Bellamy v. Bellamy
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
D IV IS IO N II
No. CA 11-90
Opinion Delivered
DAWNA BELLAMY
APPELLANT
JUNE 15, 2011
APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. DR-10-348]
V.
HONORABLE SANDY HUCKABEE,
JUDGE
ROBERT BELLAMY
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
This is an appeal of a divorce proceeding heard in Lonoke County Circuit Court.
Appellant Dawna Bellamy appeals the trial court’s order contending that the division of assets
and debts is not equitable. She specifically takes issue with the trial court’s decision to permit
appellee Robert Bellamy to retain all of his military retirement benefits. We reverse and
remand.
The standard of review is well settled. We review divorce cases de novo, but we will
not reverse the trial court’s findings of fact on a division of property and allocation of debt
unless the decision is clearly erroneous. Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619
(2006); Cummings v. Cummings, 104 Ark. App. 315, 292 S.W.3d 819 (2009). We give special
deference to the superior position of the trial court to evaluate and judge the credibility of the
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
witnesses. Cummings, supra. A finding is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence
when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Farrell, supra.
Upon divorce, the trial court is required to divide marital property evenly, unless the
trial court determines that an even distribution would be inequitable. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12315(a)(1) (Repl. 2009). If an unequal distribution of marital property is made, the trial court
must state its basis and reasons for not dividing the marital property equally. Id. A trial court
is required to divide the marital estate in a manner that is equitable, but we do not require
mathematical precision in doing so. Coatney v. Coatney, 2010 Ark. App. 262; Boxley v. Boxley,
77 Ark. App. 136, 73 S.W.3d 15 (2002). Allocation of marital debt must be considered in the
context of the distribution of all the parties’ property. Hackett v. Hackett, 278 Ark. 82, 643
S.W.2d 560 (1982). We will not substitute our opinion as to what exact interest each party
should have; we will decide only if the order is clearly wrong. Pinkston v. Pinkston, 278 Ark.
233, 644 S.W.2d 930 (1983). Notably, permanent disability benefits are excluded from the
definition of marital property. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(6); Skelton v. Skelton, 339 Ark.
227, 5 S.W.3d 2 (1999). Typically, each spouse is entitled to one-half of the value of the
other’s retirement benefits, proportionate to the number of years those benefits accrued while
married. Cherry v. Cherry, 55 Ark. App. 178, 934 S.W.2d 936 (1996).
The parties married in 1990 and divorced in 2010. During their marriage, the parties
had two sons and one daughter. By the time of divorce, the eldest son was an adult. The trial
2
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
court granted Robert the divorce, gave him custody of their minor son, and gave Dawna
custody of their minor daughter. Neither party was assessed a child-support duty because of
the divided custody. Dawna, age 39, was gainfully employed; Robert, age 42, was a retired,
disabled military veteran. Relevant to this appeal, the trial court divided the assets and debts
as follows.
Robert was awarded possession and ownership of the marital residence, a mobile home
on 5.5 acres in Austin, Arkansas, and he was ordered to be responsible for any and all
indebtedness and expense related to it. Dawna had moved out, taking the vast majority of the
contents when she did. Robert remained and paid all expenses related to the property. Robert
testified that the remaining mortgage indebtedness was approximately $110,000, but he
believed the total value to be only $85,000, resulting in a negative $25,000 value. Dawna had
“no clue what that property is worth.”
Robert retained possession and ownership of a 2005 Chrysler minivan and the
indebtedness related to it of several thousand dollars. Dawna retained possession and
ownership of a 1998 Chevrolet Z71 truck, but Robert was ordered to be responsible for the
remaining $3500 indebtedness owed to the credit union on it.
The parties had owned a timeshare, but they both believed it had been lost in
foreclosure. The judge ruled that if any indebtedness eventually came to light, it would be
Robert’s responsibility. The parties had already divided their bank accounts. Robert retained
a Dell computer, for which he was responsible for the remaining indebtedness. Robert was
3
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
to be responsible for a Military Star credit card that he used to buy a washer and dryer after
Dawna took the appliances from their mobile home. Dawna was ordered to be responsible
for the $600 to $800 indebtedness she incurred by purchasing additional furnishings for her
apartment. She was also ordered to be responsible for her Visa credit card, on which she
charged vacation travel expenses. Robert was ordered to be responsible for the Home Depot
credit card used to buy a lawnmower and shed on the marital property, a jointly-held Chase
credit card with an approximate balance of $6985 in marital debt, and a Care Credit card used
to pay for medical services for their son that had approximately $1000 owed on it. Robert was
also ordered to maintain medical insurance on both minor children, which he could provide
through the military.
