Hughes v. ADHS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 526
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA10-173
KIMBRA HUGHES
Opinion Delivered JUNE 23, 2010
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES and MINOR
CHILDREN
APPELLEES
APPEAL FROM THE POINSETT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[JV-08-112]
HONORABLE RALPH WILSON, JR.,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED
RITA W. GRUBER, Judge
This is an appeal from an order terminating appellant’s parental rights to her children
J.H., born November 29, 2006, and A.M., born March 10, 2008.1 Appellant’s counsel has
filed a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359
Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), asserting that
there are no issues that would support a meritorious appeal and requesting to be relieved as
counsel. The clerk of this court mailed a certified copy of counsel’s motion and brief to
appellant’s last known address informing her of her right to file pro se points for reversal. She
has not done so. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the order terminating
The court’s order also terminated the parental rights of legal/putative father Joseph
Hueitt, legal/putative father Edward Moore, and all other putative fathers of the children.
Neither Mr. Hueitt nor Mr. Moore attended the termination hearing or filed an appeal.
1
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 526
appellant’s parental rights.
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural
rights of parents, but parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of
the health and well-being of the child. Meriweather v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 98
Ark. App. 328, 331, 255 S.W.3d 505, 507 (2007). Grounds for termination of parental rights
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is that
degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction as to the allegation
sought to be established. Id. When the burden of proving a disputed fact is by clear and
convincing evidence, the appellate inquiry is whether the trial court’s finding that the
disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Id. A finding
is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Id.
We first address the issue presented in the no-merit brief regarding whether there is
clear and convincing evidence to support the circuit court’s decision to terminate appellant’s
parental rights. See Linker-Flores v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.(II), 364 Ark. 224, 217 S.W.3d
107 (2005). The trial court in this case determined that it was in the children’s best interest
to terminate appellant’s parental rights and found that DHS had proven four grounds for
termination: Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i), (ii)(a), (iv), and (ix)(a)(3)(B)(I) (Repl.
2009). First, the trial court determined that termination was in the children’s best interest
-2-
CA10-173
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 526
considering the likelihood that they would be adopted and the potential harm caused by
returning them to the custody of appellant. The temporary custodian in this case testified that
he wanted to adopt both children as quickly as the court would allow. Further, the DHS
caseworker testified to appellant’s inability to maintain stable or adequate housing. During
the twelve-month period the children were in DHS custody, appellant lived in a relative’s
home without electricity, a Travel Air Motel, several addresses in Wynne, somewhere in
Mulberry, a car in a West Memphis parking lot, a hotel in West Virginia, and an apartment
without electricity in West Virginia. There was no evidence that any of these places were
adequate for the children to live. This is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
We also believe that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s findings of statutory
grounds. The court first found that the children had been adjudicated by the court to be
dependent-neglected and had continued to be out of appellant’s custody for twelve months
and, despite a meaningful effort by DHS to rehabilitate appellant and correct the conditions
that caused removal, the conditions had not been remedied. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27341(b)(3)(B)(i). The children came into DHS custody on August 25, 2008, due to the
parents’ lack of stable housing. The children were living with their grandfather at some
friends’ home because his electricity had been turned off. The DHS caseworker noted that
J.H. was dirty and had a diaper rash. The children were adjudicated dependent-neglected on
October 29, 2008, based on inadequate supervision. Although appellant did not attend the
-3-
CA10-173
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 526
termination hearing, the evidence indicated that she still had no stable home adequate to
house her children. Nor was there any evidence that she was employed.
Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. Gossett
v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 240, ___ S.W.3d ___.
We agree with
the circuit court’s ruling that there was clear and convincing evidence to support its decision
to terminate appellant’s parental rights upon this ground. Therefore the court’s findings on
the other three grounds for termination need not be discussed.
Appellant’s counsel also included in her brief three rulings adverse to appellant and
explained why they would not support a meritorious appeal. First, appellant’s counsel
objected to DHS’s admission of the emergency custody order on the basis of relevance and
the fact that it was issued before appellant had notice and a chance to defend herself. The
court admitted the order because it was a certified copy of the order in the case. Counsel
contends that appellant’s case was not harmed because she was afforded the opportunity to
defend herself, which she did with counsel present, at the probable cause hearing five days
after the order was entered. We agree.
The second adverse ruling in counsel’s brief is an objection by appellant’s counsel to
a caseworker’s testimony regarding certain dates. The court did not rule on the objection,
but the caseworker continued to testify without using dates. When the caseworker again
began testifying about particular dates, appellant’s counsel objected and requested DHS to lay
a proper foundation as to whether the dates were given to the caseworker by appellant. The
-4-
CA10-173
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 526
court sustained the objection. The caseworker then testified that the dates came from
information on receipts of residency provided to the caseworker by appellant or from direct
conversations between the caseworker and appellant. Because the proper foundation was laid,
no further objection or ruling was made. Thus, there was no ruling adverse to appellant.
Finally, appellant’s counsel attempted to object to alleged hearsay. DHS’s counsel
responded, stating that she was seeking to submit a statement of appellant and thus it was not
hearsay because it was an admission of a party opponent. Appellant’s counsel said that she was
not objecting to statements made by a party. Appellant’s counsel made no further objection.
Appellant essentially withdrew her objection.
We note that there was one additional adverse ruling that counsel’s brief failed to
address. At the beginning of the termination hearing on November 9, 2009, appellant’s
counsel requested a continuance because she had been unable to reach appellant and appellant
was not present at the hearing. Counsel agreed, however, that appellant had been served with
notice of the termination hearing at the permanency planning hearing on August 24, 2009.
Appellant was also personally served after the hearing with an order to appear at the
termination hearing. In spite of this notice and counsel’s repeated attempts to contact
appellant, appellant failed to contact her counsel after the permanency planning hearing or
attend the termination hearing. The court denied the motion for continuance. We may
affirm a termination-of-parental-rights case where an adverse ruling was not included in a nomerit brief if the omitted adverse ruling would clearly not be a meritorious ground for appeal.
-5-
CA10-173
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 526
Sartin v. State, 2010 Ark. 16, ___ S.W.3d ___. In our view, the court’s denial of counsel’s
motion for a continuance would clearly not be a meritorious ground for appeal.
Based on our review of the record and the brief submitted to us, we conclude that
counsel has complied with Rule 6-9(i) and that the appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
affirm the termination order and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
VAUGHT, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.
-6-
CA10-173
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.