Paige v. State
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CACR08-1179
Opinion Delivered
May 20, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE FAULKNER
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR2007-515]
CORNELIOUS PAIGE
APPELLANT
V.
HONORABLE DAVID L.
REYNOLDS, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
LARRY D. VAUGHT, Chief Judge
Cornelious Paige was convicted by a Faulkner County jury of aggravated robbery,
three counts of kidnapping, attempted capital murder, theft of property, aggravated assault,
felony fleeing, and misdemeanor fleeing. He was sentenced to eighty-five years’
imprisonment. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence and in denying his motions for directed verdict. After a thorough review
of the record, we find no error and affirm.
On April 13, 2007, three individuals robbed the First Arkansas Bank and Trust in
Greenbrier, Arkansas, and escaped with $149,600. The robbery took place in the morning,
approximately twenty minutes before the bank’s drive-through window opened for business
at 8:00 a.m. Three bank employees were victims of the robbery. They were forced into the
bank, ordered to open the vault, and threatened verbally with a gun and knife. One of the
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three victims was beaten. When a fourth bank employee arrived for work just before 8:00
a.m., the three robbers had already fled the bank, and the victims were still in the vault. The
fourth bank employee immediately called 911 to report the robbery. The report included one
of the victim’s recollection that, just prior to entering the bank that morning, she observed
a maroon, four-door vehicle with tinted windows and an out-of-state license plate, possibly
from Illinois, pull into and drive out of the bank’s parking lot. The victims also reported that
the two robbers inside the bank were black.
Law-enforcement officers began searching for the suspect vehicle, and a vehicle
matching the description—a maroon, four-door vehicle with tinted windows and a Missouri
license plate—was located by a corporal of the Arkansas State Police. The corporal was unable
to determine who was in the vehicle due to the tinted windows. When the corporal turned
on his blue lights to initiate an investigatory stop, the vehicle accelerated to speeds in excess
of one hundred miles per hour and led law-enforcement officers on an extended and very
dangerous chase. During the chase, the suspect vehicle ran two red traffic lights, struck
another vehicle, and passed other vehicles on double yellow lines and on the right shoulder.
During the chase, six gunshots were fired out the back right side of the suspect vehicle toward
the law-enforcement officer in pursuit. When the suspect vehicle became disabled and rolled
to a stop, three black men fled on foot. Two of the men were apprehended immediately,
James Walker and Paige. The third suspect, Johnta Barber, was apprehended later that
afternoon.
The suspect vehicle was searched, and the following evidence was retrieved: cash in
an orange duffle bag (some of the cash was bundled in wrappers from First Arkansas Bank and
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Trust), five gun-shell casings, a semi-automatic handgun, black clothing including hooded
sweatshirts, white gloves, cell phones, and a small pocketknife. On the day of the robbery, law
enforcement found $108,400, the majority of which was found in and about the vehicle, and
some was found in Paige’s possession. The following day, officers found $33,000 wrapped in
a black shirt in the woods near the final resting point of the suspect vehicle.
Prior to trial, Paige 1 moved to suppress evidence obtained in the search of the suspect
vehicle on the basis that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to believe that the
vehicle had been involved in a bank robbery. The trial court denied the motion. During trial,
Paige twice moved for a directed verdict on all charges except for the misdemeanor fleeing
charge. These motions were also denied. Thereafter, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all
of the charges against Paige. He timely appealed.
While Paige presents the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as his second
point on appeal, preservation of his freedom from double jeopardy requires us to examine the
sufficiency argument before addressing trial errors. Nelson v. State, 365 Ark. 314, 229 S.W.3d
35 (2006). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we consider only the evidence
that supports the verdict, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. LeFever
v. State, 91 Ark. App. 86, 208 S.W.3d 812 (2005). The test is whether there is substantial
evidence to support the verdict, which is evidence that is of sufficient force and character that
it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or another. Id. On review,
this court neither weighs the evidence nor evaluates the credibility of witnesses. Cluck v. State,
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Paige and Walker were tried together.
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91 Ark. App. 220, 209 S.W.3d 428 (2005).
Paige groups his convictions for aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and theft of property
together, contending that substantial evidence fails to support these convictions because the
three eyewitnesses to the robbery could not identify him as one of the robbers, and the State
failed to present any physical evidence that he was in the bank or involved in the robbery. He
argues that the only evidence connecting him to the robbery was the fact that he was in
possession of stolen money. We disagree.
