Haynes v. Faulkner County

Annotate this Case
Henry HAYNES v. FAULKNER COUNTY, Arkansas;
John Wayne Carter, as County Judge of
Faulkner County; and Faulkner County Museum
Commission

96-388                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered November 11, 1996


1.   Judgment -- summary judgment -- chancellor correctly concluded
     no genuine issue of material fact remained. -- The supreme
     court observed that the gravamen of appellant's complaint was
     not that appellee county, in deciding to create a commission
     to operate a museum in a building that had previously housed
     the county library rather than to reserve the old library
     building for the judiciary's use, had failed to provide for
     the administration of justice but that it has chosen a more
     expensive way of doing it than appellant would have liked;
     although appellee county might have had only three courtrooms
     to house its five judges, the supreme court could not conclude
     that the fact, if proven, would demonstrate a failure to
     provide for the administration of justice; hence, the supreme
     court held that the chancellor correctly concluded that no
     genuine issue of material fact remained and that appellee
     county was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2.   Jurisdiction -- chancellor did not lack jurisdiction -- no
     need to transfer to circuit court. -- Where appellant argued
     that either chancery or circuit court may have jurisdiction of
     an illegal-exaction suit but asked the supreme court to remand
     the case to the chancellor for transfer to circuit court, the
     supreme court declined to do so, noting that the chancellor
     had ruled that appellant's illegal-exaction and breach-of-
     trust claims were without merit and had denied the injunctive
     relief sought; the Chancellor considered the items of proof
     proffered by the parties and entered a summary judgment
     pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 56; the supreme court held that
     the chancellor did not lack jurisdiction of appellant's
     claims, and there was no need to transfer the case to circuit
     court.

3.   Counties -- assignment of old library building to county
     museum commission was not illegal exaction. -- In light of the
     provisions of Ark. Const. amend. 55,  3, and Ark. Code Ann.
      14-14-1102(b)(3)(1987), which provided that the county judge
     was the custodian of county property and was therefore
     authorized to determine how the property should be used, and
     Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-802(b)(2)(C)(v) and 13-5-501--13-5-504
     (Repl. 1995), which authorized appellee county to provide for
     a county museum, the supreme court agreed with the chancellor
     that, as a matter of law, the assignment of the old library
     building to appellee county museum commission was not an
     illegal exaction.  

4.   Counties -- no proof of conflicts of interests displayed by
     county judges -- no breach of trust found. -- Where appellant
     contended that the county judge who signed the building lease
     with the museum commission and his successor who was to
     administer the lease were members of the county historical
     society, which had lobbied for the museum before the quorum
     court, and therefore should have disclosed their membership
     and should have been disqualified from participating in any
     transactions concerning the old library building, the supreme
     court agreed with the chancellor's conclusion that there was
     no proof that the judges had displayed conflicts of interests
     in carrying out the wishes of the quorum court or that a
     breach of trust had occurred.

5.   Counties -- county may enter enforceable contracts. -- A
     county may enter enforceable contracts.

6.   Counties -- county judge has authority to assign use of county
     property -- invalidation of lease upheld. --  Ark. Code Ann.
      14-14-1102(b)(3) gives the county judge the authority to
     "assign or not assign" county property at will and does not
     mention duration of assignment; the supreme court concluded
     that it was the intention of the legislature that the
     authority of a county judge to assign the use of county
     property, at least as that authority pertains to assignment of
     it among county entities, be unfettered by agreements such as
     the one by which the county attempted to lease the old library
     building to the museum commission; the supreme court upheld
     the chancellor's invalidation of appellee county's lease with
     appellee museum commission.


     Appeal from Faulkner Chancery Court; Annabelle Clinton Imber,
Chancellor on Assignment; affirmed on appeal; affirmed on cross-
appeal.
     Callis L. Childs, for appellant.
     Gill Law Firm, by: Glenn E. Kelley, for appellee Faulkner
County Museum Commission.
     Graddy & Adkisson, by: Larry Graddy, and Hartje & Collier, by:
Linda Collier, for appellees.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     This case is about county government.  The dispute arose when
Faulkner County decided to build a new building to house the county
library and to create a commission to operate a museum in the 
building which had previously housed the county library.  The
appellant, Henry Haynes, and other concerned citizens voiced 
objections to the proposed disposition of the old library building. 
They claimed that the courts in Faulkner County badly needed space
and that the County therefore should have reserved the old library
building for the judiciary's use.  In their view, it would have
been more economical for the County to improve the judicial
facilities by renovating the old library building than to renovate
and expand the Courthouse.  The objections were not well taken by
the county authorities, and Mr. Haynes sued the County, the County
Judge, and the County Museum Commission to enjoin them from
implementing their plan.  Except when necessary to distinguish
among them, we will refer to the appellees collectively as "the
County."
     The Chancellor entered summary judgment in favor of the County
with the exception that she invalidated a 99-year lease of the old
library building executed by the County Judge and the Commission. 
Although the Chancellor found that the County and the Commission
could not enter into a formal lease, she found that the County
Judge had the authority to assign the use of the building to the
Commission.
     Mr. Haynes has raised four main points in his appeal, none of
which has merit.  We therefore affirm on the appeal.  As the
Chancellor did not err in invalidating the lease, we affirm on the
County's cross-appeal as well.

