Turner v. State
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 822
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CACR09-212
TROZZIE L. TURNER
Opinion Delivered December
APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF ARKANSAS
9, 2009
APPEAL FROM THE COLUMBIA
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-06-79-5]
HONORABLE LARRY W.
CHANDLER, JUDGE
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOSEPHINE LINKER HART, Judge
A jury found appellant, Trozzie L. Turner, guilty of possession of cocaine with the
intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, and maintaining
a drug premises. On appeal, appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the convictions. Particularly, he asserts that the State failed to present evidence that
he constructively possessed the drugs found at the residence searched by law-enforcement
officers. Second, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in admitting a witness’s
testimony regarding subsequent drug sales made by appellant, as the evidence should have
been excluded under Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence. We affirm.
Appellant’s charges stem from the execution of a search warrant on a residence in
Magnolia, Arkansas, on March 1, 2006, during which law-enforcement officers seized cocaine
and methamphetamine concealed in a canister on a kitchen shelf in the residence. On appeal,
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 822
appellant argues that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that he constructively
possessed the drugs. He points to certain evidence to support his contention: that when the
search warrant was executed, three people were present but he was not there; that at the time
of the search of the Magnolia residence, another person (one of the three persons who were
in the residence at the time of the search) resided there; and that prior to the search, his
fiancée (now wife) had signed a lease to a residence in Emerson, Arkansas. He also discounts
as not credible an informant’s testimony that appellant had sold drugs at the Magnolia
residence.
Although appellant was not present at the residence at the time of the search, it is not
necessary that the State prove literal physical possession of contraband. See Morgan v. State,
2009 Ark. 257, ___ S.W.3d ___. Contraband is deemed to be constructively possessed if the
location of the contraband was under the dominion and control of the accused. Id. Further,
constructive possession exists where joint occupancy of the premises occurs and where there
are additional factors linking the accused to the contraband. Id. Those additional factors
include whether the accused exercised care, control, and management over the contraband
and whether the accused knew the material was contraband. Id. This control and knowledge
can be inferred from the circumstances. Id.
The State presented evidence that appellant continued to live at the Magnolia
residence at the time of the search. Appellant signed a lease to the premises, and the landlord
of the residence testified that he was unaware of any evidence that anyone had moved out.
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Further, the landlord had received rent payments from appellant’s fiancée in February 2006,
which she paid at the residence, and on February 27, 2006, he received a check for rent
drawn on the account of appellant and his fiancée that was later returned for insufficient
funds. Also, law-enforcement officers found papers at the residence that included a February
23, 2006 telephone bill that was addressed to appellant at the Magnolia residence.
Furthermore, there was evidence linking appellant to the contraband. The informant testified
that he made three controlled drug buys from appellant at the Magnolia residence. During
two of the purchases, the informant dealt directly with appellant, with the last buy occurring
on February 3, 2006, less than a month before the search warrant was executed. And finally,
appellant’s wife and the three people whom law-enforcement officers found at the residence
all testified and denied knowledge of the contraband.
On appeal, appellant’s argument focuses on what evidence was presented at trial in his
favor. However, after reviewing the evidence introduced at trial in the light most favorable
to the State and considering only the evidence supporting the verdict, we conclude that there
was substantial evidence that appellant was in constructive possession of the contraband. See
id. Therefore, we affirm appellant’s convictions.
For his second argument on appeal, appellant argues that the circuit court erred in
permitting the State to introduce a witness’s testimony that from the end of 2006 to 2008,
appellant was selling drugs to her in other locations, months after the March 1, 2006 search
of the Magnolia residence. Particularly, he asserts that the testimony was not independently
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relevant and that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed the probative value of the
evidence.
Evidence offered under Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence must be
independently relevant, thus having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Bragg v. State, 328 Ark. 613, 946 S.W.2d 654 (1997). But even if
relevant, under Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence, the evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. On
appeal, we will not disturb the circuit court’s decision to admit or reject evidence submitted
under Rule 404(b) absent a showing of manifest abuse of discretion. Id. As to the requirement
that the probative value not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, we
accord the circuit court wide discretion in balancing the conflicting interests. Id.
In this case, appellant was charged with possession with the intent to deliver both
cocaine and methamphetamine. The supreme court has held on a number of occasions that
evidence of prior sales of contraband is independently relevant on the issue of intent when
the accused is charged with possession of contraband with the intent to deliver. See, e.g.,
Holloway v. State, 293 Ark. 438, 738 S.W.2d 796 (1987). The evidence of the subsequent drug
sales also went to appellant’s intent regarding to the drugs seized in Magnolia, that is, whether
he intended to deliver the drugs, and we cannot say that this evidence was unfairly prejudicial.
Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
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evidence of subsequent drug sales.
Affirmed.
VAUGHT, C.J., and ROBBINS, J., agree.
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