Moore v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 771
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CACR10-359
No.
Opinion Delivered
November 17, 2010
JOE K. MOORE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE MILLER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2009-276-2]
V.
HONORABLE KELVIN WYRICK,
JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
A jury found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery and sentenced him to fifty years’
imprisonment. He argues on appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress a
custodial statement made by him after his arrest for public intoxication at the scene of the
robbery. We affirm.
A statement made while an accused is in custody is presumptively involuntary, and the
burden is on the State to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a custodial statement
was given voluntarily and was knowingly and intelligently made. Jones v. State, 344 Ark. 682,
42 S.W.3d 536 (2001). In order to determine whether a waiver of Miranda rights is voluntary,
this court looks to see if the confession was the product of free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Id. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on the
voluntariness of a confession, we make an independent determination based upon the totality
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 771
of the circumstances, reviewing the trial court’s findings of fact for clear error, the ultimate
question of whether the confession was voluntary being subject to an independent, de novo
determination by this court. Clark v. State, 374 Ark. 292, 287 S.W.3d 567 (2008). The
standard of review for the particular issue to be decided in this case has been stated as follows:
When an appellant claims that his confession was rendered involuntary
because of his drug or alcohol consumption, the level of his comprehension is
a factual matter to be resolved by the trial court. While this court will make
a closer examination of the appellant’s mental state, we still leave the factual
question to the trial court on whether the accused had sufficient capacity to
waive his rights. The test of voluntariness of one who claims intoxication at
the time of waiving his rights and making a statement, is whether the individual
was of sufficient mental capacity to know what he was saying—capable of
realizing the meaning of his statement—and that he was not suffering from any
hallucinations or delusions. We have also stated that it is significant in making
a finding of voluntariness that the accused answered questions without
indications of physical or mental disabilities, that the accused remembered a
number of other details about the interrogation even though he could not
remember waiving his rights, and that a statement was given in a short period
of time after his rights had been read to him.
Jones v. State, 344 Ark. 682, 688–89, 42 S.W.3d 536, 541 (2001) (internal citations omitted).
Our independent review of the record reveals that Officer Les Moody, an eighteenyear veteran of the Texarkana Police Department, responded to the scene of a robbery at
Max’s Arcade on April 2, 2009. After Officer Moody left the arcade, other officers on the
scene took appellant into custody for public intoxication. Appellant was later that day
brought to the criminal investigation division. No interview was attempted at that time
because appellant was intoxicated. Approximately twenty-four hours later, Officer Moody
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 771
interviewed appellant.
Officer Moody read appellant his Miranda rights paragraph-by-
paragraph from a written form. Appellant orally confirmed that he understood each paragraph
and initialed each paragraph on the form. On the face of the document, appellant denied that
he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs and stated that he had a ninth-grade education.
Officer Moody testified that appellant did not appear to be intoxicated or impaired, that he
did not appear to be confused, and that he did not ask for any further explanation concerning
his rights. Appellant evinced no confusion and appeared to understand when he was advised
of his right to request an attorney, he signed his name in the section of the form indicating
that he waived his right to have an attorney present, and he thereafter gave an incriminating
statement. Only Officer Moody and appellant were present in the interview room during this
procedure; Officer Moody was unarmed and made no threats or promises to appellant. On
cross-examination, Officer Moody acknowledged that appellant gave him an incorrect date
of birth during the interview.
Appellant argues on appeal that the fact that he gave an incorrect date of birth during
the interview proves that he was unable, because of lack of education or possible intoxication,
to understand the waiver of rights that he executed before making that statement. We do not
agree. It is possible, as the State suggests, that appellant was simply lying about his date of
birth in an attempt to conceal his prior criminal history, including convictions for aggravated
robbery and theft of property. Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances, we
hold that the
trial court did not clearly err in finding that appellant knowingly and
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intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
Affirmed.
G LADWIN and K INARD, JJ., agree.
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