Rebecca Garcia Strickland v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA 08-441
REBECCA GARCIA STRICKLAND
APPELLANT
Opinion Delivered
September 24, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE DREW
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JV2006-16-5]
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
HONORABLE TERESA FRENCH,
JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
WENDELL GRIFFEN, Judge
1.
PARENT & CHILD – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO
WARRANT TERMINATION – TERMINATION DECISION RESTED PRIMARILY ON
APPELLANT’S NUMEROUS MOVES.– The circuit court erred in terminating appellant’s
parental rights where the termination decision was primarily informed by appellant’s
numerous moves during the time she was awaiting reunification with her children;
appellant was under orders from the circuit court to maintain stable housing; the case
plan required her to do so for one year; however, nothing in the court orders or case
plan required appellant to stay in a fixed location in order to meet that requirement;
appellant always maintained some type of housing, and the Department of Human
Services (DHS) presented no clear and convincing evidence that any of her
residences were unsafe or inappropriate; the termination decision was too important
to rest on this factor, given the entirety of the evidence in this case.
2.
PARENT & CHILD – TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS – EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO
WARRANT TERMINATION .– There was no clear and convincing evidence that
appellant’s cognitive abilities or her possible depression, which was not shown to be
anything other than situational, adversely affected her ability to parent her children;
nor was there clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s meager income rendered
her unfit; the appellate court therefore reversed the termination order and directed the
circuit court to conduct an immediate review hearing and either return the child to
appellant’s custody or continue reunification services, as appropriate.
Appeal from Drew Circuit Court; Teresa French, Judge; reversed and remanded.
Deborah R. Sallings, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant.
Tabitha Baertels McNulty, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Greg Fallon, attorney ad litem.
Appellant Rebecca Garcia Strickland appeals from an order terminating her parental
rights in CS (born August 13, 2003) and JS (born August 5, 2005). She argues that there was
insufficient evidence to warrant termination. We agree and reverse the termination order.
I. Background Information
Appellant is a twenty-six-year-old resident of Drew County. Both of her children
suffer from developmental delays, and JS suffers from numerous physical problems as well. In
January 2006, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) submitted an affidavit to
the Drew County Circuit Court, seeking emergency custody of the children. The affidavit
stated that JS was not attending a Kids First daycare program as prescribed by his doctor; that,
when JS did attend, he arrived dirty and needing a bath; and that appellant had picked the
children up from daycare in a vehicle with no child seats, accompanied by a cousin who
smelled of alcohol. The circuit court granted emergency custody to DHS on February 3,
2006.
On March 31, 2006, CS and JS were adjudicated dependent-neglected. The court
approved a goal of parental reunification and directed appellant to obtain stable housing,
employment, and transportation; complete parenting classes; and obey court orders and the
case plan. Subsequent review orders in June and July 2006 found that appellant had completed
-2-
parenting classes, assisted with the children’s transportation, visited the children, and
maintained stable housing since May 2006. The court allowed an increase in appellant’s
visitation.
An October 12, 2006, review order continued the goal of reunification. The court
observed that appellant had attended all of JS’s medical appointments and had moved in
September 2006 due to a break-in at her home. Appellant was directed to re-enroll in
parenting classes, maintain stable housing, and obey the case plan and court orders.
In January 2007, DHS reported that appellant “has done well in the past year.” The
report stated that appellant had complied with court orders and the case plan; maintained
stable housing and transportation; kept the children overnight on a weekly basis; and ensured
the children’s health and safety needs when they were in her care.
A permanency-planning hearing, scheduled for January 2007, was continued based on
appellant’s separation from her husband, Jose Garcia-Lopez.1 Several additional continuances
involving Mr. Garcia-Lopez resulted in the permanency-planning hearing not being held until
July 12, 2007. Interim court reports and case plans state that appellant did not have stable
transportation; had been living in her aunt’s home for six months; and had been encouraged
by DHS to obtain her own home.
On August 21, 2007, the court entered a permanency-planning order, stating that
reunification was expected by January 1, 2008, based on appellant’s significant progress toward
1
Mr. Garcia-Lopez was the father of JS. His parental rights were also terminated.
He does not appeal the termination in this proceeding.
-3-
achieving the case-plan goals and her diligent work toward reunification. However, the court
pointed out that, while appellant had obtained a car, she had not had her driver’s license
reinstated and had not maintained stable housing or attended all of JS’s medical appointments
(though it was possible she had not received notice of every appointment). Appellant was
ordered to attend JS’s medical appointments; notify DHS if she needed transportation to the
appointments; obtain and maintain a safe and stable home; complete another parenting course;
maintain visitation; reinstate her driver’s license; and have adequate transportation.
