Robert Wayne Grady v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT
No. CR 0876
Opinion Delivered
ROBERT WAYNE GRADY
Appellant
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Appellee
March 6, 2008
PRO SE MOTIONS FOR
CLARIFICATION AND FOR COPY OF
TRANSCRIPT [CIRCUIT COURT OF
PERRY COUNTY, CR 9912, HON.
TIMOTHY D. FOX, JUDGE]
APPEAL DISMISSED; MOTIONS
MOOT.
PER CURIAM
In 2001, appellant Robert Wayne Grady was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and
sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. We affirmed. Grady v. State, 350 Ark. 160, 85
S.W.3d 531 (2002). In 2007, appellant filed in the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus
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pursuant to Act 1780 of 2001. The trial court treated the petition as one under Ark. R. Crim. P.
37.1 and denied it without a hearing. Appellant lodged an appeal here from the order.
Now before us are appellant’s pro se motions for clarification of our court’s rules in appeals
and for a copy of the transcript, although it is not clear whether he seeks the transcript from his direct
appeal or the record in this appeal. As appellant could not be successful on appeal, the appeal is
dismissed and the motions are moot. An appeal from an order that denied a petition for
postconviction relief will not be permitted to go forward where it is clear that the appellant could not
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Act 1780 of 2001, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified as Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16112
201–16112208 (Repl. 2006), provides that a writ of habeas corpus can issue based upon new scientific
evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense or offenses for which he or she was convicted.
prevail. Johnson v. State, 362 Ark. 453, 208 S.W.3d 783 (2005) (per curiam).
In his petition, appellant argued the following bases for dismissal of his conviction: (1) civil
rights violation based on prosecutorial conflict of interest and bias; (2) temporary insanity as an
affirmative defense; (3) ineffective assistance of counsel; (4) incorrect criminal charge and time
limitations placed on the trial by the trial court. None of these arguments concerned scientific testing
of physical evidence introduced at trial that would prove appellant’s actual innocence. Therefore, the
petition was not one predicated upon Act 1780.
The trial court considered the petition to be seeking postconviction relief under Rule 37.1,
which provides a means to collaterally attack a conviction, and is not a means for direct attack on the
judgment or a substitute for an appeal. Wainwright v. State, 307 Ark. 569, 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992)
(per curiam). To the extent that any of these allegations presented valid claims for a collateral attack
on the judgment, the petition was untimely filed.
Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.2(c), if an appeal was taken, a petition under Rule 37.1 must
be filed in the trial court within sixty days of the date the mandate was issued by the appellate court.
Here, the mandate was issued by our court on October 16, 2002, and appellant’s petition was filed
on August 21, 2007, almost five years after the mandate was issued. Time limitations imposed in
Rule 37.2(c) are jurisdictional in nature, and if they are not met, a trial court lacks jurisdiction to
consider a Rule 37.1 petition. Maxwell v. State, 298 Ark. 329, 767 S.W.2d 303 (1989).
Appeal dismissed; motions moot.
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