The three victims of the bank robbery testified that the robbers were black men. One
of the victims observed a maroon, four-door vehicle with tinted windows and out-of-state
tags pull into and out of the bank parking lot at the time the robbery was in progress. When
a vehicle exactly matching that description was located and an investigatory stop of that
vehicle was attempted, the vehicle led law-enforcement officers on an extended high-speed
chase. During that chase, multiple traffic violations occurred, and six shots were fired from the
rear of that vehicle at an officer. When the chase ended, Paige exited the vehicle and
continued to flee on foot. When he was apprehended, money from the bank was found in his
possession and in the vehicle in which he was a passenger. In and about that vehicle were
many items that the victims identified as part of the robbery: an orange duffle bag filled with
cash (some still bundled in First Arkansas Bank and Trust wrappers), black clothing, a semiautomatic gun, a knife, gloves, and cell phones.
Guilt may be proved even in the absence of eyewitness testimony, and evidence of
guilt is not less because it is circumstantial. Sanders v. State, 340 Ark. 163, 8 S.W.3d 520
(2000). Furthermore, identification can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances in
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evidence. Holloway v. State, 312 Ark. 306, 849 S.W.2d 473 (1993). Finally, flight following
the commission of an offense is a factor that may be considered with other evidence in
determining guilt. Parker v. State, 355 Ark. 639, 144 S.W.3d 270 (2004). Based on these
principles, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we hold that
substantial evidence supports the three convictions for aggravated robbery, kidnapping, and
theft of property.
Next, Paige argues that his conviction for attempted capital murder is not supported
by substantial evidence because there was no evidence presented at trial that he fired the shots
at a law-enforcement officer during the chase. He also claims that the convictions for
aggravated assault and felony fleeing are not supported by substantial evidence, because it was
undisputed that he was not the driver of the suspect vehicle; therefore, he had no control over
the vehicle. We disagree.
In this case, there is substantial evidence supporting Paige’s convictions for attempted
capital murder, aggravated assault, and felony fleeing under the accomplice-liability theory.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-403 (Supp. 2007) defines an accomplice:
(a) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense
if, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense, the
person:
...
(2) Aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in planning or
committing the offense . . . .
We will affirm a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge if substantial evidence exists that the
defendant acted as an accomplice of the offense. Bienemy v. State, 374 Ark. 232, ___ S.W.3d
___ (2008). There is no distinction between principals on the one hand and accomplices on
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the other, insofar as criminal liability is concerned. Id. When two or more people assist one
another in the commission of a crime, each is an accomplice and criminally liable for the
conduct of the others. Id. The presence of an accused in the proximity of a crime,
opportunity, and association with a person involved in a crime in a manner suggestive of joint
participation, are relevant factors in determining the connection of an accomplice with the
crime. Ashley v. State, 22 Ark. App. 73, 732 S.W.2d 872 (1987). One cannot disclaim
accomplice liability simply because he did not personally take part in every act that went to
make up the crime as a whole. Bienemy, supra.
Thus, just because Paige could not be positively identified as the gunman and because
Paige was not driving the vehicle, his role in the attempted-capital-murder, aggravated-assault,
and felony-fleeing offenses is not negated. There was substantial evidence that he aided in the
commission of these offenses. He was a passenger in a vehicle that was used in the robbery
that set all of the subsequent events into motion. That vehicle led officers on a dangerous
high-speed chase and crashed into another vehicle, causing it to roll over several times. Six
gunshots were fired out of the back window of the suspect vehicle at a corporal with the
Arkansas State Police, who testified that Paige exited the right rear of the vehicle when it
finally came to rest. Gunshot-residue tests confirmed that Paige had gunshot residue on his
hands. Finally, when the suspect vehicle stopped, Paige did not surrender; he fled on foot.
Flight following the commission of an offense is a factor that may be considered with other
evidence in determining guilt and may be considered as corroboration of evidence tending
to establish guilt. Hill v. State, 325 Ark. 419, 931 S.W.2d 64 (1996); Passley v. State, 323 Ark.
301, 915 S.W.2d 248 (1996).
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In sum, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold
that there was more than substantial evidence establishing Paige’s accomplice liability of
attempted capital murder, aggravated assault, and felony fleeing. As such, we hold that the trial
court did not err in refusing to grant Paige’s motions for a directed verdict.
