Presley v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA 09-762
CHARLES T. PRESLEY
APPELLANT
V.
ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, BAXTER
COUNTY REGIONAL HOSPITAL,
n/k/a BAXTER REGIONAL MEDICAL
CENTER, MICHAEL S. HAGAMAN,
M.D., and KERR MEDICAL CLINIC
APPELLEES
Opinion Delivered April 28, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE BAXTER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV-2001-43-1]
HONORABLE ROGER V. LOGAN,
JR., JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
COURTNEY HUDSON HENRY, Judge
This malpractice case involves the direct-action statute and the changes in the law that
occurred during the course of the litigation. Appellant Charles Presley challenges the orders
entered by the Baxter County Circuit Court dismissing his complaint against St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul), the insurer of appellee Baxter County Regional
Hospital, Inc. (hospital), and dismissing his amended complaint against both St. Paul and the
hospital. Four issues are raised on appeal. Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in
dismissing the initial complaint that he brought against St. Paul pursuant to the direct-action
statute. As his second point, appellant contends that the trial court erred in determining that
he did not plead sufficient facts to establish the immunity of the hospital. Further, appellant
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
asserts that the trial court erred in concluding that the amended complaint naming the hospital
as a defendant did not relate back to the filing of the initial complaint. Appellant also argues
that the trial court erred by denying his motion to allow an earlier appeal under the provisions
of Rule 54(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. We find merit in the first two points
and reverse and remand.
On February 1, 2000, appellant received treatment at the hospital’s emergency room
for injuries he sustained in an automobile accident. He subsequently received follow-up
treatment from his family physician, appellee Dr. Michael Hagaman, at Hagaman’s office,
referred to as appellee Kerr Medical Clinic. On January 25, 2002, appellant filed this
malpractice suit against St. Paul as the hospital’s insurer pursuant to the direct-action statute,
Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-210 (Supp. 2009).1 He also asserted malpractice
1
This statute provides in part:
(a)(1) When liability insurance is carried by any cooperative nonprofit
corporation, association, or organization, or by any municipality, agency, or
subdivision of a municipality, or of the state, or by any improvement district
or school district, or by any other organization or association of any kind or
character and not subject to suit for tort, and if any person, firm, or corporation
suffers injury or damage to person or property on account of the negligence or
wrongful conduct of the organization, association, municipality, or subdivision,
its servants, agents, or employees acting within the scope of their employment
or agency, then the person, firm, or corporation so injured or damaged shall
have a direct cause of action against the insurer with which the liability
insurance is carried to the extent of the amounts provided for in the insurance
policy as would ordinarily be paid under the terms of the policy.
....
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
claims against Dr. Hagaman and the Kerr Medical Clinic. With regard to St. Paul’s liability,
appellant alleged:
That Baxter County Regional Hospital is not subject to suit in tort due to the
fact that it is a cooperative, non-profit corporation, which has received
501(c)(3) designation from the Internal Revenue Service. That at the time of
the events leading to the Complaint at Law, the Baxter County Regional
Hospital was insured by the separate defendant, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Company. Pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79210, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company is directly liable for any
negligent medical services performed at the Baxter County Regional Hospital
and, therefore, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company is the correct
party in interest.
On April 30, 2002, St. Paul filed its answer to appellant’s complaint wherein St. Paul admitted
that “[s]eparate defendant St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company is the proper
substitute defendant pursuant to Arkansas law based on the non-profit status of Baxter County
Regional Hospital, n/k/a Baxter Regional Medical Center.”
