Intents, Inc. v. SWEPCO
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Cite as 2011 Ark. 32
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
10-589
Opinion Delivered
INTENTS, INC.
APPELLANT,
VS.
SOUTHWESTERN ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY
APPELLEE,
February 3, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE WASHINGTON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CV-2008-4286-2,
HON. KIM M. SMITH, JUDGE
AFFIRMED.
JIM GUNTER, Associate Justice
Appellant, Intents, Inc., appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee,
Southwestern Electric Power Company (SWEPCO). On appeal, appellant asserts that the
circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because (1) appellant was immune from
liability pursuant to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act; and
(2) appellee did not sustain any property damage or personal injury, therefore it was not
entitled to recover attorney’s fees under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-305 (Repl. 2002). Appellant
also argues that the circuit court erred in awarding attorney’s fees incurred by appellee in
bringing the indemnity action. We affirm on all points.
On November 13, 2008, appellee filed a complaint against appellant in the Washington
County Circuit Court. In the complaint, appellee explained that on October 14, 2004, several
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of appellant’s employees were injured, some fatally, while they were moving a tent at the
Chile Pepper Festival held at the University of Arkansas Agricultural Park. The employees
were moving a fully assembled tent, approximately twenty feet in height, and lifted the tent
into an energized overhead electrical line owned and operated by appellee. Pursuant to Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-5-307 (Repl. 2002), part of the Work Near High Voltage Lines Act,
appellant was required to notify appellee in writing that a function, activity, work, or
operation was to occur within ten feet of its energized overhead electrical line so safety
arrangements could be made. Appellant failed to notify appellee as required. One of the
injured employees filed suit against appellee, attempting to hold it liable for damages, but that
suit was voluntarily dismissed. The estates of two employees that were killed also filed suit for
damages against appellee, but a judgment was entered in appellee’s favor. Appellee asserted
that, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-305, appellant was liable for the attorney’s fees
incurred in defending these lawsuits, which totalled $78,283.76.
Appellant filed an answer on December 8, 2008, asserting that appellee was not entitled
to indemnification and asking that the complaint be dismissed. Appellant also pled a number
of affirmative defenses, including the exclusive-remedy provision of the Arkansas Workers’
Compensation Act. On August 24, 2009, appellant filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting that, under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-105(a) (Repl. 2002), the exclusive remedy
against appellant for the work-related injuries and deaths that occurred was workers’
compensation benefits; therefore, appellee’s claim was barred as a matter of law. Appellee
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responded and argued that appellant was not entitled to summary judgment because the
indemnification action provided for by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-305 was a recognized
exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act.
On October 21, 2009, appellee filed its own motion for summary judgment, arguing that it
was entitled to indemnification pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-305, notwithstanding the
exclusive-remedy provision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act. Appellant
responded and again argued that appellee’s claim was barred as a matter of law.
A hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment was held on February 16, 2010.
After hearing arguments from counsel, the court ruled that the exclusive-remedy provision
did not bar appellee’s action for indemnification. In making its ruling, the court relied on
Smith v. Paragould Light & Water Commission, 303 Ark. 109, 793 S.W.2d 341 (1990), in which
a cause of action for implied indemnity was allowed on the basis of a special relationship
arising by operation of law, specifically the “tapping of sewers” statute. The court held that,
in the present case, there was not an implied indemnity but an indemnity “on its face”
contained in Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-305. The court also held that there had clearly been a
violation of the statute and that the owner in this case had incurred monetary damages in
defending personal-injury claims by the employees. Therefore, the court granted summary
judgment to appellee.
In its March 15, 2010, order, the court found it was undisputed that appellant had
violated Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-307 and -308 by failing to notify appellee of work that
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would occur within ten feet of the energized overhead electric lines; that those violations
caused personal injuries to certain employees; and that appellant paid workers’ compensation
benefits on behalf of those employees. The court found as a matter of law that “the right of
recovery for damages granted to an owner or operator of an electrical line or conductor under
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-305 has priority over the ‘exclusive remedy’ provisions of Ark. Code
Ann. § 11-9-105.” The court held that appellee was entitled to indemnification in the amount
of $78,283.76, attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,448.00, and costs in the amount of
$149.79. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this order on April 14, 2010.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation within the context of a grant of
summary judgment. This court has repeatedly held that summary judgment, although no
longer viewed as a drastic remedy, is to be granted only when it is clear that there are no
genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Monday v. Canal Ins. Co., 348 Ark. 435, 73 S.W.3d 594 (2002). In this case, the
parties filed cross motions for summary judgment and did not dispute the facts. As such, the
case was decided purely as a matter of statutory interpretation.