For his second point on appeal, Paige argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion to suppress. Specifically, Paige argues that there was a lack of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to stop the vehicle in which he was traveling because the information about
the vehicle was not specific enough for the corporal to ascertain that he was attempting to
stop the correct vehicle. He contends that there was no make or model information provided
and that the suspect vehicle had Missouri, not Illinois, tags.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we conduct a de
novo review based on the totality of the circumstances, reviewing findings of historical facts
for clear error and determining whether those facts give rise to reasonable suspicion or
probable cause, giving due weight to inferences drawn by the trial court and proper deference
to the trial court’s findings. Yarbrough v. State, 370 Ark 31, 257 S.W.3d 50 (2007). We reverse
only if the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.
In Reeves v. State, 20 Ark. App. 17, 722 S.W.2d 880 (1987), we had occasion to review
the line of cases dealing with investigatory stops. We noted that Fourth Amendment
protection “against unreasonable searches and seizures” extends to persons driving down the
street. However, it has been held that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, police may
stop persons on the street or in their vehicles in the absence of either a warrant or probable
cause under limited circumstances. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Leopold v. State, 15 Ark.
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App. 292, 692 S.W.2d 780 (1985). One of those limited circumstances involves the
investigatory stop. Reeves, supra.
The test to be applied in determining whether an investigatory stop has been made
consistent with the mandates of the Fourth Amendment is a balancing of the nature and
quality of the intrusion against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
that intrusion. Miller v. State, 21 Ark. App. 10, 727 S.W.2d 393 (1987). Where felonies or
crimes involving a threat to public safety are concerned, the government’s interest in solving
the crime and promptly detaining the suspect outweighs the individual’s right to be free from
a brief stop and detention. Miller, supra. This policy consideration appears in Arkansas Rule
of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.1, which provides in part that:
A law enforcement officer lawfully present in any place may, in the performance of his
duties, stop and detain any person who he reasonably suspects is committing, or is
about to commit (1) a felony, or (2) a misdemeanor involving danger of forcible injury
to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, if such action is reasonably
necessary either to obtain or verify the identification of the person or to determine the
lawfulness of his conduct.
In determining the reasonableness of the officer’s suspicion, Arkansas Rule of Criminal
Procedure 2.1 provides the following definition:
“Reasonable suspicion” means a suspicion based on facts or circumstances which of
themselves do not give rise to the probable cause requisite to justify a lawful arrest, but
which give rise to more than a bare suspicion; that is, a suspicion that is reasonable as
opposed to an imaginary or purely conjectural suspicion.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he common thread which runs
through the decisions makes it clear that the justification for the investigative stops depends
upon whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police have specific, particularized,
and articulable reasons indicating the person or vehicle may be involved in criminal activity.”
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Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 80, 628 S.W.2d 284, 288 (1982).
In the case at bar, law enforcement had specific, particular, and articulable reasons
indicating that the vehicle in which Paige was a passenger had been involved in criminal
activity. The vehicle exactly matched the description given by the victim—it was a maroon,
four-door vehicle with tinted windows and out-of-state tags. The suspect vehicle was located
in Conway, less than thirty minutes after the aggravated robbery that took place in
Greenbrier. It was not likely that another vehicle matching the description of the suspect
vehicle would have been in that area at that time, just minutes from the small community of
Greenbrier, where the crimes had been committed. Hill v. State, 275 Ark. 71, 628 S.W.2d
284 (1982) (holding that police had reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop based
on information that the defendant, who four hours earlier, robbed and shot two men, fled in
a late model maroon Ford Thunderbird with dark lettering on a white license plate).
Therefore, we hold that the corporal had reasonable suspicion to initiate the investigatory stop
of the suspect vehicle.
Paige’s reliance upon Van Patten v. State, 16 Ark. App. 83, 697 S.W.2d 919 (1985), is
misplaced. There, police initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle that had not committed any traffic
violations based only on an anonymous call about a “loud party” and a “brown Jeep.” Van
Patten, 16 Ark. App. at 86, 697 S.W.2d at 921. The instant case presents very different facts.
Here, the person who provided the information was not anonymous; it was the victim. A
“loud party” was not the complaint; an aggravated robbery was. The description of the
vehicle was more than a “brown Jeep”; it was a maroon, four-door vehicle with tinted
windows and an out-of-state license plate. As such, we hold that the information provided
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to law enforcement constituted specific, particularized, and articulable reasons indicating the
vehicle in which Paige was traveling was involved in the robbery of the First Arkansas Bank
and Trust. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Paige’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.
K INARD and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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