The crux of Patillo's argunlent on appcal is that thc circuit corlrt crrcd in lir"niting his second inquiry into various inconsistencies between Parker's recorded statenrent and his testinrony at trial. exanrination of Parker, and he Notably, Patillo addresscd nlrn)erolls inconsistencics during his crossdoes not argue that hc sougl-rt to introduce any new inconsistency in recross-examination. In fact, in his reply briefl he inclicates that the exclucled cll-15-381 Cite as 2015 Ark. 441 testimony was "a matter of record by way of direct and cross-examination." In other words, Patillo recognizes that the testimony he sought to elicit on recross was merely a repetition of the testimony Parker had already given on cross-examination. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Patillo to rehash testimony from cross-examination on recross. As noted above, we have held that the circuit court may impose reasonable limits on cross-examination to avoid unnecessary duplication of testimony and where it appears that the matter has been sufficiently developed and clearly presented to the jury. Edison, supra. In this case, Patillo does not argue that he intended to seek new information on recross; rather, he admits that any testimony that rhe circuit court excluded was previously admitted in cross-examination. (Jnder these circunrstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Patillo's recross-examination. In conrpliance with Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i), the record has been examined lor all objections, motions, and requests made by either parry that were decided adversely to appellant, and no prejudicial error has been found. AfTirnred. Robinson & Zakrzewski, P.A., by: Luke Zakrzewski, for appellant. Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: appellee. Karen Virginia Wallace, Ass't Att'y Gen., for cR-15-381

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