Mason v. State

Annette MASON, et al. v. STATE of Arkansas

95-690                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered February 12, 1996


1.   Juveniles -- Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure apply to
     delinquency proceedings. -- The Arkansas Rules of Criminal
     Procedure apply to delinquency proceedings.

2.   Juveniles -- juvenile defendants may not appeal from plea of
     guilty or nolo contendere except for conditional guilty plea -
     - appellants' guilty pleas were not conditional -- supreme
     court precluded from hearing their appeals. -- Under Ark. R.
     Crim. P. 36.1 (1995), juvenile defendants may not appeal from
     a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except as provided by
     Ark. R. Crim. P. 24.3(b), which provides that a defendant may
     enter a guilty plea conditioned on the reversal of a pretrial
     determination of a motion to suppress illegally obtained
     evidence; appellants' guilty pleas were not conditional and
     did not fall within the terms of Rule 24.3(b); consequently,
     the supreme court was precluded by Rule 36.1 from hearing
     their appeal, which was dismissed.


     Appeal from St. Francis Chancery Court; Baird Kinney,
Chancellor; dismissed.
     Heather P. Hogrobrooks, for appellants.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Gil Dudley, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.*ADVREP5*






ANNETTE MASON, ET AL.,
                    APPELLANTS,

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS,
                    APPELLEE.



95-690

Opinion Delivered:  2-12-96

APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY COURT
OF ST. FRANCIS COUNTY,
ARKANSAS, NOS. J-95-26, J-95-
27; HONORABLE BAIRD KINNEY,
CHANCELLOR 

DISMISSED





                  TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice


     The state filed delinquency petitions in juvenile court,
alleging Frederick Mason and Nicholas Mason were each guilty of
burglary and two counts of felony theft of property.  At a hearing,
the court entertained true pleas from both.  Frederick entered a
plea to one count of burglary and two counts of theft, and Nicholas
pled to one count of burglary and one count of theft.  Frederick
and Nicholas were then placed on six months supervised probation,
followed by six months unsupervised probation.  After their
respective pleas and judgments were entered, the Masons retained
new counsel who filed notices of appeal from the court's judgments. 
On appeal, the Masons contend that (1) their pleas were not
intelligent, knowing, or voluntary and (2) their prior counsel was
ineffective.
     We first point out that the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
Procedure apply to delinquency proceedings, Ark. Code Ann.  9-27-
325(f) (Supp. 1995).  Thus, under Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.1 (1995),
juvenile defendants, like the Masons here, may not appeal from a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except as provided by Ark. R.
Crim. P. 24.3(b).  Rule 24.3(b) provides a defendant may enter a
guilty plea conditioned on the reversal of a pretrial determination
of a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence.  Scalco v.
City of Russellville, 318 Ark. 65, 883 S.W.2d 813 (1994).  The
Masons' guilty pleas were not conditional and do not fall within
the terms of Rule 24.3(b).  Consequently, we are precluded by Rule
36.1 from hearing their appeals.  See also Hodge v. State, 320 Ark.
31, 894 S.W.2d 927 (1995).
     Because we have no authority to consider the Masons' appeals,
we also are unable to consider their ineffective assistance of
counsel argument.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.