We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo, as it is for this court to decide
what a statute means. Fewell v. Pickens, 346 Ark. 246, 57 S.W.3d 144 (2001). In this respect,
we are not bound by the trial court’s decision; however, in the absence of a showing that the
trial court erred, its interpretation will be accepted as correct on appeal. Harris v. City of Little
Rock, 344 Ark. 95, 40 S.W.3d 214 (2001). The first rule in considering the meaning and effect
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of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually
accepted meaning in common language. Raley v. Wagner, 346 Ark. 234, 57 S.W.3d 683
(2001). When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort
to rules of statutory construction. Stephens v. Ark. Sch. for the Blind, 341 Ark. 939, 20 S.W.3d
397 (2000). When the meaning is not clear, we look to the language of the statute, the subject
matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, the
legislative history, and other appropriate means that shed light on the subject. Id. The basic
rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Ford v.
Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999).
On appeal, appellant first asserts that the circuit court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of appellee because appellant was immune from liability pursuant to the
exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. Generally, an employer who
has secured for its employees the benefits of workers’ compensation is immune from liability
for damages in a tort action brought by an injured employee, his legal representative,
dependents, and next of kin. Gourley v. Crossett Pub. Schs., 333 Ark. 178, 968 S.W.2d 56
(1998). This rule, known as the exclusivity doctrine, arises from Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-105(a) (Repl. 2002), which provides that
[t]he rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to the provisions of this
chapter, on account of injury or death, shall be exclusive of all other rights and
remedies of the employee, his legal representative, dependents, next of kin, or anyone
else entitled to recover damages from the employer . . . . No role, capacity, or persona
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of any employer . . . other than that existing in the role of employer of the employee
shall be relevant for consideration for purposes of this chapter.
This court has also held that, in matters involving workers’ compensation benefits, the
employer shall be immune from third-party tortfeasor’s claims. W.M. Bashlin Co. v. Smith,
277 Ark. 406, 643 S.W.2d 526 (1983). In addition, in Mosley Machinery Co., Inc. v. Gray
Supply Co., 310 Ark. 214, 219, 833 S.W.2d 772, 775 (1992), we reiterated the general rule
that “when the relation between the parties involves no contract or special relation capable
of carrying with it an implied obligation to indemnify, the basic exclusiveness rule generally
cannot be defeated by dressing the remedy itself in contractual clothes, such as indemnity.”
(quoting Morgan Constr. Co. v. Larkin, 254 Ark. 838, 841, 496 S.W.2d 431, 433 (1973)).
In this case, it was undisputed that appellant violated Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-307 and
-308 by failing to notify appellee that work would occur within ten feet of its energized
overhead electric lines and that those violations proximately caused personal injuries to
appellant’s employees. Appellee’s claim for indemnity was derived from Ark. Code Ann. §
11-5-305(a) (Repl. 2002), which provides:
Every person, firm, corporation, or association who violates any of the provisions of
this subchapter shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than
one thousand dollars ($1,000); and in addition thereof, if the violation results in
physical or electrical contact with any energized overhead electrical line or conductor,
and the violation is a proximate cause of any damage or injury to person or property,
then the person, firm, corporation, or association violating the provisions of this
subchapter shall be liable to the owner or operator of the electrical line or conductor
for all damage to the facilities and for all loss, cost, and damages, including attorney’s
fees, incurred by way of property damage or personal injury by the owner or operator
as a result of any such accidental contact.
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On appeal, appellant argues that, contrary to the circuit court’s decision, this provision does
not override the exclusive-remedy provision of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act.
