Zola Willis v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
No. CA 07-1355
Opinion Delivered
ZOLA WILLIS
APPELLANT
V.
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
MAY 21, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. JN2006-1642]
HONORABLE JOYCE WILLIAMS,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant Zola Willis argues that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights
in M.W. (born May 14, 2003). We disagree and affirm.
On August 7, 2006, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS) exercised a
seventy-two-hour hold on M.W.’s older sister, L.S., after L.S. reported being sexually abused
by Christopher Willis, who was M.W.’s father and L.S.’s putative father. While L.S. was at
the DHS office, appellant left town with Willis and her other three children, including M.W.
They were later found in southeast Arkansas, and M.W. was taken into DHS custody on
August 16, 2006, along with the other children. Christopher Willis was criminally charged.
On October 13, 2006, the trial court adjudicated M.W. and the other children
dependent-neglected and found that Willis had sexually abused L.S. The court noted that
appellant “has gone back and forth on whether or not she believes [L.S.].” Later, the court
set a goal of reunifying M.W. with appellant, and appellant was ordered to, among other
things, cooperate with DHS; keep DHS informed of her places of residence and employment;
maintain stable housing and employment; undergo a psychological evaluation; participate in
individual and family therapy; and demonstrate the ability to protect M.W. and keep her safe.
On January 9 and 10, 2007, Dr. Paul Deyoub conducted a psychological evaluation
of appellant. He found that appellant did not believe L.S.’s accusations of sexual abuse. He
also doubted appellant’s insistence that she was no longer seeing Christopher Willis. Dr.
Deyoub recommended that appellant enter a family-treatment program and stated that she
must prove herself capable of maintaining a safety plan that prevented Willis from seeing the
children. Dr. Deyoub stated, “If [appellant] continues a regular marital relationship with Mr.
Willis, I do not see that she will be able to regain custody of the children. . . .”
The court held a review hearing on January 26, 2007, and observed that appellant
“testified again today she is not sure if she believes [L.S.’s] allegations or not.” The court also
found that appellant had refused to provide an address to DHS; lied to DHS about her address
on another occasion; and was untruthful about her ongoing involvement and living
arrangement with Willis. The court credited testimony from a landlord that appellant and
Willis told her they would both be living in the same apartment. Appellant was ordered to
participate in the family-treatment program.
Workers from the family-treatment program tried to contact appellant, but she did not
return their calls until February 2007. She set up an appointment for February 13, 2007,
rescheduled it, then was not heard from again until May 2007. Social Worker Jim Harper saw
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appellant for about five sessions in May and June, but she did not show up for an appointment
in July. According to Harper, appellant still did not believe that Willis had abused L.S.
The court held a permanency-planning hearing on July 26, 2007, and found that
appellant had not attended therapy as required, had not kept DHS informed when she moved,
and had not provided proof of stable income or housing. The court specifically mentioned
Jim Harper’s conclusion that appellant still believed that L.S. fabricated the abuse allegations.
The court changed the goal of the case to termination of parental rights.
Near the time the permanency-planning order was entered, appellant notified Harper
that she preferred a female therapist. Dr. Karen Worley was prepared to begin seeing appellant
in early August 2007, but Dr. Worley was mistakenly told by DHS family service worker
Elnora Perkins that appellant’s parental rights had already been terminated. Once the error
was corrected, Dr. Worley began seeing appellant in mid-September 2007.
The termination hearing was held on September 21 and 28, 2007. Dr. Deyoub testified
that appellant did not believe that her husband sexually abused L.S. Dr. Deyoub said that, had
appellant begun the family-treatment program in January 2007, she could have completed it
by January 2008. But the fact that she had only attended five or six sessions and did not begin
them until May 2007 indicated a poor prognosis for reunification. He also said that he was
not yet confident that appellant would prevent Willis from having access to M.W.
On cross-examination, Dr. Deyoub acknowledged the possibility that appellant was
going through denial, which would not be unusual. But, he said, denial is only a legitimate
excuse “for a little while, not very long.” Further, he said, he could not have been clearer in
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his evaluation that appellant’s relationship with Willis was incompatible with getting her
children back. If indeed appellant was continuing to see Willis, he said, she had “made a
choice” and was not doing what was necessary to reunite with her children.
