Pharmerica and SRS v. Marlene Seratt
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA 08-83
Opinion Delivered
PHARMERICA and SRS
APPELLANTS
JUNE 18, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION,
[NO. F508000]
V.
MARLENE SERATT
APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
1.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – PROCEDURE – COMMISSION HAD AUTHORITY TO RENDER
ANEW THE FINDINGS RELEVANT TO THE CLAIM BEFORE IT.– The Workers’
Compensation Commission did not err in entertaining appellee’s claim seeking
compensation under an occupational disease theory; the Commission was presented
with the stipulated issue as compensability for injuries from carbon monoxide
exposure at work; the Commission has authority, and the duty, to render anew
findings relevant to the claim before it; given the posture of the claim as it was
presented, the Commission was within its power to render findings on compensability
regarding an occupational disease or single workplace accident.
2.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – CERTAIN
– REVERSED AND
There were no findings by the
Commission on the required ninety-day statutory notice of occupational disease; in
addition, the Commission’s findings were also lacking with regard to the substantive
claim; such additional findings were potentially unnecessary, but in furtherance of
judicial economy, the appellate court directed the Commission to make such
necessary findings to explain the basis of its conclusion on compensability;
meaningful appellate review requires adequate and specific findings, which were
incomplete in this case; the appellate court therefore reversed and remanded for
additional findings of fact.
Appeal from the Workers’ Compensation Commission; reversed and remanded.
FINDINGS WERE LACKING
REMANDED FOR ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT.–
Michael E. Ryburn, for appellants.
Tolley & Brooks, P.A., by: Evelyn E. Brooks, for appellee.
This is a workers’ compensation case in which the claimant was awarded benefits
related to injuries arising out of carbon monoxide exposure at work culminating on June 8,
2005. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied compensability, but on appeal to the
Workers’ Compensation Commission, it awarded benefits finding that objective findings and
a causal link supported the existence of workplace injury and that appellee was entitled to
reasonably related medical treatment and attorney’s fees. The employer appeals contending
that (1) the Commission awarded benefits for an occupational disease where only a specificincident injury was to be litigated, which was an error of law; (2) any claim for occupational
disease was barred for failure of appellee to give the statutorily-required ninety-day written
notice; and (3) even if the issue was properly before the Commission, there were no objective
findings to support the existence of an occupational injury or substantial evidence on
causation, nor did this case fit within the definition of “occupational disease.” Because the
Commission’s opinion lacks sufficient findings of fact upon which we may perform proper
appellate review, we reverse and remand.
In reviewing decisions from the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the
evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the
Commission's findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See
Whitlach v. Southland Land & Dev., 84 Ark. App. 399, 141 S.W.3d 916 (2004). Substantial
evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
-2-
Williams v. Prostaff Temporaries, 336 Ark. 510, 988 S.W.2d 1 (1999). There may be substantial
evidence to support the Commission’s decision even though we might have reached a
different conclusion if we had sat as the trier of fact or heard the case de novo. Freeman v.
Con-Agra Frozen Foods, 344 Ark. 296, 40 S.W.3d 760 (2001). We do not review the decision
of the ALJ but rather review the decision of the Commission, which performs a de novo
review of the evidence, and in this instance, did not adopt any of the findings of the ALJ. See,
e.g., Matthews v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n, 341 Ark. 5, 14 S.W.3d 482 (2000); Scarbrough v.
Cherokee Enters., 306 Ark. 641, 816 S.W.2d 876 (1991).
The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence as it does any other
evidence, and the resolution of conflicting evidence is a question of fact for the Commission.
Public Employee Claims Div. v. Tiner, 37 Ark. App. 23, 822 S.W.2d 400 (1992). A finding of
a compensable injury cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Smith-Blair, Inc. v. Jones,
77 Ark. App. 273, 72 S.W.3d 560 (2002). However, the Commission may not arbitrarily
disregard medical evidence or the testimony of any witness. Patchell v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
86 Ark. App. 230, 184 S.W.3d 31 (2004); Hill v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 74 Ark. App. 250, 48
S.W.3d 544 (2001). Furthermore, any compensable injury must be established by medical
evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 1999).
