Simpkins v. State
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 723
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CACR10-374
No.
Opinion Delivered
November 3, 2010
DAN SIMPKINS, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIFTH
DIVISION [NO. CR-2008-4167]
V.
HONORABLE WILLARD
PROCTOR, JR., JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
Dan Simpkins, Jr., appeals from his conviction at a jury trial of first-degree murder, for
which he was sentenced to a term of thirty years in the Arkansas Department of Correction.
He argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal
because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he purposely caused the victim’s
death. We find no error and affirm.
A motion for a directed verdict is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Slade
v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 405. When sufficiency is challenged on appeal from a criminal
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, considering only
the evidence that tends to support the verdict. Lawshea v. State, 2009 Ark. 600, ___ S.W.3d
___. We will affirm if the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence, direct or
circumstantial. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force to compel a
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 723
conclusion one way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. The weight of the
evidence and credibility of the witnesses are matters for the fact-finder, not for the trial court
on a directed-verdict motion or this court on appeal. Ridling v. State, 360 Ark. 424, 203
S.W.3d 63 (2005); Williams v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996). The fact-finder
is free to believe all or part of a witness’s testimony and may resolve all questions of conflicting
testimony and inconsistent evidence. Lawshea v. State, supra.
A person commits murder in the first-degree if, with a purpose of causing the death
of another person, he causes the death of another person. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-102(a)(2)
(Repl. 2006). A person acts “purposely” with respect to his conduct or a result thereof when
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. Ark.
Code Ann. § 5-2-202(1) (Repl. 2006). A criminal defendant’s intent or state of mind is
seldom capable of proof by direct evidence and must usually be inferred from the
circumstances of the crime. Davis v. State, 2009 Ark. 478, ___ S.W.3d ___. Such
circumstances can include the type of weapon used, the manner of its use, and the nature,
extent, and location of the wounds inflicted. Copeland v. State, 343 Ark. 327, 37 S.W.3d 567
(2001); Fudge v. State, 341 Ark. 759, 20 S.W.3d 315 (2000). Conduct of the accused
following the crime, such as flight or concealment or destruction of evidence, is also relevant
and properly considered as evidence of consciousness of guilt. Crawford v. State, 309 Ark. 54,
827 S.W.2d 134 (1992). Moreover, because of the difficulty in ascertaining a defendant’s
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 723
intent or state of mind, a presumption exists that a person intends the natural and probable
consequences of his acts. Davis v. State, supra.
Here, a neighbor witnessed appellant stab appellant’s estranged girlfriend and then
chase her down the street and stab her again. Appellant admitted at trial that he and the victim
had been arguing and that he stabbed her several times with a six-inch-long knife that he
pulled from his pocket. The victim died as the result of multiple stab wounds to the chest and
back, one of which penetrated two chambers of her heart and another of which punctured
a lung. After the crime, appellant left the scene and went to a vacant lot near a wooded area.
There, he admittedly buried the knife in the ground and covered the spot with leaves. The
arresting police officer testified that he found appellant shortly after the stabbing near the edge
of a tree line “lying in the brush . . . trying to pull bushes and stuff over his head.”
Appellant contends that the State failed to prove that he purposely killed the victim
because he testified that he did not intend to hurt her and, he argues, his testimony was
uncontradicted. We cannot agree. The jury clearly was not required to believe appellant’s
statement of intent. We conclude that the proof that appellant stabbed the victim multiple
times in the chest and back with a long knife and that he then fled and concealed the weapon
is more than adequate evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that he intended
to cause the victim’s death.
Affirmed.
G LADWIN and K INARD, JJ., agree.
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