Dr. Karen Worley testified that she would know in three to six months the direction
that appellant’s therapy was going. She observed that appellant expressed sorrow at being
separated from M.W. and that it was not unusual for women to go through a period of denial
in this situation, up to six months if they did not undergo treatment. However, Dr. Worley
stated that appellant was “not going to be able to do a lot of what she needs to do” if she
continued to be involved with Willis.
Appellant acknowledged in her testimony that she was supposed to keep DHS
informed of her living arrangements but did not do so. She admitted to having neither a fixed
address nor sufficient income to take care of M.W. She also said that she stayed with Willis
the night before the termination hearing and had done nothing to separate herself from him,
despite having read Dr. Deyoub’s evaluation and understood his recommendations, as well
as the court’s instructions, about separating from Willis. She said she did not believe that
Willis molested L.S. and that she would not believe it until she received more counseling.
Upon further examination, appellant stated that she would be willing to separate from Willis
if that was what it took to get M.W. back, and she asked the court for more time and
counseling to be able to do that. She said that her sessions with Worley were going very well.
Adoption specialist Lisa Saulsberry testified that M.W. was very adoptable and had
several prospects, including her current foster family. Family service worker Elnora Perkins
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testified that she made a mistake when she determined after the July 26, 2007 hearing that
appellant’s parental rights had been terminated. She apologized for her error.
Following the hearing, the trial court terminated appellant’s parental rights. The court
expressed disbelief regarding appellant’s testimony that she had not lived with Willis during
the case and noted that appellant spent the night before the termination hearing with Willis.
The court also observed that appellant had no home or sufficient income to care for M.W.;
that appellant deliberately withheld information from DHS about her address; that appellant
still did not believe that Willis abused L.S.; and that appellant was not diligent in pursuing
family therapy. Based on these findings, the court ruled that termination was in M.W.’s best
interest and that four grounds for termination were proved by clear and convincing evidence,
including the following: 1) M.W. was adjudicated dependent-neglected and continued out
of appellant’s custody for more than twelve months and, despite a meaningful effort by DHS
to rehabilitate appellant and correct the conditions that caused removal, those conditions have
not been remedied by appellant; 2) other factors or issues arose subsequent to the filing of the
original dependency-neglect petition that demonstrated a return of M.W. to appellant was
contrary to M.W.’s health, safety, or welfare and that, despite the offer of appropriate family
services, appellant manifested an incapacity or indifference to remedying the subsequent
factors or issues. Appellant appeals from that order.
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence that termination was in M.W.’s
best interest and insufficient evidence of grounds for termination. We disagree. Appellant has
one daughter who, based on the court’s findings and the opinion of a psychological expert,
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was sexually abused by Christopher Willis. Yet, appellant refused to believe the allegations and
maintained a close relationship with Willis, even spending the night before the termination
hearing with him. See Sparkman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 96 Ark. App. 363, 242 S.W.3d
282 (2006) (upholding termination where mother would not commit to keeping her sexuallyabusive husband away from her child); Wright v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 83 Ark. App. 1,
115 S.W.3d 332 (2003) (upholding termination where mother stood by the perpetrator who
abused her child). There was also evidence that, despite M.W.’s being out of appellant’s
custody for more than one year, appellant had no residence or income sufficient to take care
of the child. She further demonstrated an untruthful and uncooperative attitude towards DHS
and a casual if not neglectful approach to the therapy that Dr. Deyoub and the court regarded
as critical to her regaining custody of her child. Given these factors, we cannot say that the
trial court clearly erred in finding that termination was in M.W.’s best interest and that at least
one of the above mentioned grounds was proven. See Camarillo-Cox v. Ark. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 360 Ark. 340, 201 S.W.3d 391 (2005); Sparkman, supra.
Appellant argues that she needed more time in therapy to work through her denial.
However, her past actions demonstrate an indifference or inability to participate in therapy
on a regular basis. Furthermore, by the time of the termination hearing, M.W. had been out
of appellant’s custody for over a year, and appellant’s therapist predicted it would take three
to six months to determine the direction appellant’s therapy was going. M.W. is a young child
with a need for permanency and stability. See Camarillo-Cox, supra.
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Appellant also cites the DHS’s worker’s August 2007 mistake in telling Dr. Worley that
appellant’s parental rights had already been terminated, which caused a one-month delay in
appellant’s therapy. While this was an unfortunate error, by that point, appellant had
squandered several months of opportunity to engage in regular therapy and had only recently
begun participating in therapy at all.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and BAKER, JJ., agree.
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