Young v. Kajkenova
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 783
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CA10-172
No.
LAWRENCE YOUNG, AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF VIRGINIA CASTLEBERRY,
DECEASED
APPELLANT
V.
OUMITANA KAJKENOVA, M.D.
APPELLEE
Opinion Delivered
November 17, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
THIRD DIVISION
[NO. CV2008-12574]
HONORABLE JAMES MOODY, JR.,
JUDGE
REVERSED & REMANDED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
Lawrence Young, as personal representative of the estate of Virginia Castleberry,
deceased, initially filed this medical malpractice suit in 2006. On the eve of trial, he
voluntarily nonsuited the case, but later refiled it in November 2008. Dr. Oumitana
Kajkenova answered the complaint, and the circuit court entered a scheduling order, setting
the case for a jury trial on October 27, 2009, with all discovery due thirty days earlier. Dr.
Kajkenova propounded her set of interrogatories and requests for production on Young in
January 2009. By June 2, 2009, Dr. Kajkenova had not received any responses to the
interrogatories and requests for production and her attorney sent Young’s attorney a letter
requesting that Young respond. In the letter, Dr. Kajkenova’s attorney also informed Young’s
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 783
attorney that she wanted to schedule the deposition of any experts Young expected to testify
at trial.
Young’s attorney responded to the letter on June 18, 2009, stating that the responses
were nearly complete and would be delivered in the next few days. Young, however, failed
to deliver on this promise, prompting Dr. Kajkenova’s attorney to send Young’s attorney a
second letter on July 20, 2009. In the letter, Dr. Kajkenova’s attorney warned that she would
seek court intervention if the responses were not received by July 27, 2009. She also
reiterated that she wanted to depose any expert Young planned on calling at trial, including
Dr. James Sexson, whom she had earlier deposed before Young nonsuited the first case. Still,
Young did not respond or schedule any depositions.
Dr. Kajkenova’s attorney filed a motion to compel on August 10, 2009, to which
Young never responded. The court entered an order granting the motion on September 4,
2009. Pursuant to the order, Young had until September 10, 2009 to respond to the
interrogatories and requests for production and had to produce any and all witnesses listed in
discovery for deposition by September 25, 2009. The order closed with a warning: “Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant are subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the deadlines
ordered and adjudged herein.”
According to Dr. Sexson’s affidavit, Young’s counsel contacted his office on
September 9, 2009, wanting to schedule his deposition for September 21, 22, or 23, 2009.
Due to Dr. Sexson’s full schedule, however, the earliest date that he was available for the
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 783
deposition was October 5, 2009. Young was therefore unable to produce Dr. Sexson by the
deposition deadline, and Dr. Kajkenova then moved for sanctions against Young. After a
hearing on the sanctions motion, the court granted the motion and prohibited Dr. Sexson
from testifying at trial. Because Dr. Sexson was Young’s only medical expert, Young
acknowledged that he could not prove his case, and the court ultimately dismissed the lawsuit
with prejudice.
Young then filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order granting Dr.
Kajkenova’s sanctions motion. At the hearing on the motion, Young’s counsel argued, in
part, that the court’s decision was highly prejudicial to Young and that there were other less
severe options available. In response, the following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT:
Well . . . I will tell you that striking the witness
for failure to produce him before trial is an action
that I have consistently taken in every case.
[YOUNG’S LAWYER]: I understand.
THE COURT:
And rarely do I do that without somebody having
a heads up that they should produce him or that
they didn’t have a fair opportunity. And in this
situation, we have an order to compel, a
scheduling order. And the best reason I’ve got is,
all our lawyers weren’t on the same page and so
we didn’t do it.
And so while [Young’s counsel] wants to
characterize this as a dismissal of his case, that may
be the result of it. But I am merely following my
general rule of thumb with regard to experts and
witnesses who have not been produced to the
other side in a timely manner.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 783
The court denied Young’s motion for reconsideration. On appeal, Young argues 1) that the
court misapplied Arkansas Rule of Civil Procedure 37 by adhering to its “general rule of
thumb” without weighing and balancing the facts, circumstances, and equities of the case; and
2) that the sanction, in any event, was too severe.
Analysis
If a party fails to comply with an order compelling discovery, the court “may make
such orders in regard to the failure as are just” and may enter, among other options, “[a]n
order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or
defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence.” Ark. R. Civ.
P. 37(b)(2)(B). “The imposition of sanctions, including dismissal, for failure to provide
discovery rests in the trial court’s discretion; this court has repeatedly upheld the trial court’s
exercise of such discretion in fashioning severe sanctions for flagrant discovery violations.”
Southern College of Naturopathy v. State ex rel. Beebe, 360 Ark. 543, 558, 203 S.W.3d 111, 120
(2005). But “[w]hen a decision is within the discretion of the trial court, the trial court abuses
that discretion by failing to exercise it.” Lawrence v. Crafton, 2010 Ark. App. 231, at 13, ___
S.W.3d ___, ___. However, “[t]here is no requirement under Rule 37, or any of our rules
of civil procedure, that the trial court make a finding of willful or deliberate disregard under
the circumstances before sanctions may be imposed for the failure to comply with the
discovery requirements.” Calandro v. Parkerson, 333 Ark. 603, 608, 970 S.W.2d 796, 799
(1998).
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 783
In its order granting Dr. Kajkenova’s motion for sanctions, the court found that Young
had “failed to present [it] with good cause as to why Dr. Sexson was not produced on or
before September 25, 2009.” This finding seems to indicate that the court was exercising its
discretion and was weighing the facts and circumstances in making its decision. But the
court’s comments at the hearing on Young’s motion to reconsider show otherwise. As quoted
above, the court stated that striking a witness in these circumstances “is an action that [it has]
consistently taken in every case.” It went on to note that it was following its “general rule of
thumb.” These comments indicate that the court’s decision to strike Dr. Sexson was not the
product of careful consideration and discretion exercised, but was instead a mechanical
application of its “general rule of thumb.” By failing to exercise its discretion in granting Dr.
Kajkenova’s sanctions motion, the court abused its discretion. Lawrence, 2010 Ark. App. 231,
at 13, ___ S.W.3d at ___. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Id. Because of our decision on this first point, we do not reach Young’s
second point on appeal—that the sanction was too severe.
Reversed and remanded.
ROBBINS and KINARD, JJ., agree.
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