Cedric Walker v. Cooper Automotive, Crockett Adjustment, and St. Paul Travelers Insurance Co.
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
D IV IS IO N S III a n d IV
No. CA 08-519
Opinion Delivered
DECEMBER 17, 2008
CEDRIC WALKER
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
[F604949]
COOPER AUTOMOTIVE, CROCKETT
ADJUSTMENT, and ST. PAUL
TRAVELERS INSURANCE CO.
APPELLEES
REVERSED AND REMANDED ON
DIRECT APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON
CROSS-APPEAL
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
1.
WORKERS’
– SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED COM PENSABILITY OF
APP ELLA NT ’S INJURY.– Substantial evidence supported the compensability of appellant’s knee
injury, to include the tear that required surgical repair; it was determined that appellant had proven
that he had not suffered left knee problems before the described work event, that there was
evidence of swelling noted by the company doctor, and that the credible testimony was that
appellant suffered knee problems ever since that event; this was a matter of weighing the evidence
and fact finding, a function left to the Workers’ Compensation Commission, not the appellate court.
2.
W O RK ERS’
COM PENSATION
COM PENSATION
–
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF UNJUSTIFIABLE
REFUSAL TO WORK LIGHT DUTY – APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO DISABILITY BENEFITS.–
There
was no substantial evidence of unjustifiable refusal to work light duty offered to or provided for
appellant; appellant was terminated at the urging of his employer; construing the relevant statute
strictly, as the appellate court was required to do, the facts remained that appellant was neither
offered employment, nor did he refuse employment, at any time after his termination date; where
an employee suited to light duty is not offered a suitable job by the employer, Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-526 is not triggered.
Moore & Giles, LLP, by: Greg Giles, for appellant.
Bridges, Young, Matthews & Drake, PLC, by: Michael J. Dennis, for appellee.
Appellant Cedric Walker appeals the denial of temporary total disability (TTD) or
temporary partial disability (TPD)
benefits by the Workers’ Compensation Commission in his
claim against appellee Cooper Standard Automotive. Appellant asserts on appeal that while he
continued to work light-duty after his compensable left knee injury, he was ultimately
terminated due to a reduction in workforce, rendering him eligible for TTD or TPD while he
remained in his healing period.
Appellee employer resisted the claim in its entirety, and it
cross-appeals the finding that the knee injury is compensable, arguing that any medical
treatment required after he left employment was the result of a later independent intervening
event.
Thus, both employee and employer argue that the Commission’s decision lacks
substantial evidence to support it on their respective points.
We affirm on cross appeal, holding that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s
finding that appellant suffered a compensable knee injury on April 27, 2006, that included a
medial meniscus tear.
On direct appeal, we reverse and remand because appellant was not
statutorily barred from receiving TTD or TPD.
This court reviews decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Commission to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support it.
App. 149, 35 S.W.3d 328 (2000).
Rice v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 72 Ark.
Substantial evidence is that relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Armstrong, 73 Ark. App. 146, 41 S.W.3d 822 (2001).
reasonable
Wheeler Constr. Co. v .
We review the evidence and all
inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s
findings, and we affirm if its findings are supported by substantial evidence.
-2-
Geo Specialty
Chem. v. Clingan, 69 Ark. App. 369, 13 S.W.3d 218 (2000). The issue is not whether we
might have reached a different decision or whether the evidence would have supported a
contrary finding; instead, we affirm if reasonable minds could have reached the conclusion
rendered by the Commission.
Sharp County Sheriff’s Dep’t v. Ozark Acres Improv ement
Dist., 75 Ark. App. 250, 57 S.W.3d 764 (2001); Foxx v. American Transp., 54 Ark. App. 115,
924 S.W.2d 814 (1996). It is the Commission’s province to weigh the evidence and determine
what is most credible. Minn. Mining & Mfg. v. Baker, 337 Ark. 94, 989 S.W.2d 151 (1999).
In workers' compensation cases, the Commission functions as the trier of fact.
