State v. Weatherspoon
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Cite as 2009 Ark. 459
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
No.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
CR 09-153
Opinion Delivered
APPELLANT,
VS.
STERLING WEATHERSPOON,
APPELLEE,
October 1, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE JEFFERSON
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CR-2006-1088-1-5,
HON. JODI RAINES DENNIS, JUDGE,
APPEAL DISMISSED.
PAUL E. DANIELSON, Associate Justice
The State of Arkansas appeals the order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court
dismissing its multi-count prosecution of appellee Sterling Weatherspoon for lack of a speedy
trial. The State argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Weatherspoon’s April 2006
arrest commenced the running of the time for a speedy-trial determination and in dismissing
the case as a result of that finding. However, we do not reach the merits, as this is not a
proper State appeal.
The relevant facts are these. On April 12, 2006, Weatherspoon was arrested by the
Arkansas State Police for two counts of class-B-felony theft of property and 255 counts of
class-C-felony theft of property. The State was made aware of his arrest on the same day and
requested his release pending further investigation. Weatherspoon was not required to post
bail and was not given a court date. A felony information was filed against him on December
Cite as 2009 Ark. 459
6, 2006, charging him with 362 counts of class-C-felony theft of property, two counts of
class-D-felony possession of a firearm by certain persons, and class-A-misdemeanor possession
of a controlled substance (marijuana). Weatherspoon was served with a bench warrant on
December 7, 2006, and was scheduled to appear for plea and arraignment on January 8, 2007.
Weatherspoon’s attorney filed a waiver of arraignment on January 5, 2007. The jury trial was
scheduled for April 17, 2007.
On April 16, 2007, the State filed a motion for continuance based upon incomplete
lab reports. The motion was granted and time for speedy trial was tolled until the next trial
scheduling. The circuit court judge filed an order of recusal and reassignment on April 27,
2007. The case was then transferred and a new order was filed, setting the jury trial for
October 1, 2007.
On September 25, 2007, the co-defendant in the case filed a motion to continue and
motion for commitment. An order of commitment was issued for the co-defendant on
September 26, 2007. However, a motion for severance had not been filed. On January 14,
2008, the Arkansans Department of Human Services filed an extension request to complete
the mental evaluation being conducted for the co-defendant. Upon notice of completion of
the mental evaluation for the co-defendant, an order resetting the case for trial was filed, and
the jury trial was set for June 12, 2008. Pursuant to Weatherspoon’s motion to dismiss, the
circuit court filed an order dismissing the case for lack of speedy trial on December 10, 2008,
and again, including specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, on January 21, 2009. It
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is from that dismissal that the State now appeals.
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the State may appeal the circuit
court’s ruling. This court has stated many times that the State’s ability to appeal is not a
matter of right but limited to those cases described under Rule 3 of the Arkansas Rules of
Appellate Procedure–Criminal. See State v. Stites, 2009 Ark. 154, ___ S.W.3d ___. We
accept appeals by the State when our holding would be important to the correct and uniform
administration of the criminal law. See id. As a matter of practice, our court has only taken
appeals which are narrow in scope and involve the interpretation of law. See id. When an
appeal does not present an issue of interpretation of the criminal rules with widespread
ramifications, this court has held that such an appeal does not involve the correct and uniform
administration of the law. See id. Appeals are not allowed merely to demonstrate the fact that
the trial court erred. See id. Therefore, where the resolution of the State’s attempted appeal
turns on the facts of the case and would not require interpretation of our criminal rules with
widespread ramifications, acceptance of the State’s appeal is not allowed under Rule 3. See
id. An appeal that raises the issue of application, not interpretation, of a statutory provision
does not involve the correct and uniform administration of justice or the criminal law. See
id.
The State argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the time for speedy trial
commenced from Weatherspoon’s April 2006 arrest because Weatherspoon was not held in
custody or on bail and was released without any requirement that he answer for the same
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offense for which he was arrested. Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 28.2(a) (2006) provides:
The time for trial shall commence running from the date the charge is filed,
except that if prior to that time the defendant has been continuously held in
custody or on bail or lawfully at liberty to answer for the same offense or an
offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode,
then the time for trial shall commence running from the date of arrest.
In its order, the circuit court found that Weatherspoon was not held in custody and
was not required to post bail following his 2006 arrest. Therefore, the State contends that the
circuit court erroneously interpreted the remaining language of Rule 28.2(a) to determine
that Weatherspoon was “lawfully at liberty to answer for the same offense or an offense based
on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode” and that the time for speedy
trial commenced from the date of his April 2006 arrest. The State contends that where a
defendant was not held in custody, did not post bail, and was not released with instructions
to return for a court date, then that defendant was not “lawfully at liberty to answer for the
same offense or an offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal
episode” under Rule 28.2(a). Therefore, the State argues, the time for speedy trial did not
commence until the charges were filed against Weatherspoon in December 2006, and the
circuit court erred in ordering the dismissal.
While the issue presented by the State would require our interpretation of a criminal
rule, it is not an issue that, once resolved, involves the correct and uniform administration of
the criminal law or would have widespread ramifications, because this particular rule was
amended in 2007 to simply instruct, “[t]he time for trial shall commence running from the
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date of arrest or service of summons.” Ark. R. Civ. P. 28.2 (2007). The instant case, which
challenges an interpretation of a prior version of Rule 28.2, is not a case in which a decision
from this court interpreting the 2006 version of the rule would be important to the correct
and uniform administration of the criminal law or would have widespread ramifications.
Therefore, it is not a proper State appeal and we must dismiss it.
Appeal dismissed.
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