Charles D. Young v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

No. 05-614

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

CHARLES D. YOUNG

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

Opinion Delivered June 30, 2005

PRO SE MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL [CIRCUIT COURT OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, CV 2004-597-2]

MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION DENIED

PER CURIAM

Charles D. Young is an inmate in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of the county in which he is incarcerated, and the petition was denied by order entered on January 25, 2005. Young filed a notice of appeal on March 16, 2005, which was not within the thirty-day period allowed for filing a notice of appeal under Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 4 (a). When the record was tendered to this court, our clerk correctly declined to lodge it because the notice of appeal was untimely. Now before us are petitioner's motion for belated appeal and amended motion for belated appeal.

A petitioner has the right to appeal a ruling on a petition for postconviction relief, which includes the dismissal of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. See Scott v. State, 281 Ark. 436, 664 S.W.2d 475 (1984) (per curiam). Along with that right goes the responsibility to file a timely notice of appeal within thirty days of the date the order was entered as required by Ark. R. App. P.-Civ. 4 (a). If the petitioner fails to file a timely notice of appeal, a belated appeal will not be allowed absent a showing by the petitioner of good cause for the failure to comply with proper procedure. Garner v. State, 293 Ark. 309, 737 S.W.2d 637 (1987) (per curiam).

Petitioner asserts good cause from his claim that he did not receive notice of the order denying his petition until March, 12, 2005. If the order was not promptly forwarded to him after it was entered, it does not provide petitioner good cause for his failure to follow procedure. There is no absolute duty imposed on a judge or clerk to notify a petitioner that a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been denied.1 Litigants bear the responsibility to stay abreast of orders entered which pertain to legal proceedings. The pro se litigant receives no special consideration in this regard. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989); see also Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988) (per curiam); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986) (per curiam); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983) (per curiam).

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on filing a notice or lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995) (per curiam), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982) (per curiam). This court has specifically held that it is not the responsibility of anyone other than the appellant to perfect an appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990) (per curiam). It was the duty of the petitioner to file a notice of appeal in a timely manner. As he did not do so and has not demonstrated good cause for the failure to do so, the motions are denied.

Motion and amended motion denied.

1 Criminal Procedure Rule 37.3 (d), a provision of our postconviction remedy in criminal cases, does place the burden on the circuit clerk to promptly forward a copy of the order disposing of a petition under the rule to the petitioner. The failure of the clerk to act in accordance with the Rule 37.3(d) has been held to be cause to grant a motion for belated appeal. Chiasson v. State, 304 Ark. 110, 798 S.W.2d 927 (1990) (per curiam); Porter v. State, 287 Ark. 359, 698 S.W.2d 801 (1985) (per curiam).