Where the condition involved is a disease (as opposed to an accidental injury), the
claim is compensable only if the disease is an “occupational” one as defined in our Workers’
Compensation Act, and the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence a causal
connection between the employment and the disease. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 11-9-102(4)–
-3-
601(e) (Repl. 2002). An “occupational disease” is defined as any disease that results in
disability or death that arises out of or in the course of the occupation or employment. Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-9-601(e)(1) (Repl. 2002). An occupational disease is characteristic of an
occupation, process or employment where there is a recognizable link between the nature of
the job performed and an increased risk in contracting the occupational disease in question.
Sanyo Mfg. Corp. v. Leisure, 12 Ark. App. 274, 675 S.W.2d 841 (1984).
First, we consider whether there was procedural error. Appellant contends that
appellee sought benefits for an accidental injury that occurred on June 8, 2005, whereas the
Commission sua sponte found that her claim was compensable because she suffered an
occupational disease. Appellant argues essentially that it was blind-sided by this finding and
was not allowed to defend its position properly, and furthermore that appellee did not give
the required statutory notice for an occupational disease. Appellee responds that she sought
benefits for an injury that culminated on June 8, 2005, that “compensability” was the issue,
and that her claim was filed in a timely manner from her last injurious exposure. Thus, she
contends that the Commission in its de novo review was at liberty to decide whether she had
proved entitlement to benefits under the entire Workers’ Compensation Act. To the extent
that appellant contends that the Commission erred in entertaining this claim seeking
compensation under an occupational disease theory, we disagree that the Commission erred
in doing so.
The undisputed facts were that appellee worked as a pharmacy technician and had for
several years. In the pharmacy building, a faulty water heater leaked not only water but
-4-
carbon monoxide. On June 8, 2005, pharmacy employees had been taking turns emptying
the water receptacles abutting the water heater, but because the employees were suffering
from headaches, the pharmacy manager called the Rogers fire department. The building was
evacuated.
Appellant and other employees filed workers’ compensation claims.
With regard to
appellee’s claim, the pre-hearing order issued by the ALJ stated that the issue to be litigated
was “compensability of the claimant’s injuries due to carbon monoxide[.]”
Appellee
contended that she was injured on June 8, 2005, suffering injuries to her eyes, nose, throat,
lungs, and brain. Her main complaints were that she had persistent headaches, burning in her
nose/throat/chest, photophobia, memory loss, shaking, confusion, difficulty breathing,
difficulty multitasking, and anger issues. She said she suffered from none of those problems
prior to her employment in the pharmacy. Appellant contested the claim on the basis that
there lacked objective medical findings to support such injuries and further, that appellee
could not causally connect any objective findings of ill health to the carbon-monoxide
exposure.
At the hearing, appellant’s counsel made an opening statement in which he contended
that it was “hard to decide just which slot this kind of claim falls into in the current Workers’
Compensation Act,” noting that this was possibly an occupational disease case. Appellee’s
counsel made her opening statement in which she stated that there was acute exposure on
June 8 but that the employees had been exposed to this gas over a greater period of time.
The ALJ denied benefits. On de novo review, the Commission found that (1) appellee
-5-
had shown objective medical findings to support the existence of injury, specifically in
swelling and redness of her nasal passages, polyps in her nasal passages, and increased carbon
monoxide levels as shown by blood testing, which the Commission causally related to her
work exposure and not her smoking; and (2) appellee suffered a gradual occupational injury
due to prolonged carbon monoxide exposure.
The two prevailing Commissioners authored the opinion in which they found that
“her symptoms arose gradually,” and “claimant’s symptoms worsened after the incident on
June 8, 2005.” This was deemed a “culmination” of symptoms leading up to that date
“consistent with prolonged carbon monoxide exposure.” The dissenting Commissioner
wrote that she would have denied benefits because, although appellee had long-standing
medical issues, they were not shown to be causally related to her work. This appeal followed.
