Howe Now, Inc. v. Fishing Univ.
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 851
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
CA09-326
No.
Opinion Delivered
HOWE NOW, INC., ET AL.
APPELLANTS
V.
December 16, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CV-2006-373-G]
HONORABLE J. MICHAEL
FITZHUGH, JUDGE
FISHING UNIVERSITY
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED ON DIRECT APPEAL;
CROSS-APPEAL DISMISSED
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, Judge
This appeal is from an action in the Sebastian County Circuit Court to collect on a
default judgment previously rendered by a federal court. The trial court held that appellant
Jim Howe was personally liable for a corporate debt of Howe Now, Inc., finding that the
debt was incurred while the corporate charter was revoked and that Jim Howe was actively
engaged in the business during the period of revocation. Appellants argue on appeal that
these findings are clearly erroneous. We affirm.
The individual appellants are Jim and Sarah Howe. They are the shareholders of Howe
Now, Inc., a manufacturer of fishing lures. Howe Now contracted with Fishing University
to air television endorsements of its products over a period of several years. Howe Now
defaulted on its obligation to pay for the advertisements. In addition, Howe Now’s corporate
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 851
charter was revoked for failure to pay franchise taxes between January 1, 1998, and September
19, 1998. The question at trial was the liability of the individual appellants for the debt arising
out of the corporate default. The trial court held that Mr. Howe was personally liable for the
corporate debt in question because the debt was incurred while the corporate charter was
revoked and because he had continued to be actively engaged in the business. The trial court
found that Ms. Howe was not personally liable because there had been insufficient evidence
to show that she had likewise been actively engaged in the business while the charter was
revoked.
The law is well settled that officers and directors of a corporation who actively
participate in its operation during the time when the corporate charter is revoked for failure
to pay corporate franchise taxes are individually liable for debts incurred during the period of
revocation. See, e.g., Mullenax v. Edward Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 279 Ark. 247, 650 S.W.2d
582 (1983); Lazelere v. Reed, 35 Ark. App. 174, 816 S.W.2d 614 (1991). Mr. Howe does not
dispute this, but simply argues that the evidence was insufficient to show that the debts in the
present case were incurred during the period that the charter of Howe Now, Inc., was
revoked.
In bench trials, the standard of review on appeal is not whether there is substantial
evidence to support the finding of the court, but is instead whether the judge’s findings were
clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 851
court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
Chavers v. Epsco, Inc., 352 Ark. 65, 98 S.W.3d 421 (2003). Disputed facts and determinations
of credibility are within the province of the fact-finder. Id.
Here, the parties’ agreement expressly provided that the disputed debts were due and
to be paid in the first two quarters of 1998. Furthermore, Bill Balsley, a partner in Fishing
University, testified that the 1998 debts were incurred when the television program
containing the endorsements was aired during the first two quarters of 1998. Mr. Howe
testified that he informed Mr. Balsley that he was having financial problem in late 1997 that
would prevent him from making the payments scheduled for 1998, and argues that this
constituted an anticipatory breach on his part at a time when the corporate charter was still
in force. However, Mr. Balsley characterized this discussion as negotiation for a reduced rate
that ultimately resulted in failure, and the contradictions in the testimony were attributed to
mistake. Given the trial judge’s superior opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses,
we cannot say that he clearly erred in finding that the debt was in fact incurred during the
time that Howe Now’s corporate charter was revoked. Consequently, we affirm on direct
appeal.
The appellee/cross-appellant argues that appellants should have also been held liable
on grounds of fraudulent conveyances of the corporate assets to relatives and insiders
following their financial difficulties. We cannot address this issue because it is not properly
before us. Appellee failed to file a timely notice of cross-appeal from the original judgment,
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 851
which was entered December 16, 2008. Instead, some twenty days after the judgment,
appellee filed an untimely Ark. R. Civ. P. 52(b) motion for clarification that resulted in an
order that said, in essence, that the earlier order spoke for itself and that rejection of the
fraudulent-conveyance claim was implicit in the amount awarded, which corresponded to the
debts that came due during the revocation rather than the greater amount that would have
been awarded had the fraudulent-conveyance claim been proven. Although appellee’s
February 20, 2009, notice of cross-appeal was filed within thirty days of the order of
clarification, it was untimely with respect to the initial order, and a request for findings of fact
and conclusions of law after an order has become final cannot be used as a means of
resurrecting a claim already barred by finality. Majors v. Pulaski County Election Commission,
287 Ark. 208, 697 S.W.2d 535 (1985).
Affirmed on direct appeal; cross-appeal dismissed.
HART and GLOVER, JJ., agree.
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