On May 9, 2002, just nine days after St. Paul filed its answer, the supreme court
handed down the decision in Clayborn v. Bankers Standard Ins. Co., 348 Ark. 557, 75 S.W.3d
174 (2002), where the supreme court affirmed the dismissal of a complaint filed against an
insurer under the direct-action statute. The supreme court’s primary holding was that the
direct-action statute was not applicable because the appellant did not plead any facts to show
that the insured was a nonprofit corporation that was immune from suit in tort. The court
(3) The insurer shall be directly liable to the injured person, firm, or
corporation for damages to the extent of the coverage in the liability insurance
policy, and the plaintiff may proceed directly against the insurer regardless of
the fact that the actual tortfeasor may not be sued under the laws of the state.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
remarked that it knew of no law holding that all nonprofit corporations, by virtue of their
status as a nonprofit entity, are immune from suit in tort. In addition, the supreme court
rejected the appellant’s assertion that the insured enjoyed charitable immunity because the
complaint contained no allegation that the insured was a charitable organization. As a
secondary basis for its decision, the supreme court commented that the direct-action statute
would not apply in any event “because we have never held that charitable organizations are
immune from suit, but rather, we have only held that they are immune from execution
against their property.” Id. at 567, 75 S.W.3d at 180.
On September 23, 2002, St. Paul moved to dismiss based on the Clayborn decision.
The trial court granted the motion by an order dated October 6, 2003. In its order, the trial
court relied on Clayborn to hold that appellant had alleged no facts to support his claim of the
hospital’s immunity from suit and that St. Paul was not a “proper substitute defendant directly
liable for its torts.” Although the court dismissed the complaint against St. Paul, it granted
appellant fifteen days to plead further pursuant to Rule 12(j) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure.
On October 20, 2003, appellant filed an amended complaint adding the hospital as a
defendant and stating:
That the Baxter County Regional Hospital, Inc., is a domestic non-profit
corporation organized and authorized under and by virtue of the laws of the
State of Arkansas with its principal place of business in Mountain Home,
Arkansas, engaged in providing medical services and may not be subject to tort
suit for its negligence as hereinafter set out and if not subject to tort suit for its
negligence as hereinafter set out then its liability insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
and Marine Insurance Company, at the time of the acts complained of and set
forth in this Complaint at Law, the separate Defendant, St. Paul Fire and
Marine Insurance Company, is a proper party Defendant. If in the alternative
the separate Defendant Baxter County Regional Hospital, Inc., d/b/a Baxter
Regional Medical Center, Inc., alone is a proper party Defendant.
Appellant also filed a brief in support of the amended complaint in which he argued that his
claim against the hospital was not barred by the statute of limitations because the amended
complaint should relate back to the date that the original complaint was filed under Rule
15(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.
On October 27, 2003, the hospital and St. Paul filed a motion to dismiss the amended
complaint. While this motion was pending, the supreme court decided the appeal of Scamardo
v. Jaggers, 356 Ark. 236, 149 S.W.3d 311 (2004). There, the supreme court adopted the obiter
dictum in Clayborn, supra, and held that the direct-action statute does not apply to charitable
organizations, as those institutions are not immune from suit. On June 14, 2004, the trial
court dismissed the allegations in the amended complaint pertaining to St. Paul based on
Clayborn and Scamardo. The court also dismissed the amended complaint as to the hospital,
ruling that the statute of limitations barred appellant’s claim against the hospital because the
amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint.
On September 24, 2004, appellant filed a motion requesting a Rule 54(b) certification
so that he could pursue an immediate appeal. The trial court denied this motion on
February 24, 2005. In March 2005, the trial court also denied appellant’s motion to
reconsider the Rule 54(b) issue.
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
On December 15, 2005, the supreme court announced its decision in Low v. Insurance
Company of North America, 364 Ark. 427, 220 S.W.3d 670 (2005). In that appeal, Low argued
that the court should disavow the dicta contained in Clayborn, supra, and overturn the decision
in Scamardo, supra. The supreme court agreed with Low’s argument. In its opinion, the
supreme court gave a detailed history outlining the development of the law pertaining to the
direct-action statute and the question of immunity and concluded that Clayborn and Scamardo
were out of step with its interpretation of the statute, which had developed for over forty
years. The court overruled Scamardo and the Clayborn dicta and held that a qualified charitable
organization was immune from suit as well as tort liability and that the direct-action statute
authorized an action to be filed against the charitable institution’s liability carrier.