                           The appeal
                  1. Administration of justice
     Mr. Haynes contended that the County should have reserved the
old library building for the courts in order to satisfy its
mandatory duty under Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-802(a)(1)(1987) to
provide for the administration of justice.  In support of his
claim, Mr. Haynes cited a letter written by the trial judges of
Faulkner County to the County Judge complaining about their lack of
sufficient space to operate the courts and about the seeming
unwillingness of the County to do anything about it.  With his
pleadings before the Chancellor, Mr. Haynes submitted discovery
responses, including a proposed floor plan, purporting to show that
it would have been better if the County had made two courtrooms out
of the old library building rather than creating only one new
courtroom in the Courthouse.  It was contended that money to be
spent in providing for county officials who would move out of the
Courthouse into a new building to make way for one renovated
courtroom was far in excess of that which would be spent creating
two courtrooms in the old library building.  According to Mr.
Haynes, this created an illegal exaction.  
     The Chancellor agreed that the County was obliged by  14-14-
802(a)(1) to provide for the administration of justice.   She
correctly concluded that providing for the administration of
justice was a "mandatory service" and that providing a museum was
a "discretionary service" the County was authorized to offer.  See
 14-14-802(b)(2)(C)(v).  In granting summary judgment, the
Chancellor observed that Mr. Haynes's claim did not allege that the
County had failed to provide for the administration of justice. 
The Chancellor interpreted the claim as stating "only that Faulkner
County's proposed method of providing for both mandatory and
discretionary services is more expensive than providing for just
mandatory services."  
     Mr. Haynes argues that his complaint did allege that the
County had failed to provide for the administration of justice. 
Looking at the complaint in its various amended forms, and taking
its language as a whole, we must agree with the Chancellor.  The
gravamen of the complaint is not that the County has failed to
provide for the administration of justice but that it has chosen a
more expensive way of doing it than Mr. Haynes would have liked. 
While we are mindful of the fact that the County may have only
three courtrooms to house its five judges, we cannot conclude that
fact, if proven, would demonstrate a failure to provide for the
administration of justice.  With respect to the point discussed
here, we hold the Chancellor correctly concluded that there was no
remaining genuine issue of material fact and that the County was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Short v. Little Rock
Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553 (1988).

               2.  Reviewability and jurisdiction
     Mr. Haynes styles his second argument as follows:  "The
Assignment of the Building by the County Judge to the Commission,
Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-1102(b)(3), is Reviewable in
Either Chancery Court or Circuit Court."  On appeal, Mr. Haynes
contends the Chancellor failed to review his allegations that the
assignment of the building by the 99-year lease was an illegal
exaction and that the County Judge breached a fiduciary duty in
executing the lease.  He then argues that either chancery or
circuit court may have jurisdiction of an illegal-exaction suit,
but he asks that we remand the case to the Chancellor for transfer
to the circuit court.  We decline to do so.
     The order entered by the Chancellor stated it was entered in
response to the County's motion for summary judgment.  Perhaps
inadvertently, the order concluded with a remark to the effect that
the complaint was "dismissed."  We are convinced, however, that the
Chancellor did not refuse to review the illegal-exaction and
breach-of-trust claims.  Rather, she ruled they were without merit
and denied the injunctive relief sought.  The Chancellor considered
the items of proof proffered by the parties and entered a summary
judgment pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 56.  The Chancellor did not
lack jurisdiction of Mr. Haynes's claims, and there was no need to
transfer the case to circuit court.
     Arkansas Const. amend. 55,  3, and Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-
1102(b)(3)(1987), provide that the County Judge is the custodian of
county property and is therefore authorized to determine how the
property shall be used.  Moreover,  14-14-802(b)(2)(C)(v) and 
13-5-501 through 13-5-504 (Repl. 1995) authorize the County to
provide for a county museum.  In light of these provisions, we
agree with the Chancellor that, as a matter of law, the assignment
of the building to the Commission was not an illegal exaction.  

