Armstrong v. ADHS
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 355
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA09-1350
Opinion Delivered
BRENDA ARMSTRONG
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
April 28, 2010
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. JV-2008-211]
HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
This is an appeal from an order terminating appellant’s parental rights to two minor
children. Appellant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support termination. We affirm.
Although termination of parental rights is in derogation of the natural rights of the
parents, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the health and
well-being of the child: parental rights must give way to the best interest of the child when
the natural parents seriously fail to provide reasonable care for their minor children. Trout v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 283, 197 S.W.3d 486 (2004).
Grounds for termination of parental rights must be proven by clear and convincing
evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2009). When the burden of proving a
disputed fact in a bench trial is by “clear and convincing” evidence, the question we must
answer on appeal is whether the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proved by clear
Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 355
and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. Beeson v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
37 Ark. App. 12, 823 S.W.2d 912 (1992). In doing so, we give great deference to the trial
court’s superior opportunity to observe the parties and judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Trout, supra; Beeson, supra.
Our review of the record reveals that the removal of the children on November 5,
2008, resulted from a domestic disturbance that resulted in police being called to the
residence. The police found a methamphetamine lab in the home; Edward Mitchell stated
that he had cooked the methamphetamine two days previously. Both Mitchell and appellant
were arrested; appellant resisted arrest to the point that police had to use a stun gun. The
arrests left the children, ages three and four, without a caretaker, and they were taken into
emergency custody by the Department of Human Services.
The children were adjudicated dependent-neglected on December 19, 2008, on
grounds of inadequate supervision and neglect occasioned by appellant’s chronic drug use and
her exposure of the children to a hazardous environment, i.e., the manufacture of
methamphetamine in the home. Appellant refused to comply with the case plan and
continued to test positive for drugs up to the time of the review hearing on April 17, 2009.
She was found to have mostly complied with the case plan and orders of the court between
April 17 and the permanency planning hearing on May 22, 2009. The case plan was then
changed to termination of parental rights, with the trial court noting that appellant might be
allowed additional time to complete the case plan if she had made significant progress by the
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 355
time of the termination hearing. However, after the August 21, 2009, termination hearing
was concluded, the trial court found that appellant had not made sufficient progress to warrant
affording her additional time to see if she would rehabilitate herself, and the court terminated
her parental rights. In his order, the trial judge found as grounds for termination that (1)
other issues arose after the filing of the original petition for dependency-neglect that
demonstrate that return of the children to the custody of the parent is contrary to the
children’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services,
the parent has manifested the incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or
rehabilitate the parent’s circumstances that prevent return of the children to the custody of
the parent; and (2) that there was little likelihood that further reunification services would
result in reunification of the family. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a) and 927-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(B)(i) (Repl. 2009).
On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding there was little
likelihood that further services would result in reunification because she was making
demonstrable progress at the time of the termination hearing. We do not agree. We think
that the clearest indication supporting the trial court’s determination that there was little
likelihood of successful reunification was that, since the case commenced, she began living
with and had become financially dependent on a married man, Mr. Winbury, who had
physically abused her during the pendency of the case and who was also a drug user.
Appellant argues that she was not given sufficient time to show that Mr. Winbury
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Cite as 2010 Ark. App. 355
could rehabilitate himself. However, she misses the point. Appellant’s relationship with Mr.
Winbury shows that she continues to lack sound judgment in matters that would affect the
children: instead of resolving her problems and deficiencies, she stood ready to subject the
children to another adult with similar issues who himself required rehabilitation. This was
completely voluntary on appellant’s part and indicated that her focus remained on her own
wants and desires rather than on the well-being of the children. On this record, we cannot
say that the trial court clearly erred in finding that there was little likelihood of reunification
within a reasonable amount of time.
Nor can we say that the trial court erred in finding that appellant had manifested
indifference or incapacity to remedy the problems that required removal of her children from
her home. Although her failure to obtain employment may not have been wholly the result
of indifference, it is noteworthy that some of the things that appellant failed to do could have
been accomplished quite simply, e.g., completing her psychological examination and fixing
the broken door and window in her residence. The trial court could properly infer from this
record that appellant lacked the degree of motivation needed to achieve reunification in a
time frame that would be reasonable from the children’s perspective.
Affirmed.
VAUGHT, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.
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