First, appellant argues that the clear language of § 11-9-105(a) limits the rights of not
just employees but “anyone else entitled to recover damages from the employer.” Appellant
also argues that the provisions of § 11-5-305(a) do not distinguish between those whose
claims or liabilities are covered by workers’ compensation and those whose claims are not, and
that the statute does not expressly override the exclusive-remedy provisions of § 11-9-105(a).
Appellant also cites to what it calls the “dual persona” provision of § 11-9-105(a), which
basically provides that the employer cannot be considered in any role other than the
employer, and asserts that this invalidates appellee’s characterization of appellant as “someone
who had to give SWEPCO notice.”
To support its argument, appellant cites to Bashlin, supra, in which this court held that
the Workers’ Compensation Act took priority over the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act and affirmed a summary judgment granted to an employer when a
manufacturer cross-claimed against that employer in a products-liability suit. This court found
that, although the cross-complaint alleged that the relationship between the employer and the
manufacturer was such that the employer had a duty to indemnify the manufacturer, the
specific allegations in the cross-complaint sounded in tort and were generally the same as those
made by the employee against the manufacturer. We distinguished the case from those where
there was an express indemnity agreement between the employer and the third party.
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Appellant also cites Helms v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co., 281 Ark. 450, 664
S.W.2d 870 (1984), in which this court held that teachers and representatives of teachers’
estates were not entitled to proceeds of a school district’s insurance policy, which provided
in its terms that it did not apply to bodily injury to any employee of the insured. In Helms,
this court reiterated that, “except in certain cases, workers’ compensation is the exclusive
remedy between an employer and an employee. . . . [O]ther statutes must yield to the
Workers’ Compensation Act because it is in the interest of public policy to give that act
priority as an exclusive remedy.” Id. at 453, 664 S.W.2d at 871–72 (citing Bashlin, supra).
Appellant also discusses several cases that have recognized exceptions to the
exclusive-remedy doctrine and insists that none of those exceptions apply in the present case.
For example, in C & L Rural Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Kincaid, 221 Ark. 450, 256 S.W.2d
337 (1953), this court held that an action by a third party against an employer was not
precluded by the exclusive-remedy doctrine, after the third party was found liable to an
employee, due to an express indemnity contract between the third party and the employer.
Also, in Oaklawn Jockey Club, Inc. v. Pickens-Bond Construction Co., 251 Ark. 1100, 477 S.W.2d
477 (1972), this court found that an employer was not immune from liability because there
was an implied provision for indemnity in the contract between the employer and the
contractor. In the present case, appellant asserts, there was no contract between the parties,
so no indemnity provision, express or implied, can be found.
Appellant also attempts to distinguish Smith v. Paragould Light & Water Commission,
supra, which the circuit court relied on in making its decision. As explained previously, in
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Paragould, a cause of action for implied indemnity was allowed on the basis of a special
relationship arising by operation of law, specifically the “tapping of sewers” statute. The
appellant, Paul Smith, a backhoe operator, was hired as an independent contractor to dig a
trench for connecting pipes from a residence to the city’s sewer system. After the trench was
dug, two of the appellee’s employees entered the trench to tap the residential line into the
city’s main sewer line. The trench collapsed, and one employee, Thomas Faulkner, was killed.
The appellee paid workers’ compensation benefits to Faulkner’s widow, and she also filed a
negligence action against several parties, including the appellant. The appellant, in turn, filed
a third-party complaint against appellee seeking indemnity for all damages that might be
adjudged against him. The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint, but this court
reversed. Citing Oaklawn, supra, we explained that an implied provision to indemnify can be
found where a third party was not suing for damages “on account of” the injury of the
employee, but on the basis of an independent duty or obligation owed by the employer to the
third party. We stated:
[The] allegations in appellant’s third party complaint are sufficient to state a cause of
action under our law for implied indemnity as the facts pled are sufficient to bring the
parties within the provisions of Ark. Code Ann. § 14-235-305, the “Tapping of
Sewers” Statute, which creates a special relationship between the appellee and the
appellant by operation of law. This statute provides that a municipality “shall regulate,
by ordinance, the terms, time, and manner, . . . with which the parties may tap the
sewers of the municipality.” (Emphasis added.) By virtue of this statute and the
employer’s policies, the construction necessary to connect Bradley’s sewer to the City’s
main was under the appellee’s supervision and control, just as was the construction
work under the supervision and control of the contractor in Oaklawn, supra. In the
present case, implicit in the terms of the special relationship arising by operation of law
is a duty by the appellee to supervise and conduct the construction in such a way as to
insure the safety of its employees and others working on the construction. That duty
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carries with it the implied promise that the appellee will indemnify third parties such
as appellant for any damages he is made to pay as a result of the appellee’s negligence.
