David Gipson v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

PER CURIAM

NOVEMBER 21, 2002

DAVID GIPSON

Petitioner

v.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

Respondent

CR 02-782

PRO SE MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL OF JUDGMENT AND MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL [CIRCUIT COURT OF CRAWFORD COUNTY, NO. CR 2000-82A, HON. FLOYD ROGERS, JUDGE]

MOTION AND AMENDED MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL DENIED; MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL MOOT

On August 3, 2001, judgment was entered reflecting that David Gipson had entered a negotiated plea of guilty or nolo contendere to the offense of arson in the second degree. Imposition of a sentence of sixty months' imprisonment was suspended. Now before us is Gipson's pro se motion for belated appeal of the judgment. He also asks that counsel be appointed to represent him on appeal.

Petitioner Gipson asserts that the plea was conditioned on his being permitted to appeal from the judgment and on counsel's being appointed to represent him on appeal. Although Gipson contends that an attorney filed a notice of appeal from the judgment, he has presented nothing to substantiate the claim; moreover, Ark. R. App. P.--Crim.1(a) provides that there is no direct appeal from a plea of guilty, except in those instances where the defendant has entered a conditional plea of guilty and reserved in writing the right on appeal from the judgment to review

an adverse determination of a pretrial motion to suppress evidence. See also Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b). Petitioner does not contend, and the record does not reflect, that his plea of guilty was conditional. As a result, there was no right to appeal from the August 3, 2001, judgment, and the motion for belated appeal is baseless. The motion for appointment of counsel is moot.

Motion and amended motion for belated appeal denied; motion for appointment of counsel moot.