M.T. v. State
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SLIP OPINION
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 761
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION IV
No. CA09-849
M. T., a Minor,
APPELLANT
V.
Opinion Delivered NOVEMBER 11,
2009
APPEAL FROM THE CRAIGHEAD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JV-08-307]
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
HONORABLE LEE FERGUS, JUDGE,
AFFIRMED
KAREN R. BAKER, Judge
At a bench trial in Craighead County Circuit Court, Juvenile Division, the trial court
adjudicated as true one count of battery in the second degree in violation of Arkansas Code
Annotated Section 5-13-202, and one count of disorderly conduct in violation of Arkansas
Code Annotated Section 5-71-207 for appellant, M.T., a minor. Appellant was sentenced to
six months supervised probation; an 8:00 p.m. curfew; outpatient counseling; and ordered
to pay $35 in court costs, $50 in public defender’s fees, and a $20 per month probation fee.
Appellant was also sentenced to thirty days in jail, with twenty-eight deferred and two to
serve, with electronic monitoring if needed. Appellant’s sole point on appeal is whether the
State’s evidence is sufficient to support an adjudication against him on each charge. We
affirm.
Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 761
Each adjudication stems from a separate incident. The first incident, which gave rise
to the battery charge, involved appellant striking a teacher, Jennifer Malugen. After Ms.
Malugen instructed appellant to stop yelling at another teacher, he redirected his focus to Ms.
Malugen and began yelling obscenities at her. As Ms. Malugen attempted to remove
appellant from the classroom, he struck her arm “very hard.” The second incident, which
gave rise to the disorderly conduct charge, occurred when appellant was a resident in the
Methodist Family Health Bono Residential Facility. Appellant had been a resident in the
facility for two and one-half months when he lunged toward a doctor in an apparent attack.
Cheryl Shuster, a nurse at the facility, observed appellant’s aggressive behavior and placed
herself between appellant and the doctor. Appellant began swinging his fists and hit Ms.
Shuster “very hard.” During the altercation, appellant also verbally threatened to kill Ms.
Shuster and the doctor.
At trial, after the State rested its case, appellant moved for directed verdicts on both
counts. Appellant first claimed that Arkansas Code Annotated Section 5-13-202 requires a
serious physical injury to support the charge of battery in the second degree and that the State
failed to show sufficient evidence that appellant caused such an injury. Appellant also
claimed that Arkansas Code Annotated Section 5-71-207(a)(1) requires that a person cause
a “public inconvenience” in order to support a disorderly conduct charge, but that the State
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failed to present sufficient evidence to support the charge because the incident which gave
rise to the charge did not occur in a public facility.
The circuit court denied both initial motions for a directed verdict. At the close of
trial, appellant renewed his motions for directed verdict based on the previously stated
grounds. These motions were again denied by the circuit court, which found the allegations
of one count of battery in the second degree and one count of disorderly conduct against
appellant to be true. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding is the
same as in a criminal case. Hunt v. State, 92 Ark. App. 342, 344, 213 S.W.3d 667, 667
(2005) (citing Pack v. State, 73 Ark. App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409 (2001)).On appeal, a motion
for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Johnson v.
State, 375 Ark. 462, 464, 291 S.W.3d 581, 583 (2009) (citing Hoyle v. State, 371 Ark. 495,
268 S.W.3d 313 (2007)). The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial. Fields v. State, 349
Ark. 122, 124, 76 S.W.3d 868, 870 (2002) (citing Smith v. State, 346 Ark. 48, 55 S.W.3d 251
(2001)). Substantial evidence is evidence of sufficient force and character that it will, with
reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without mere speculation or
conjecture. Hunt, 92 Ark. App. at 344, 213 S.W.3d at 667. In determining whether there is
substantial evidence, this court will only consider that evidence tending to support the
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verdict, and this court does not weigh the evidence presented at trial, as that is the
responsibility of the finder of fact. Id. (citing Pack v. State, 73 Ark. App. 123, 41 S.W.3d 409
(2001)). In other words, when a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
convicting him, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. Fields, 349
Ark. at 124, 76 S.W.3d at 870. This court will affirm a delinquency adjudication if it is
supported by substantial evidence. Hunter v. State, 341 Ark. 665, 668, 19 S.W.3d 607, 609
(2000) (citing McGill v. State, 60 Ark. App. 246, 962 S.W.2d 382 (1998)).
Appellant first claims that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a conviction
for second-degree battery because the State failed to show that the teacher suffered a
“physical injury” as a result of appellant’s striking her (At trial, appellant erroneously
claimed that the relevant statute requires a serious physical injury; on appeal he corrects his
claim to comply with the wording of the statute.). Arkansas Code Annotated Section 5-13202(a)(4)(B)(Supp. 2009) states that “a person commits battery in the second degree if the
person knowingly, without legal justification, causes physical injury to a person he or she
knows to be a teacher… acting in the course of employment.” “Physical injury” means the
“impairment of a physical condition; infliction of substantial pain; or infliction of bruising,
swelling, or a visible mark associated with physical trauma.” Ark. Code Ann. § 5-1-102(14)
(Supp. 2009).