                    3. Conflicts of interests
     Mr. Haynes alleged the County Judge who signed the lease with
the Commission, Judge Ferrell, and his successor who was to
administer the lease, Judge Carter, engaged in a breach of trust. 
Because the judges were both members of the Faulkner County
Historical Society, which had lobbied for the museum before the
Quorum Court, Mr. Haynes contended the judges should have disclosed
their membership and should have been disqualified from
participating in any transactions concerning the old library
building.
     In her order, the Chancellor noted that the Quorum Court had
condoned the assignment of the building to the Commission in an
Ordinance of July 22, 1992.  She also noted that, in accordance
with Ark. Const. amend. 55,  3, the County Judge presides over the
Quorum Court "without a vote but with the power of veto."  She
concluded that there was no proof that the judges had displayed 
conflicts of interests in carrying out the wishes of the Quorum
Court.  She found no breach of trust, and we agree.

                        The cross-appeal
     The County argues on cross-appeal that the Chancellor erred in
invalidating the lease by which the County assigned the old library
building to the Museum Commission.  The Chancellor held the lease
void primarily because she viewed it as an improper attempt on the
part of the County to contract with itself.  As she saw it, the
issue was whether the Museum Commission was an autonomous entity
sufficiently separate from the Quorum Court and the County Judge to
permit the agreement.  After holding in the negative, the
Chancellor observed that the disposition of the old library
building by assignment of it to the Museum Commission, as opposed
to leasing it to the Museum Commission, was appropriate pursuant to
 14-14-1102(b)(3).  We agree with the result she reached.
     A county may enter enforceable contracts.  See Boone County
Abstract & Title Co. v. Boone County, 252 Ark. 255, 478 S.W.2d 429
(1972); Watts & Sanders v. Myatt, 216 Ark. 660, 226 S.W.2d 800
(1950).  The cited cases are, however, ones in which the persons
with whom the counties contracted were not county entities.  This
case is different because the Museum Commission, whether an
autonomous county entity or not, is nonetheless a creation of
Faulkner County, and the property it sought to lease is county
property.  Section 14-14-1102(b)(3) gives the county judge the
authority to "assign or not assign" county property at will.  The
statute does not mention duration of assignment.  We conclude it
was the intention of the General Assembly that the authority of a
county judge to assign the use of county property, at least as that
authority pertains to assignment of it among county entities, be
unfettered by agreements such as the one attempted here.     
     Affirmed on appeal, and affirmed on cross-appeal.
     Glaze, J., concurs.

=================================================================
             Tom Glaze, Associate Justice, concurs.
     I join with the majority opinion regarding its decision on
direct appeal, but concur with the result reached on cross-appeal. 
Summarily stated, I agree that the chancellor was correct in
concluding there is no legal authority to lease county property to
county entities.  Counties are created by the authority of the
legislature, and they derive all their powers from the source of
their creation, except where the Constitution of the state
otherwise provides.  City of Hot Springs v. Gray, 215 Ark. 243, 219 S.W.2d 930 (1949).  Here, the county had no statutory authority to
enter into a contract with the Musuem Commission. 
     The services the county may provide include a museum, and the
county has the power to provide the necessary facilities to support
such a service.  Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-802(b)(2)(C)(v) and -803
(1987).  However, nowhere is there law cited that a county can
enter a 99-year lease contract with a county entity to provide such
county property or facility.  Rather, Ark. Code Ann.  14-14-
1102(3) (1987) sets out the extent of a county's authority in this
respect as follows:
          CUSTODY OF COUNTY PROPERTY.  The county judge, as
     the chief executive officer of the county, shall have
     custody of county property and shall be responsible for
     the administration, care, and keeping of such county
     property, including the right to dispose of county
     property in the manner and procedure provided by law for
     the disposal of county property by the county court.  The
     county judge shall have the right to assign or not assign
     use of such property whether or not the county property
     was purchased with county funds or was acquired through
     donations, gifts, grants, confiscation, or condemnation. 
     (Emphasis added.)
     In sum, the county has the foregoing statutory authority to
assign necessary facilities to county officers or county entities,
but that power is not exhausted when once exercised; instead, the
assignment of county offices or facilities may be changed whenever
public convenience will be promoted by the change.  See Penix v.
Shaddox, 165 Ark. 152, 263 S.W.2d 389 (1924).   

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