Linda Lovell v. Central Arkansas Development Council
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CA08-202
Opinion Delivered DEC EM BER
3, 2008
LINDA LOVELL
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CV2006-476-2]
HONORABLE GARY M. ARNOLD,
JUDGE
CENTRAL ARKANSAS
DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Judge
Linda Lovell appeals the October 25, 2007 judgment entered against her in Saline
County Circuit Court. She contends that the trial court had insufficient evidence before it
to grant judgment based upon the counterclaim filed by appellee Central Arkansas
Development Council (CADC). She further claims that the trial court erred in failing to
sustain her complaint for breach of contract. We affirm.
Lovell filed her complaint for breach of contract on March 2, 2006, against CADC and
Rick Holland, the mayor of Benton, who authorized the contract with Lovell.1 She sought
payment for her work performed under the contract, which was to resurface kitchen space
1
This case was originally filed in Saline County District Court, but transferred by
order of May 17, 2006, to Saline County Circuit Court upon motion by CADC that the
basis of its counterclaim exceeded the jurisdictional limits of district court. Lovell
nonsuited as to Rick Holland by order filed April 24, 2006, in Saline County District
Court.
at the Benton Senior Citizens Center. CADC filed a counterclaim against Lovell alleging that
the contract called for a “like new” concrete floor at the Center and that Lovell did not
provide it. The total contract price was $6,659.50, and CADC acknowledged that final
payment of $2,219.83 had not been paid to Lovell because the floor was not “like new.”
CADC alleged that they gave Lovell an opportunity to cure the defective performance, but
Lovell demanded more money. CADC was forced to hire a new contractor to remove the
floor applied by Lovell and apply a new finish. Further, CADC had to repaint the kitchen
walls that Lovell had painted, as the paint used by Lovell was not in compliance with Arkansas
Department of Health regulations. CADC sought judgment for Lovell’s breach of contract
in using the incorrect type paint for the kitchen and failing to perform satisfactory work in
resurfacing the floor.
After a bench trial, the circuit court granted judgment to CADC. The judgment
states:
After hearing all evidence in this matter and considering the applicable law, the Court
finds that the Plaintiff is not entitled to damages on the Complaint. However, the
Defendant/Counter Plaintiff, Central Arkansas Development Council, has
demonstrated to this Court that it is entitled to Judgment against the Plaintiff/Counter
Defendant in the amount of $4,439.66 in order to be made whole under the contract
between it and the Plaintiff. The Counter Plaintiff is also awarded attorney fees in the
amount of $750.00 plus Court costs in the amount of $160.00, for a total Judgment
of $5,349.66.
Lovell filed a timely notice of appeal, and this appeal followed.
The standard that we apply when we review a judgment entered by a circuit court
after a bench trial is well established. We do not reverse such a judgment unless we determine
that the circuit court erred as a matter of law or we decide that its findings were clearly against
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the preponderance of the evidence. Heartland Community Bank v. Holt, 68 Ark. App. 30, 3
S.W.3d 694 (1999). Disputed facts and determination of the credibility of witnesses are
within the province of the circuit court, sitting as trier of fact. Id.
Lovell contends that the trial court erred in sustaining CADC’s counterclaim for breach
of contract. She argues that she properly performed the labor as per the terms of the contract
and thus could not have been in breach. The circuit court determined that Lovell failed to
properly resurface the Center’s floor and interior walls, which necessitated CADC having to
spend money to get the work done properly.
Lovell points out that she testified that the terms of the contract provided that she was
to use ARDEX CD as the floor-finishing material. She claimed that she followed the
specifications to the letter concerning application of the product. CADC’s witness, Mr.
Victor Wheatley, stated that ARDEX could be applied to the floor. Lovell claims that
Wheatley’s objection to the floor seemed to be the floor’s texture. Further, Lovell contends
that there was no specific regulation or policy prohibiting the type of texture she applied to
the interior walls. She contends that any dispute as to the finish or texture of the floor or
walls would not have been a material breach of contract entitling CADC to an award of
monetary damages because the contract did not specify texture.
CADC contends that Lovell’s argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court’s finding of breach on her part, fails to consider the facts presented at trial.
Wheatley, whom the trial judge found to be the most credible witness, testified that the floor
was not satisfactory for a kitchen because it would not hold up under hot grease and, with the
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abuse of walking back and forth, it would only last a few months. He also testified that the
floor had too many ridges to make it possible to squeegee water to the drain. He stated that
the product used might be permissible to use in a kitchen if it were properly applied, but he
believed that the application of the product here was the problem. He stated that he only
used this product for decks and patios.
CADC also points out that Lovell admitted that she had not used ARDEX before
using it on the floor at the Center. Lovell also stated that her finished product did not look
anything like the floor at Rhea Men’s Store in Benton, even though she was hired to install
a floor to look like it. Pat Sanders, an environmental health specialist for the State, testified
that a floor in a commercial-grade kitchen is to be smooth and easily cleanable and that a floor
that you could not squeegee would be a problem. CADC argues that the evidence was that
Lovell was to resurface a floor for a commercial-grade kitchen. Upon completion, CADC
had to hire the job to be redone because the ridges in the floor did not make it possible to
squeegee water off the floor. CADC contends that the ridges were due to misapplication of
the product.
CADC submits that the evidence regarding the kitchen walls supports the trial court’s
findings. Lovell testified that the paint was like the example at the bottom of the board on
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, which was a demonstration board of the various types of paint
applications. The example Lovell pointed to was that of the type of wall surface which was
gritty and attracts dust and dirt over time. Also, Pat Sanders testified that the walls were not
smooth and were chalky. She advised that the walls should be repainted, and they were.
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CADC maintains, therefore, that the trial court’s finding of a breach of contract is not clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence. We so hold.
For her second point on appeal, Lovell contends that if she was not in breach of
contract, as argued above, she should have been awarded damages for CADC’s breach of
contract for not paying her for the work she performed. Because we hold that the trial court
was not in error in finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Lovell failed to perform
under the contract, her argument that she is entitled to the final payment under the contract
must also fail. Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT and H UNT, JJ., agree.
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CA08-202
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