According to DHS reports, appellant made unsuccessful attempts after the hearing to
live with her mother and her grandmother. She then obtained her own apartment in
September 2007. On October 4, 2007—before the predicted reunification date and only six
weeks after the last order—DHS filed a petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights. On
the same day the petition was filed, the court entered a fifteen-month review order, changing
the goal of the case to termination of parental rights and adoption. The court found that
appellant had completed parenting classes, visited the children, and attended JS’s medical
appointments but failed to acquire stable transportation or maintain stable housing, having
moved three times since the last hearing.
II. The Termination Hearing
A termination hearing was held on December 13, 2007. Adoption specialist Marrianne
Cruce testified that the children were adoptable and that DHS had families for them. Family
service worker Jennifer Harper testified that appellant was in partial compliance with the case
plan, having completed her parenting classes. However, Harper said, appellant had not
-4-
acquired stable transportation, was not employed, and had not maintained stable housing for
a year, as designated in the case plan. With regard to transportation, Harper admitted that the
case plan did not require appellant to own a vehicle and that appellant could comply with the
case plan by having readily available transportation. She further acknowledged that the
children would not necessarily be endangered by appellant’s relying on others for
transportation. Harper also testified that appellant was unemployed due to a disability and
received SSI payments of $623 per month. Harper said that appellant could possibly support
herself and the children on that income. As for housing, Harper testified that appellant had
moved eight times since the case began, prior to moving to her current one-bedroom
apartment in September 2007. According to Harper, JS’s medical needs required stable
housing. She referenced a letter from Dr. Maryelle Vonlanthen, which stated that JS’s weight
gains varied with changes in his living conditions.
CASA volunteer Cynthia Pope testified that she recommended termination of parental
rights. Her recommendation was based on appellant’s purported failure to meet three basic
requirements of the case plan—stable housing, reliable transportation, and employment. Pope
stated, however, that appellant “has a support system in place for her transportation.” She also
placed a CASA court report into evidence. The report stated, if appellant continued to move
frequently, the children’s medical and emotional well-being could be disrupted. However,
it also stated that appellant had no desire to vacate her apartment, that all utilities were in
working order, and that appellant could possibly obtain a larger apartment when the children
were returned to her. Additionally, the report stated that appellant could be situationally
-5-
depressed. It referred to appellant’s psychological evaluation, which described appellant’s
limited intellectual functioning and cognitive abilities, though it made no recommendation
about reunification. Finally, the report noted that appellant was working hard to improve
herself and was trying for her GED; that appellant understood the importance of her children’s
education; that she loved her children and strongly desired that they be returned to her care;
that appellant demonstrated an adequate ability to care for her home; that family members in
the area assisted her with transportation; and that appellant “frequently stated her spiritual
beliefs and how she used this for guidance and strength.”
Appellant testified that she suffered from a learning disability and had trouble spelling
and reading. Because of this, she received $623 in disability payments and food stamps, which
covered expenses with money left over. She testified that she had completed three sets of
parenting classes and that she visited her children every week. Further, she had acquired a
driver’s license. However, she relied on her aunt, who lived in the same apartment complex,
or her mother, who lived about twenty minutes away, for transportation. She also said that
she could use the Medicaid bus. Appellant said that she understood JS’s medical condition and
received training from Arkansas Children’s Hospital on how to care for him. She also said that
she had attended all of JS’s medical appointments that she knew of except one. Appellant said
she intended to stay in her apartment complex and would be transferred to a three-bedroom
apartment if the children were returned to her. On cross-examination, she testified that her
rights had been terminated as to another child and possibly second, although the testimony
is unclear. Appellant also said on cross-examination that she did not think she needed
-6-
counseling, but she would go if she were ordered to.
On rebuttal, Jennifer Harper testified that appellant was not notified about some of JS’s
doctor appointments, but appellant did miss three appointments to which she was “invited.”
III. The Termination Decision
Following the hearing, the court entered an order terminating appellant’s parental
rights. The court found that appellant had not been in a stable home environment due to her
frequent moves; that appellant’s SSI income might not be enough to support the children; that
appellant could not understand some of JS’s medical needs; that appellant could not read well;
and that appellant was depressed, yet declined to seek treatment. Based on these findings, the
court ruled that termination was in the children’s best interest and that the following grounds
for termination were proved: 1) the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected and
continued out of appellant’s custody for twelve months and, despite a meaningful effort by
DHS to rehabilitate appellant and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions
have not been remedied by appellant; 2) the children lived outside appellant’s home for a
period of twelve months, and appellant willfully failed to provide significant material support
in accordance with her means or maintain meaningful contact with the children; 3) other
factors or issues arose subsequent to filing the original dependency-neglect petition that
demonstrate a return of the children to appellant is contrary to their health, safety, or welfare
and that, despite the offer of appropriate family services, appellant has manifested the
incapacity or indifference to remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the
circumstances that prevent return of the children to her. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-
-7-
341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a); (ii)(a); and (vii)(a) (Repl. 2008). Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
from the termination order.