We hold that there was no procedural error. The Commission was presented with the
stipulated issue as compensability for injuries from carbon monoxide exposure at work. In
American Transportation Co. v. Payne, 10 Ark. App. 56, 661 S.W.2d 418 (1983), our court
noted that Workers’ Compensation Commission Rule 25, defining the scope of review from
the ALJ to the Commission, does not preclude the Commission from reviewing issues
not appealed from or not raised at the ALJ level if it so chooses. 10 Ark. App. at 61. The
Commission reviews cases appealed to it de novo, and the duty of the Commission is not to
determine whether there was substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings; rather, it must
make its own findings in accordance with a preponderance of the evidence. See Tyson Foods,
Inc. v. Watkins, 31 Ark. App. 230, 792 S.W.2d 348 (1990). Hence, the Commission has
-6-
authority, and the duty, to render anew findings relevant to the claim before it. Given the
posture of this claim as presented, we hold that the Commission was within its power to
render findings on compensability, regarding an occupational disease or single workplace
accident.
Appellant also claims that the Commission’s decision cannot stand because
appellee is not entitled to any occupational-disease benefits absent her giving a statutorily
required ninety-day notice of occupational disease.
Arkansas Code Annotated section
11-9-603(a)(2)(A) (Repl. 2002) requires that written notice of an occupational disease be
given within ninety days after the first distinct manifestation of the disease; such notice must
be given by the employee or someone on her behalf. The ninety-day statutory period does
not begin to run until the employee knows or should reasonably be expected to know that
he is suffering from an occupational disease. See Quality Service Railcar v. Williams, 36 Ark.
App. 29, 820 S.W.2d 278 (1991). Failure to give notice shall not bar any claim if the
employer had knowledge of the injury; if the employee had no knowledge that the condition
or disease arose out of and in the course of his employment; or if the Commission excuses the
failure on the grounds that, for some satisfactory reason, the notice could not be given. Ark.
Code Ann. § 11-9-701(b)(1) (Repl. 2002).
We have before us no findings by the Commission on this statutory notice, regarding
compliance or lack thereof. Where it is clear what the appropriate law is but the Commission
fails to apply the law to the facts of the case, it is appropriate to reverse and remand. See, e.g.,
Westside High School v. Patterson, 79 Ark. App. 281, 86 S.W.3d 412 (2002) (reversing and
-7-
remanding, stating that “the Commission must apply the appropriate law to the evidence
before it to reach a conclusion”).
Because we are remanding for sufficient findings, we take this opportunity to point out
that the Commission’s findings are also lacking with regard to the substantive claim. Such
additional findings may become unnecessary if there is a statutory bar to this claim. However,
in furtherance of judicial economy, we direct the Commission to make such findings that are
necessary to explain the basis of its conclusion on compensability.
There is a thorough discussion of the existence of objective findings to support the
existence of a compensable injury. There are findings on the causal relationship between the
injury and the work. A causal connection is generally a matter of inference to be drawn from
all the evidence. See Hope Brick Works v. Welch, 33 Ark. App. 103, 802 S.W.2d 476 (1991).
However, the Commission made no findings on the issue of how this claim fits within the
occupational-disease construct except to state that the injury was of gradual onset. It did not
make findings required by the Act that an occupational disease be “due to the nature of an
employment in which the hazards of the disease actually exist and are characteristic thereof
and peculiar to the trade[.]” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-601(g)(1)(A).
When the Commission decides a claim, the parties are entitled to know the factual
basis for the decision. Lowe v. Car Care Marketing, 53 Ark. App. 100, 102, 919 S.W.2d 520,
521 (1996). Moreover, meaningful appellate review requires adequate and specific findings.
Lowe, 53 Ark. App. at 102, 919 S.W.2d at 521. Here, the findings are incomplete. We
-8-
therefore reverse and remand for additional findings of fact. Wright v. American Transp., 18
Ark. App. 18, 22, 709 S.W.2d 107, 110 (1986).
Reversed and remanded.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and B AKER, J., agree.
-9-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.