303 Ark. at 113, 793 S.W.2d at 343.
Appellant asserts that there is a clear distinction between Paragould and the present case,
however, because the statute in Paragould required the employer to control and supervise the
manner of the work being done by the third-party contractor. In contrast, appellant, argues,
the Work Near High Voltage Lines Act does not create any such relationship or responsibility
between appellant and appellee. Appellant also argues that Paragould should not be relied upon
because it was decided before the workers’ compensation statute was amended to include the
“dual persona” language in the exclusive-remedy provision.
Finally, appellant cites Elk Corp. of Arkansas v. Builders Transport, Inc., 862 F.2d 663 (8th
Cir. 1988), for the proposition that there are only two situations in which indemnity can arise
by operation of law: (1) when a faultless principal is subjected to liability by reason of the
faulty conduct of his agent, the principal may sue his agent for indemnity; (2) when the
supplier of a product is liable in warranty or strict liability for a defect that existed in the
product at the time it left the manufacturer’s hands, indemnity is permitted against the
manufacturer. Neither of these situations applies to the present case, appellant argues;
therefore, no cause of action against appellant for indemnity arises by operation of law.
In response, appellee devotes a large amount of its argument to a discussion of those
cases cited above that have or have not allowed an exception to the exclusive-remedy
provision of the workers’ compensation statute. Appellee also discusses five other states that
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have resolved a similar statutory conflict between indemnity and exclusivity under workers’
compensation in favor of allowing the indemnity action. However, because the circuit court
made clear that its decision was based on the reasoning in Paragould, supra, we will focus on
appellee’s discussion of that case.
Appellee argues that, similar to the facts of Paragould, the language of the Work Near
High Voltage Lines Act clearly creates a special relationship between appellant and appellee
by operation of law. Specifically, appellee asserts that the claim in this case is “based upon an
indemnity statute that is triggered if an employer such as appellant fails to follow safety
procedures designed to protect those working in the vicinity of energized overhead electrical
lines.” Arkansas Code Annotated sections 11-5-307 and -308 require employers to give notice
to the owner of the energized overhead electrical line if work will be carried out within ten
feet of the electrical line and to prohibit employees from performing work within ten feet of
an energized overhead electrical line unless safety precautions have been taken according to
the statute. It is undisputed that these statutory requirements were not followed by appellant,
which in turn triggered the indemnity provision in § 11-5-305. This interpretation, argues
appellee, effectuates the legislative intent of the Work Near High Voltage Lines Act, which
is to “provide for the protection of persons engaged in work of any nature in the vicinity of
energized overhead electrical lines, . . . to provide penalties, and to provide remedies for those
affected by violations of this subchapter.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-301(b)(1). Appellee
contends that to hold otherwise would remove any incentive for employers to comply with
the safety statutes and render the indemnity statute meaningless.
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We agree that the present case is analogous to Paragould. In both cases, an employer
had a statutorily-created duty, and the employer failed to carry out this duty. As a result,
employees were harmed and a third party incurred damages as a result. Thus, due to the
“special relationship” created by the statutory duty to notify, the third party, appellee, was
entitled to indemnification from the employer, appellant, pursuant to § 11-5-305. To hold
otherwise would, in the words of the circuit court, “eviscerate the statute” and fail to give
effect to the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the Work Near High Voltage Lines
Act. In addition, regarding appellant’s argument that appellee’s claim violated the “dual
persona” provision of the exclusive-remedy provision, we disagree that appellee was
attempting to cast appellant in any role other than the employer. On the contrary, and to use
appellant’s own words, appellant was not just “someone who had to give SWEPCO notice,”
it was an employer who had to give appellee notice but failed to do so. Therefore, we find
that the circuit court’s interpretation of the statute was not in error and affirm.