Blevins
v . Safeway Stores, 25 Ark. App. 297, 757 S.W.2d 569 (1988). The credibility of witnesses
and any conflict and inconsistency in the evidence is for the Commission to resolve.
Electronics, Inc. v. Devazier, 253 Ark. 1100, 490 S.W.2d 792 (1973).
Commission is required to reach a decision.
Warwick
A majority of the
See Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-204(b)(1) (Repl.
1996); see also S & S Constr., Inc. v. Coplin, 65 Ark. App. 251, 986 S.W.2d 132 (1999).
Two-to-one decisions are frequently issued by the Commission, and those are majority
decisions.
S & S Constr., Inc. v. Coplin, supra.
Here, all three Commissioners agreed to
affirm and adopt the ALJ’s finding of compensability of the knee injury and reasonably related
medical expenses.
Two of the three Commissioners agreed to affirm and adopt the ALJ’s
finding of appellant being barred from TTD or TPD because of refusal of suitable employment.
To perform the proper review on appeal, we must examine the basis for the
Commission’s findings.
Appellant, a man in his forties, had worked for Cooper Standard
-3-
Automotive since 1997.
Appellant was in a light-duty position1 in the storeroom when he hurt
his knee walking up stairs on April 27, 2006, in the middle of his shift.
Appellant lost his
balance, his weight shifted, and in an effort to protect his post-surgical right knee, he hurt his
left knee.
Appellant stated that although he finished his shift, his knee immediately began to
hurt and swell. The next day, his knee was swollen so badly he could hardly walk. Appellant
filed an incident report and was sent to the company doctor, who performed an x-ray and
prescribed ice packs and anti-inflammatory medication.
physical exam.
The nurse noted visible swelling upon
After that incident, his knee continued to bother him, but he continued in his
light-duty job at work.
Appellant signed a severance agreement at the end of June 2006, because the plant was
reducing its workforce and was heading for closure.
Appellant added that he probably could
not continue to work as he had been doing because his knee was continuing to hurt. Appellant
testified that he felt he had no alternative but to sign the severance form and take the severance
money ($3,541.19) in order to pay for medical care, which was being declined by the workers’
compensation carrier.
The pre-printed form, signed by appellant, the employer’s human
resources manager, and the union representative, stated that appellant understood that he was
“being terminated from employment at Cooper-Standard Automotive effective 7-5-06 due to
reduction in workforce in accordance with the plant closure agreement.” It acknowledged that
1
Appellant had been on light duty intermittently for years with this employer as an
accommodation for other work-based injuries. Those injuries were in 2000 to his
shoulder, in 2001 to his right knee, in 2002 or 2003 to his hands (carpal tunnel syndrome),
and in 2004 to his shoulder.
-4-
he was being “terminated due to my seniority or that I have chosen to be voluntarily
terminated.”
The form ensured that appellant had read “the El Dorado Plant closing
termination agreement.”
Appellant presented to an emergency room on August 2, 2006, wherein the report was
that appellant had twisted his left knee while getting out of the bathtub, causing worsening pain
that night. Appellant recalled going to the emergency room that night, but he denied any new
injury, testifying that his knee was hurting before that night. Appellant challenged the accuracy
of any written note saying he hurt his knee a couple days before August 2, 2006.
presented to another physician in late 2006, and appellant was prescribed
Appellant
a knee brace.
Appellant said it helped but that he knew something was still very wrong with his left knee
because it hurt all the time. An MRI performed in January 2007 demonstrated the existence
of a medial meniscus tear, for which surgical repair was suggested. Appellant said he wanted
the surgery but could not pay for it.
Appellee argued that the cause for the need for extensive medical treatment including
surgery was just as likely the bathtub event in August, not the April work event.
Appellee
asserted that appellant failed to prove a compensable surgical injury. Appellee also argued that
appellant’s voluntary resignation barred any claim for TTD or TPD.
The ALJ found appellant’s testimony credible as to the onset and severity of injury. The
ALJ rejected appellee’s theory as to the alleged later injury.