On October 29, 2007, the trial court granted Dr. Hagaman’s motion for summary
judgment. Appellant brought an appeal, but we dismissed for the lack of a final order because
Kerr Medical Clinic remained as a defendant. Presley v. Baxter County Reg’l, Inc., CA08-90
(Ark. App. Sept. 3, 2008) (unpublished). On March 24, 2009, the trial court entered an order
dismissing the clinic with prejudice. This timely appeal followed.
Appellant’s first argument is that he correctly sued St. Paul in his original complaint
and that the trial court erred in ruling that St. Paul was not a proper substitute defendant for
the hospital. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss by treating the facts
alleged in the complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Tate v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 102 Ark. App. 354, 285 S.W.3d 261 (2008). In testing the
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
sufficiency of a complaint on a motion to dismiss, all reasonable inferences must be resolved
in favor of the complaint, and all pleadings are to be liberally construed. Downing v. Lawrence
Hall Nursing Ctr., 2010 Ark. 175, ___ S.W.3d ___. However, when a complaint is dismissed
on a question of law, we conduct a de novo review. Dollarway Patrons for Better Schs. v.
Morehead, 2010 Ark. 133, ___ S.W.3d ___.
Before Clayborn, supra, the supreme court had held that charitable organizations were
immune from execution on their property and were, therefore, immune from tort liability.
See, e.g., Helton v. Sisters of Mercy of St. Joseph’s Hosp., 234 Ark. 76, 351 S.W.2d 129 (1961).
The court had also held that, where a charitable organization was not liable in tort, its insurer
was subject to a direct action pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 23-79-210. With
the dicta in Clayborn, the supreme court broke with these precedents by distinguishing
between a charitable organization’s immunity from suit and its immunity from liability and
stating that the direct-action statute provided for suit to be brought against an insurer only in
the event that the organization was immune from suit in tort. The supreme court reaffirmed
this distinction in Scamardo, supra. However, in Low, supra, the court overruled the Scamardo
decision and the dicta in Clayborn and held that immunity from liability in tort constitutes
immunity from suit under the direct-action statute and that the statute permits a lawsuit to
be filed against the insurer of the charitable organization.
The state of the law has come full circle during the course of this case, and with the
decision in Low, the law is once again the same as it was when appellant filed his original
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complaint against St. Paul. In Felton v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., 373 Ark. 472, 486 S.W.3d 486
(2008), the supreme court stated that the decision in Low applied retroactively. Therefore,
we hold that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint against St. Paul by ruling that
the direct-action statute did not apply.
Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that he did not plead
sufficient facts in his original complaint to establish the hospital’s immunity. In Clayborn, the
primary holding of the court was that the trial court properly dismissed the complaint against
the insurer because an entity’s status as a nonprofit corporation does not ipso facto demonstrate
that the corporation is immune from suit. Here, appellant not only alleged that the hospital
was a nonprofit corporation, but he also asserted that the hospital was “not subject to suit in
tort due to the fact that it . . . has received 501(c)(3) designation from the Internal Revenue
Service.” This subsection of the federal tax code confers tax-exempt status on corporations
that are organized and operated exclusively for religious and charitable purposes, or the like.
26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c)(3) (West 2010). Treating the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
viewing them in the light most favorable to appellant, we hold that this language sufficiently
invoked the direct-action statute to survive a motion to dismiss.
Appellant’s remaining points are moot, as resolving them will have no practical legal
effect on the outcome of the litigation. Rudder v. Hurst, 2009 Ark. App. 577, ___ S.W.3d
___. In light of our decision that appellant properly filed suit against St. Paul in the original
complaint, it is irrelevant whether the amended complaint adding the hospital as a defendant
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 367
related back to the filing of the original complaint. Also, even if we were to agree with
appellant that the trial court should have allowed an appeal under Rule 54(b), that is an error
that cannot be rectified at this juncture.
Reversed and remanded.
GLADWIN and BROWN, JJ., agree.
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