Appellant also asserts that summary judgment in favor of appellee was in error because
appellee did not sustain any property damage or personal injury and was therefore not entitled
to recover attorney’s fees under § 11-5-305. As explained previously, appellee sought relief
under § 11-5-305(a), which allows for indemnity for “all loss, cost, and damages, including
attorney’s fees, incurred by way of property damage or personal injury by the owner or
operator as a result of any such accidental conduct.” In this case, appellant argues, appellee
sought recovery of attorney’s fees that it paid defending claims asserted by appellant’s
employees, who had suffered injury, but appellee itself did not sustain any property damage
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or personal injury as a result of accidental contact with the electrical line. Because appellee
suffered no such damage, appellant argues, attorney’s fees cannot be recovered under §
11-5-305. Appellant acknowledges that this is but one interpretation of the statute, but
contends that because § 11-5-305 is a penal statute it must be strictly construed in favor of
“those upon who a penalty may be imposed.” Roberts v. Smith Furniture & Appliance Co., 263
Ark. 869, 874, 567 S.W.2d 947, 949 (1978).
In response, appellee argues that to interpret the statute as appellant suggests would
contradict legislative intent and produce an absurd result. Under appellant’s interpretation,
appellee would only be entitled to indemnity if appellee itself, or presumably its employees,
incurred personal damages. But a review of the statutory section in question clearly indicates
that it is designed primarily to prevent personal injury to workers not employed by the power
company. Appellee also disagrees that § 11-5-305 is strictly penal in nature; it argues that the
portion of the statute relied upon by appellee is a right to indemnification and not penal.
Appellee also notes that a penal statute must not be construed so strictly as to reach absurd
consequences that are clearly contrary to legislative intent. Thomas v. State, 315 Ark. 79, 864
S.W.2d 835 (1993).
As noted previously, the purpose of the Work Near High Voltage Lines Act is
to provide for the protection of persons engaged in work of any nature in the vicinity
of energized overhead electric lines, to define the conditions under which work may
be carried on safely, the procedures and means by which these conditions may be
created, to provide penalties, and to provide remedies to those affected by violations
of this subchapter.
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Ark. Code Ann. § 11-5-301(b)(1). We agree with appellee that interpreting the statute as
appellant suggests, and limiting recovery under § 11-5-305 to only those situations in which
the owner of the electrical line sustains property damage and personal injury, would lead to
an absurd result and be contrary to the legislative intent in enacting the statutes. Therefore,
we affirm on this point.
For its final point on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in awarding
attorney’s fees for the present indemnity action because the statute does not provide for an
award of fees in an indemnity claim. The statute only provides for attorney’s fees “incurred
by way of property damage or personal injury by the owner or operator.” This court has
made clear that attorney’s fees are not allowed except when expressly provided for by statute.
Harris v. City of Fort Smith, 366 Ark. 277, 234 S.W.3d 875 (2006). A decision to grant or deny
a motion for attorney’s fees will not be set aside absent an abuse of discretion by the circuit
court. Id.
In response, appellee argues that the statute expressly provides that appellant is liable
for “all loss, cost, and damages, including attorney’s fees, incurred by way of property damage
or personal injury by the owner or operator.” (Emphasis added.) Appellee asserts that “all”
encompasses attorney’s fees for the indemnity action filed because those fees were incurred
in connection with the personal injury action and flowed from the result of the personal injury
action.
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In its ruling, the circuit court stated:
These attorney fees have been incurred by way of the personal injury in that they
brought this suit to get their attorney fees in defending the other suit. So it appears to
me that this is still by way of the personal injury, that’s what created the situation. And
by putting attorney fees in this statute, it is provided for. I think a fair reading is that
they are allowed to get their attorney fees.
We find that this is a valid interpretation of the statute and, therefore, that there was no abuse
of discretion on the part of the circuit court in awarding attorney’s fees.
Affirmed.
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