The ALJ found that appellant
suffered a compensable knee injury on April 27 and that all the medical treatment including
surgical repair was reasonably necessary and causally related to the work injury.
-5-
As to the
request for temporary disability, the ALJ found that appellant was barred because he took a
voluntary severance with no knowledge of how long the plant would remain open. Thus, finding
that appellant refused suitable employment offered to or procured for him in accordance with
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-526.
The ALJ did not find appellant’s contention, that he would not
have been physically able to continue to work light duty much longer anyway, to be persuasive
where there was no physician’s recommendation to cease light duty.
Both parties appealed to
the Commission.
After performing its de novo review, the Commission, by a unanimous vote, found that
appellant had proven by a preponderance that he suffered a specific incident left knee injury
at work on April 27, 2006, while walking up stairs and that all medical treatment
was reasonably necessary in connection with that compensable injury.
The majority of
Commissioners also found that appellant had not proven by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was entitled to any temporary disability benefits, total or partial, because he had
voluntarily accepted a severance package after his work-related injury.
The dissenting
Commissioner asserted that he would have found that the employer did not offer suitable work
available for its injured employee.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal, and appellee filed a
notice of cross-appeal.
First, we address the cross-appeal, challenging the substantiality of evidence to support
that appellant’s knee injury occurring in April 2006 caused the extensive tear.
Appellee
concedes that there might have been a minor injury causing swelling in April 2006, but that the
-6-
eventual finding of a medial meniscus tear was just as likely caused by an incident on or about
August 2, 2006, as noted in contemporaneous emergency room reports.
The Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ opinion, in which this precise argument
was raised and rejected. The ALJ determined that appellant had proven that he had not suffered
left knee problems before the event described in April 2006, that there was evidence of
swelling noted by the company doctor, and that the credible testimony was that appellant
suffered knee problems ever since that event. This was a matter of weighing the evidence and
fact finding, a function left to the Commission and not our court on appeal.
Minn. Mining &
Mfg. v. Baker, supra. Based upon the standard of review, we hold that substantial evidence
exists to support compensability of this knee injury, to include the tear that requires surgical
repair.
Moving to the direct appeal, appellant challenges the ALJ’s (and the Commission’s)
finding that he was barred from receiving TTD or TPD because, even though he remained in his
healing period and continued to work in his light-duty job, he voluntarily removed himself from
the workplace.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-9-521 states that
a claimant with a scheduled
injury is entitled to temporary total disability benefits “during the healing period or until the
employee returns to work, whichever occurs first. . . .” Appellant undisputedly remained in his
healing period and continued to work.2
Thereafter, pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-
2
Although the ALJ’s opinion, adopted by the Commission, recites no less than three
times that appellant continued to work over five months after his compensable injury, it is
-7-
526, he was not entitled to any TTD or TPD if he “refused employment suitable to his or her
capacity offered to or procured for him . . . during the continuance of the refusal, unless . . .
the refusal is justifiable.”
We hold that there is no substantial evidence of unjustifiable refusal to work light duty
offered to or provided for appellant.
Appellant was terminated at the urging of his employer.
Compare Superior Indus. v. Thomaston, 72 Ark. App. 7, 32 S.W.3d 52 (2000). Construing
the relevant statute strictly, as we must, the facts remain that this employee was neither offered
employment, nor did he refuse employment, at any time after July 5, 2006.
As we held in
Barnette v. Allen Canning Co., 49 Ark. App. 61, 896 S.W.2d 444 (1995), where an employee
suited to light duty is not offered a suitable job by the employer, section 11-9-526 is not
triggered.
Contrary to the dissenting judge’s opinion, we are not holding that Walker was
unable to continue light duty work.
evidence.
We uphold that finding as supported by substantial
We hold only that appellant could not have refused employment where it was no
longer offered by his employer.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand on
appellant’s direct appeal because the Commission’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence.
Reversed and remanded on direct appeal. Affirmed on cross-appeal.
HART , GLOVER and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree.
PITTMAN, C.J., and HEFFLEY, J., dissent.
undisputed that only two months elapsed between the injury and when appellant accepted
the severance package.