IV. Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of the natural
rights of the parents. Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 100 Ark. App. 74, ___ S.W.3d ___
(2007). A heavy burden is placed upon a party seeking to terminate the parental relationship,
and the facts warranting termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Albright v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 97 Ark. App. 277, 248 S.W.3d 498 (2007). Clear and
convincing evidence is that degree of proof which will produce in the fact-finder a firm
conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established. Smith, supra. This standard of
proof reduces the possibility that a parent’s rights are terminated based solely on a few isolated
instances of unusual conduct or idiosyncratic behavior and impresses the fact-finder with the
importance of the decision, thereby perhaps reducing the chances that inappropriate
terminations will be ordered. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). However, courts
are not to enforce parental rights to the detriment or destruction of the health and well-being
of the child. Smith, supra.
The law presumes that a fit parent acts in the best interests of his or her children. See
Linder v. Linder, 348 Ark. 322, 72 S.W.3d 841 (2002). While there is still reason to believe
there can be a positive, nurturing parent-child relationship, the law favors preservation, not
severance, of natural familial bonds. Santosky, supra. The fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because
-8-
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life. Id.
Our termination statute requires clear and convincing proof that termination is in the
child’s best interest, plus clear and convincing proof of at least one of the enumerated grounds
for termination. See Smith, supra. We do not reverse the circuit court’s finding of clear and
convincing evidence unless that finding is clearly erroneous. See id. A finding is clearly
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. Our
review is de novo. Williams v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 99 Ark. App. 95, 257 S.W.3d 574
(2007).
Discussion
[1] We are firmly convinced that the circuit court erred in terminating appellant’s
parental rights. When reviewing termination cases, we are ever mindful of the extraordinary
nature of that remedy. As noted above, a heavy burden is placed upon a party seeking to
terminate the parental relationship, and the facts warranting termination must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence. Albright, supra. Often, this burden is met by a showing of
physical or emotional abuse, drug or alcohol abuse, parental indifference, abandonment, severe
psychological disturbances, or environmental neglect. Those factors are noticeably absent here.
Instead, the termination decision, which forever severed appellant’s parental bonds with CS
and JS, was primarily informed by appellant’s numerous moves during the time she was
-9-
awaiting reunification with her children.
The evidence showed that appellant moved away from her mother shortly after the
children were placed in DHS custody. She later lived with Mr. Garcia-Lopez, but they moved
after a criminal incident at their home. She moved again when she separated from Mr. GarciaLopez, and lived in her aunt’s house for six months, according to at least one DHS report.
When she was encouraged by DHS to get her own place, she apparently tried to live with her
mother and her grandmother for brief periods. She then acquired her own apartment. By the
time of the termination hearing, she had been living in the apartment for approximately three
months. At least one other move took place during the case, but the circumstances are not
explained in the record.
Unquestionably, appellant was under orders from the trial court to maintain stable
housing. The case plan required her to do so for one year. However, nothing in the court
orders or case plan required appellant to stay in a fixed location in order to meet that
requirement. Appellant always maintained some type of housing, and DHS presented no clear
and convincing evidence that any of her residences were unsafe or inappropriate. DHS cites
the moves as evidence of an unusually peripatetic or unstable personality, but there are logical
explanations for many of the moves. Moreover, they equally connote a continual striving by
appellant to maintain suitable housing despite her circumstances.
We believe the termination decision is too important to rest on this factor, given the
entirety of the evidence in this case. As late as August 2007, the court lauded appellant’s
progress and predicted imminent reunification. Appellant is unquestionably devoted to her
-10-
children and visited them faithfully throughout the case. Her completion of three sets of
parenting classes is a testament to her determination to abide by the case plan and court
orders. And, while it appears she may have missed some of JS’s doctor’s appointments during
this two-year case, the record reveals some confusion as to whether she received notification
of all appointments.
[2] Further, there was no clear and convincing evidence that appellant’s limited
cognitive abilities or her possible depression, which was not shown to be anything other than
situational, adversely affected her ability to parent JS and CS. Nor was there clear and
convincing evidence that appellant’s meager income rendered her unfit. Appellant testified
that her disability payments and food stamps covered what few expenses she had, with money
left over. DHS witness Jennifer Harper testified that appellant could possibly support herself
and the children on that income. It is also noteworthy that, when appellant lost her vehicle
after separating from Mr. Garcia-Lopez, she was able to establish a transportation support
system that no DHS witness could seriously fault. Jennifer Harper testified that appellant’s
obligation to acquire stable transportation did not necessarily require ownership of a car.
We therefore reverse the termination order. The circuit court is directed to conduct
an immediate review hearing and either return the children to appellant’s custody or continue
reunification services, as appropriate.
Reversed and remanded.
H ART and H UNT, JJ., agree.
-11-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.