Hart v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 762
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
CA10-733
No.
STACY HART
Opinion Delivered
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES and MINOR
CHILD
APPELLEES
November 10, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
WESTERN DISTRICT
[NO. JV-08-376]
HONORABLE CINDY THYER,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED
RAYMOND R. ABRAMSON, Judge
The circuit court terminated Stacy Hart’s parental rights to her child, M.T. Hart’s
attorney has filed a no-merit brief and a motion to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Rule 69(i) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals and Linker-Flores v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004). The brief
discusses each adverse ruling and explains why there is no meritorious basis for an appeal.
Despite being given the opportunity to do so, Hart has filed no pro se points for reversal.
The Termination Decision
In terminating Hart’s parental rights, the court found termination to be in M.T.’s best
interest. The court specifically found that M.T. is likely to be adopted and that returning
M.T. to Hart’s care presented a potentially harmful situation due to the lack of bonding
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 762
between Hart and M.T. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A) (Repl. 2009). The court also
found several statutory grounds supporting termination, though only one is required. Dowdy
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 180, at 14, 314 S.W.3d 722, 729. One ground
was that M.T. had been adjudicated dependent-neglected and had been out of Hart’s care for
more than a year, and despite DHS’s meaningful efforts to rehabilitate Hart and to correct the
conditions that caused M.T.’s removal, Hart had not remedied those conditions. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a).
On the best-interest question, Valorie McDuff, the caseworker, testified that M.T. is
likely to be adopted—M.T.’s foster parents had been approved for adoption and were very
interested in adopting M.T. McDuff further opined that M.T. was at a good age for adoption
and had no handicaps that would prevent him from being adopted. On the potential-harm
issue, Dr. David Blaske, a psychologist, testified that M.T. would cling to the DHS worker
and was very hesitant to approach Hart during their sessions. Dr. Blaske said he tried to help
Hart reconnect with M.T., but there was no improvement. When asked by the court
whether any psychological harm could result if M.T. was returned to Hart, Dr. Blaske stated
that the most significant issue was the lack of bonding. The court pressed further, asking
“[a]nd would that cause emotional harm to a child to be in an environment on a regular basis
where the child was [not] receiving the kind of love and affection that you would expect
between mother and child?” Dr. Blaske responded, “[u]nfortunately, that’s an extremely
significant predictor for long-term problems.”
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 762
As to the statutory ground, M.T. was removed from Hart’s care in late November
2008 and was adjudicated dependent-neglected pursuant to a February 2009 order. By the
time of the February 2010 termination hearing, M.T. had been out of Hart’s care for more
than a year. McDuff testified about DHS’s efforts to rehabilitate Hart. Despite these efforts,
however, Hart had only partially complied with her case plan and had not corrected the
conditions that caused M.T. to be removed from her care. McDuff testified that Hart did not
actively participate in counseling. And Dr. Blaske testified that Hart had cancelled
appointments or just failed to show up several times, ultimately leading him to discontinue
their visits. McDuff also said that Hart, despite being taken off all medication by her
psychiatrist so that he could better determine what medications Hart needed to bring her into
stabilization, went to her primary care physician and obtained more prescription medication.
Though Hart was supposed to maintain stable employment and housing, McDuff said that
Hart had been evicted from her home and was fired from her job after only two weeks of
work. McDuff also testified that Hart had failed to keep DHS informed of her current address
and to stay in contact with her caseworker.
In short, DHS proved its case by clear and convincing evidence. Rodgers v. Ark. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 452, at 5–6, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___. We are not left, after
looking at all the evidence, with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id. In other words, the circuit court’s best-interest and statutory-ground findings are not
clearly erroneous. Id.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 762
Other Adverse Rulings
Motion for a Continuance. At the start of the February 23, 2010 termination
hearing, Hart’s attorney informed the court that Hart was not present and asked for a
continuance. The court had an extensive conversation with the attorneys on this issue. Hart’s
attorney said that he told Hart about the February 23 hearing, that she was “fully aware” of
the termination hearing, and that she had called him two weeks earlier requesting a
continuance. Hart’s attorney also said that Hart had recently moved to Corning and that she
claimed that she could not get transportation to the hearing. There was also some discussion
about Hart’s mother’s recent passing, though it had apparently been several weeks since that
event. DHS’s attorney pointed out Hart’s failure to attend a previously scheduled termination
hearing in early January 2010. The court had continued that hearing and rescheduled the
termination hearing for February 23. The court noted that Dr. Blaske was already present and
had been sitting in court for several hours waiting for the termination hearing to begin.
Taking all of these facts into consideration, the court denied Hart’s motion for a continuance.
We see no abuse of discretion here. Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 93 Ark. App. 395,
401, 219 S.W.3d 705, 708 (2005).
Evidentiary Objection. During Hart’s attorney’s cross-examination of McDuff, the
following colloquy occurred:
Q.
Okay. Ms. Hart has had a difficult time keeping a job, maintaining
stable housing throughout this whole case; is that correct?
A.
Yes.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 762
Q.
Do you think part of that is based upon her mental status?
A.
I believe that has a big—
The attorney ad litem objected, arguing that the question called for speculation. Hart’s
attorney neither laid any foundation nor presented any argument, the court sustained the
objection, and Hart’s attorney moved on. We see no abuse of discretion here either. Tadlock
v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2009 Ark. App. 821, at 6, ___ S.W.3d ___, ___.
Conclusion
In sum, Hart’s appeal counsel’s brief complies with all the requirements of Rule 6-9(i).
And we agree with counsel’s conclusion—there are no issues of arguable merit for appeal. We
therefore affirm the court’s termination decision and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw as
counsel.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
HENRY and BROWN, JJ., agree.
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