-8-
SARAH HEFFLEY, Judge, dissenting. Though I might have reached a different result from that
reached by the Commission in awarding Walker further medical benefits including surgery, I recognize the
standard of review. Applying that standard, I join in the portion of the majority opinion affirming that
award. However, applying the same standard to the Commission’s denial of TTD following Walker’s
voluntary termination, I must respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion reversing on that
point.
When reviewing a decision of the Commission, the issue is not whether we might have reached a
different result from the Commission, but rather whether reasonable minds could have reached the result
found by the Commission. Superior Industries v. Thomaston, 72 Ark. App. 7, 9, 32 S.W.3d 52, 53
(2000). Reasonable minds could conclude, as did the Commission, that Walker was not physically unable
to perform light-duty work and that he refused suitable employment at Cooper Tire and was, therefore,
disqualified from receiving TTD.
As recognized by the Commission, Walker returned to his normal, light-duty work at the tire plant
immediately after his injury; he did not stop working until June 30, 2006, having signed a voluntary
termination agreement on June 28.
Moreover, as noted by the Commission, no physician ever
recommended that Walker cease his light-duty position. The majority implies that Walker was forced to
sign the termination agreement due to the Cooper Tire plant closure. However, as recognized by the
Commission, the record reveals no firm evidence that Cooper Tire’s closure was imminent. At the time
Walker was offered the termination agreement—implying that he had a choice—there were layoffs
occurring at the plant. But Walker does not assert that he was laid off or that he had been notified of a
certain job loss. Instead he testified that he “agreed to take the voluntary termination because, man, it
-9-
wasn’t no way that I could keep working on my knee the way it was. They offered me that severance
package and I decided to take the little money that they was giving me. My number was coming anyway
so I got the money to get me some medical attention.” There was no ambiguity about whether Walker
voluntarily chose to leave his work at Cooper rather than seek other job duties to accommodate his knee
pain. Any potential ambiguity was clarified by Walker’s own testimony.
This case is unlike Superior Industries, cited by the majority, where Thomaston was involuntarily
terminated for misconduct. 72 Ark. App. 7, 32 S.W.3d 52 (2000). The court there stated that “Mr.
Thomaston did not refuse employment; he accepted the employment and was later terminated not by his
choice, but at the option of his employer.” 72 Ark. App. at 11, 32 S.W.3d at 54 (emphasis added). Here,
regardless of whether Walker’s knee pain played a role in his decision, he admits that the termination was
by his choice. Walker could have rejected Cooper Tire’s offer of a voluntary termination package and
sought a lighter or different work duty from Cooper Tire. Indeed, Cooper Tire had a statutory duty to
provide him with suitable work. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-526. But because Walker continued to work,
Cooper had no need to make such an offer. Walker accepted a termination agreement and voluntarily gave
up his job. His refusal to continue working disqualified him from benefits.3 This case is also distinguishable
from Barnette v. Allen Canning Co., cited by the majority. 49 Ark. App. 61, 896 S.W.2d 444 (1995).
There, Barnette was unable to work in any capacity at the canning company and the employer failed to
3
Ark. Code Ann.§ 11-9-526 states that “[if] any injured employee refuses employment
suitable to his capacity offered to or procured for him, he shall not be entitled to any compensation
during the continuance of the refusal, unless . . . the refusal is justified.”
-10-
offer her suitable work. Our case is different because at no time before he signed the voluntary termination
agreement did Walker become unable to perform his normal light-duty work.
A reasonable person, considering Walker’s continuing to work, the medical records, the language
of the agreement, and Walker’s testimony, could have found that he refused the work at Cooper Tire, not
due to his knee pain, but because he was offered a voluntary termination package. Walker would not
receive TTD benefits if he had taken an early retirement instead of seeking suitable work at Cooper Tire.
I see the same logic at work here. By reversing this case, the majority eschews the standard of review, and
gives Walker a double-reward: a voluntary termination package plus TTD benefits even though he refused
to work at Cooper Tire.
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.