Robert Wayne Grady v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT  No.  CR 08­76  Opinion Delivered  ROBERT WAYNE GRADY  Appellant  v.  STATE OF ARKANSAS  Appellee  March 6, 2008  PRO SE MOTIONS FOR  CLARIFICATION AND FOR COPY OF  TRANSCRIPT [CIRCUIT COURT OF  PERRY COUNTY, CR 99­12, HON.  TIMOTHY D. FOX, JUDGE]  APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS  MOOT.  PER CURIAM  In 2001, appellant Robert Wayne Grady was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and  sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.  We affirmed.  Grady v. State, 350 Ark. 160, 85  S.W.3d 531 (2002).  In 2007, appellant filed in the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus  1  pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001.  The trial court treated the petition as one under Ark. R. Crim. P.  37.1 and denied it without a hearing.  Appellant lodged an appeal here from the order.  Now before us are appellant’s pro se motions for clarification of our court’s rules in appeals  and for a copy of the transcript, although it is not clear whether he seeks the transcript from his direct  appeal or the record in this appeal.  As appellant could not be successful on appeal, the appeal is  dismissed  and  the  motions  are  moot.  An  appeal  from  an  order  that  denied  a  petition  for  postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not 1  Act 1780 of 2001, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16­112­  201–16­112­208 (Repl. 2006), provides that a writ of habeas corpus can issue based upon new scientific  evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which he or she was convicted.  prevail.  Johnson v. State, 362 Ark. 453, 208 S.W.3d 783 (2005) (per curiam).  In his petition, appellant argued the following bases for dismissal of his conviction:  (1) civil  rights violation based on prosecutorial conflict  of interest  and bias; (2) temporary insanity  as  an  affirmative  defense;  (3)  ineffective  assistance  of counsel;  (4)  incorrect  criminal charge  and  time  limitations placed on the trial by the trial court.  None of these arguments concerned scientific testing  of physical evidence introduced at trial that would prove appellant’s actual innocence.  Therefore, the  petition was not one predicated upon Act 1780.  The trial court considered the petition to be seeking postconviction relief under Rule 37.1,  which provides a means to collaterally attack a conviction, and is not a means for direct attack on the  judgment or a substitute for an appeal.  Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992)  (per curiam).  To the extent that any of these allegations presented valid claims for a collateral attack  on the judgment, the petition was untimely filed.  Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), if an appeal was taken, a petition under Rule 37.1 must  be filed in the trial court within sixty days of the date the mandate was issued by the appellate court.  Here, the mandate was issued by our court on October 16, 2002, and appellant’s petition was filed  on August 21, 2007, almost five years after the mandate was issued.  Time limitations imposed in  Rule 37.2(c) are jurisdictional in nature, and if they are not met, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to  consider a Rule 37.1 petition.  Maxwell v. State, 298 Ark. 329, 767 S.W.2d 303 (1989).  Appeal dismissed; motions moot. ­2­ 

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