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 761
Appellant argues that the State offered no testimony showing any type of impairment
or infliction of substantial pain, and no evidence of bruising, swelling, or a visible mark.
Appellant’s argument fails to give sufficient weight to the victim’s description of the pain
she suffered immediately upon receiving the blow from appellant, as well as the pain suffered
for days following his striking of her. In determining whether an injury inflicts substantial
pain the trier of fact must consider all of the testimony and may consider the severity of the
attack and the sensitivity of the area of the body to which the injury is inflicted. Pettigrew v.
State, 64 Ark. App. 339, 351, 984 S.W.2d 72, 78 (1998) (citing Holmes v. State, 15 Ark.
App. 163, 690 S.W.2d 738 (1985)). The finder of fact is not required to set aside its common
knowledge and may consider the evidence in the light of its observations and experiences in
the affairs of life. Id. For the purposes of our statute that defines second-degree battery, there
is no requirement that a victim of second-degree battery seek medical treatment in order to
be deemed to have sustained a physical injury. Id. (citing Gilkey v. State, 41 Ark. App. 100,
848 S.W.2d 439 (1993)).
Here, appellant hit his teacher in the arm “very hard.” The teacher testified that after
appellant hit her, the pain she suffered in her arm was of a sufficient nature to cause her to
seek medical treatment. She also testified that her arm was “very sore” for at least a week.
With regards to sufficiency matters, the testimony of one eyewitness is sufficient to sustain
a conviction. Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 215, 223, 91 S.W.3d 54, 58 (2002) (citing Harmon,
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340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000)). While medical treatment is not required in order to
establish a physical injury, the fact the pain was of a sufficient nature to cause the victim to
seek medical care constitutes evidence that she experienced “substantial pain.” Here, Ms.
Malugen’s testimony alone is sufficient evidence of physical injury to support appellant’s
adjudication for second-degree battery.
Appellant next claims that the State’s evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction for disorderly conduct because the incident that gave rise to the charge did not
occur in a public place or create a risk of public inconvenience. Arkansas Code Annotated
Section 5-71-207(a)(1) (Supp. 2009) states that “[a] person commits the offense of disorderly
conduct if, with the purpose to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly
creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, he … engages in fighting or in
violent, threatening, or tumultuous behavior.”
First, our precedent refutes appellant’s narrow interpretation of the disorderly conduct
statute that the incident giving rise to the charge must occur in a public place. A public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm can occur due to an individual’s conduct whether the
individual and the people are on public or private property. Farr v. State, 6 Ark. App. 14, 17,
636 S.W.2d 884, 886 (1982). Second, section 5-71-207(a)(1) does not require an actual
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. The statute requires only that a person engages
in fighting or in violent, threatening, or tumultuous behavior with the purpose of creating a
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Cite as 2009 Ark. App. 761
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or that a person engages in such behavior in a way
that recklessly creates a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. A person acts
purposefully with respect to his conduct when it is his conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result. Maxwell v. State, 73 Ark. App. 45, 53, 41 S.W.3d
402, 408 (2001) (citing Harmon v. State, 340 Ark. 18, 8 S.W.3d 472 (2000)).
Here, Ms. Shuster, an employee of the behavioral health facility where appellant was
a resident, testified that appellant attacked her on several different occasions, including the
February 23, 2009 incident where appellant “flipped out” and attacked both Ms. Shuster and
the doctor. During this incident, Ms. Shuster testified that appellant hit her in the stomach
and caused her to “double over.” It is clear from this testimony that appellant engaged in
fighting or in violent, threatening or tumultuous behavior. Appellant’s violent actions support
the inference that his purposeful intent was to cause a public inconvenience, annoyance or
alarm. Moreover, appellant does not argue that he was in any way incapable of controlling
his actions at the time he threatened to kill either the nurse or the doctor and struck the nurse.
At the very least, he consciously disregarded the effects of his actions. “Recklessly” is
defined in Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-2-202(3) (Repl. 2006) as follows:
(A) A person acts recklessly with respect to attendant circumstances or a result of his
or her conduct when the person consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the attendant circumstances exist or the result will occur.
(B) The risk must be of a nature and degree that disregard of the risk constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
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the actor’s situation[.]
Here the fact that appellant engaged in this behavior, with not even a reference to a
compromised mental state, is sufficient to support the appellant’s adjudication for disorderly
conduct. The evidence supports the inference that appellant intended to engage in the
conduct of hitting the nurse and threatening her and the doctor’s lives to create public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. See Maxwell, supra.
Accordingly, we affirm.
G RUBER and B ROWN, JJ., agree.
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