The trial court ordered that Dawna would retain her entire 401K account, then valued
at approximately $14,000; she was not yet retired and had worked for six years at Suddenlink.
She testified she brought home an approximate weekly income of $700 to $800 depending
upon the availability of hours (approximately $3000 per month).
Robert was permitted to retain his non-marital disability benefits of approximately
$1470 per month (due to PTSD) and his full military retirement benefits of approximately
$1470. He retired in 2008 after 22 years of service, 18 of which he was married. Robert also
received $900 per month from the government to cover college education expenses related
to vocational rehabilitation. This totals approximately $3840 per month of income for Robert.
Robert testified, and Dawna agreed, that she had not made her truck payments, so Robert
4
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
paid them to avoid their bank account being “frozen.” He testified that after paying all the
monthly debts and expenses for Dawna and himself, he was left with about $100 per month.
In rendering findings from the bench, the trial judge acknowledged that allowing
Robert to keep his entire military retirement benefits would result in an unequal distribution
of marital assets. But the judge found that Robert would be assessed the bulk of the marital
debt—Dawna’s truck indebtedness, the marital Chase credit card, the home indebtedness, and
the Care credit card used for their son.
In review of this distribution, and ignoring those marital debts for which Robert
received a potential correlating asset, Robert was assessed a negative value of $25,000 on the
marital real property, the entire $6985 in Chase credit card marital debt, $1000 owed for their
son’s medical care, and $3500 on Dawna’s truck. This gave Robert an overall marital debt
burden of approximately $36,485, which necessitated enough income to service it. Robert
was also due half of Dawna’s 401K retirement, which he did not receive and about which he
does not complain. Dawna had few debts to pay, which she incurred for additional furnishings
and travel, and a steady income of approximately $3000 per month.
Dawna argues that the trial court clearly erred in failing to award her half of the marital
portion of Robert’s $1470 in monthly military retirement benefit. She acknowledges that her
marital share of retirement would be calculated upon 18 of the 22 years Robert was in the
military, so approximately $600 per month or $7200 per year to her. This, she says, is a
tremendous overall loss to her, even after Robert pays off the disproportionate portion of
5
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
marital debts. She asserts that her situation is comparable to that of the appellant in BroggiDunn v. Dunn, 2011 Ark. App. 56. While we acknowledge that each case is to be tried, and
reviewed on appeal, on its own facts, we are convinced that Broggi-Dunn compels reversal and
remand for reconsideration.
The trial judge is vested with a measure of flexibility in apportioning the total assets
held in the marital estate upon divorce, and the critical inquiry is how the total assets are
divided. See Canady v. Canady, 290 Ark. 551, 721 S.W.2d 650 (1986). The trial judge is thus
given broad powers under the statute to distribute all property in divorce cases, marital and
nonmarital, in order to achieve an equitable distribution. Smith v. Smith, 32 Ark. App. 175,
798 S.W.2d 442 (1990). Where a trial court fails to compare the amount of debt from which
the non-receiving spouse was relieved to the amount and duration of retirement benefits of
which she was deprived, this compels reversal and remand. See Broggi-Dunn, supra.
In that appeal, Ms. Broggi-Dunn appealed portions of the Lonoke County Circuit
Court’s division of marital assets, one being military retirement benefits allowed to be retained
fully by Mr. Dunn. Although the circuit court reasoned that it was assessing Mr. Dunn
responsibility for $20,000 more in marital debt than Ms. Broggi-Dunn to justify allowing him
to keep his full retirement, we found that to be inequitable. We reasoned that Ms. BroggiDunn’s portion of the military retirement would pay off the disproportionate debt in a few
years or less, the parties were in their forties and relatively young, and Mr. Dunn would
receive a windfall by continuing to retain the full monthly pension for the remainder of their
lives.
6
Cite as 2011 Ark. App. 433
In this particular case, Robert was ordered to pay the vast majority of marital debts,
approximately $36,485 when counting the loss in value on the marital residence. Dawna’s
portion of the military retirement would pay off the outstanding indebtedness she was spared
within a few years. After a certain point, the extra marital debt assigned to Robert would be
paid off, but his continued receipt of the entire monthly benefit would result in a substantial
windfall to him, considering the parties’ relatively young ages. See Broggi-Dunn, supra. While
not as patently unfair as the situation in Broggi-Dunn, it is unfair nonetheless.
We remand to the circuit court to determine an equitable division of the marital
portion of the monthly military pension, in light of the specific facts and circumstances of this
case. See Broggi-Dunn, supra. The circuit court has discretion to make other adjustments to the
division of all the marital property and debt responsibility that it deems necessary as a
consequence of our holding. Id.
Reversed and remanded.
M ARTIN and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
7
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.