James Hannah v. Martin Lilly

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

No. 05-462

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

JAMES HANNAH

Petitioner

v.

MARTIN LILLY

Respondent

Opinion Delivered June 9, 2005

PRO SE MOTION TO PROCEED WITH APPEAL [CIRCUIT COURT OF CRAIGHEAD COUNTY, WESTERN DISTRICT, CV 2003-6, HON. DAVID LASER, JUDGE]

MOTION TREATED AS MOTION FOR RULE ON CLERK AND DENIED

PER CURIAM

In 2003, James Hannah filed a pro se complaint against attorney Martin Lilly alleging that Lilly's representation as his defense attorney in a criminal matter amounted to malpractice. On August 26, 2004, an order was entered granting Lilly's motion for summary judgment. Hannah filed a timely notice of appeal from the order on August 31, 2004.

The record was due to be lodged here pursuant to Ark. R. App.-Civil 5(a) within ninety days of the date of the notice of appeal, i.e. no later than November 29, 2004. The record was tendered on April 22, 2005, two-hundred thirty-four days after the notice of appeal was filed.

Petitioner Hannah now seeks leave to lodge the record belatedly and proceed with an appeal of the order. He contends that he should be permitted to lodge the record belatedly because he was proceeding pro se and made every effort to obtain the record but did not know how to do so.

We treat the motion as a motion for rule on clerk under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 2-2(b).

This court has consistently held that all litigants, including those who proceed pro se, must bear responsibility for conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating good cause for not doing so. See Gibson v. State, 298 Ark. 43, 764 S.W.2d 617 (1989); see also Bragg v. State, 297 Ark. 348, 760 S.W.2d 878 (1988) (per curiam); Peterson v. State, 289 Ark. 452, 711 S.W.2d 830 (1986) (per curiam); Walker v. State, 283 Ark. 339, 676 S.W.2d 460 (1984) (per curiam); Thompson v. State, 280 Ark. 163, 655 S.W.2d 424 (1983) (per curiam). The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal. See Gibson, supra. It is entirely the responsibility of the pro se party desiring to appeal to perfect the appeal. See Sullivan v. State, 301 Ark. 352, 784 S.W.2d 155 (1990) (per curiam); Bragg, supra.

The purpose of the rule setting time limitations on lodging a record is to eliminate unnecessary delay in the docketing of appeals. We have made it abundantly clear that we expect compliance with the rule so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Jacobs v. State, 321 Ark. 561, 906 S.W.2d 670 (1995) (per curiam), citing Alexander v. Beaumont, 275 Ark. 357, 629 S.W.2d 300 (1982) (per curiam). It was the duty of petitioner to lodge the record in accordance with the procedural rule. As he did not do so and has not demonstrated good cause for the failure to do so, the motion to proceed with the appeal is denied.

Motion denied.