Leonard Terral v. Betty Terral
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
LARRY D. VAUGHT, JUDGE
DIVISION I
CA07-1116
May 14, 2008
LEONARD TERRAL
APPELLANT
v.
BETTY TERRAL
APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM SEBASTIAN COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. DR2005-404(II)]
HONORABLE HARRY FOLTZ,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Leonard Terral appeals from an order denying his petition to terminate
alimony and awarding damages to appellee Betty Terral for Leonard’s contempt of the
parties’ divorce decree. We affirm.
Leonard and Betty were divorced on December 30, 2005. Their marital property
included gas and mineral rights on several acres of land; a “home place” that contained the
couple’s marital dwelling; various vehicles; household furnishings and garage tools; and
stock, retirement, and bank accounts. The decree divided this property equally for the
most part and gave the parties ninety days to “mutually sell and dispose” of it or petition
for a public sale. Betty received possession of the marital home until it sold and alimony
for life in the form of gas and mineral royalties.
After the divorce hearing, Betty asked the court to hold Leonard in contempt. She
alleged that, while she was away receiving treatment for cancer, Leonard broke into the
marital home, removed items from the house and garage, placed a “For Rent” sign on the
house, and placed a “For Sale” sign on the parties’ truck. Leonard responded that he
offered the house for rent in order to keep it insured after Betty “removed herself” from
the property. He admitted taking some of his “personal items” out of the garage and stated
that he was selling the truck because its $9000 indebtedness needed to be satisfied.
In February 2006, the parties addressed some of their property disputes in a
handwritten contract. They agreed, among other things, that they would meet at Farmers
Bank on March 16, 2006, to divide accounts and, after meeting at Farmers, would divide
accounts at other financial institutions; that neither would make further sales of property
identified in the decree without a court order or written agreement; and that the circuit
clerk would begin the process of holding a public sale of their personalty. Thereafter, most
of the parties’ real and personal property was sold and the proceeds distributed by order
dated December 8, 2006.
On December 21, 2006, Leonard filed a motion to terminate Betty’s alimony citing
changed circumstances. He claimed that Betty had started receiving Social Security
disability payments and that the royalties constituting her alimony had increased from
$1600 per month to about $2200 per month. Betty responded that circumstances had not
changed because the trial judge knew at the divorce hearing that she would receive Social
Security payments and that the royalties would fluctuate. She also asserted that Leonard
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refused to divide an IRA account, refused to divide the proceeds from the house rental
and truck sale, and removed items from the garage that were scheduled to be sold.
Following a hearing, the court denied Leonard’s petition to terminate alimony and
held him in contempt for removing items from the garage and failing to divide proceeds
from the IRA, house rental, and truck sale. The court criticized Leonard’s “cavalier
disregard” of its orders, declared that Leonard’s actions “have caused considerable
inconvenience to [Betty],” and stated that Leonard “sometimes appeared to intentionally
cause [Betty] as much anguish and inconvenience as possible.” The court made the
following awards to Betty as damages for Leonard’s contempt: 1) $1750 as half the IRA
account; 2) $1437 for the items taken from the garage; 3) $2325 as half the house-rental
proceeds; 4) $1355 as half the truck-sale proceeds. The court also denied Leonard’s motion
to terminate alimony. Leonard appeals from each of these rulings.
I. Contempt
Contempt may be used to effect civil remedies, the result of which is to make the
innocent party whole from the consequences of contemptuous conduct. Wakefield v.
Wakefield, 64 Ark. App. 147, 984 S.W.2d 32 (1998). In cases of civil contempt, the
objective is the enforcement of the rights of the private parties to litigation. Id.
Punishment for civil contempt will be upheld on appeal unless the trial court’s order is
arbitrary or against the weight of the evidence. Id.
A. IRA account
Betty and Leonard met at Farmers Bank on March 16, 2006, to divide accounts
pursuant to their handwritten agreement. Afterwards, Betty and her attorney prepared to
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go to Arvest Bank to divide a $3500 IRA there. Leonard refused to do so. The court held
Leonard in contempt, ruling that the decree was “crystal clear” that all IRAs were to be
divided equally.
Leonard contends on appeal that the court divided the Arvest IRA twice because
he purchased it with funds that he and Betty split when they separated in 2005. Leonard is
essentially arguing that he bought the IRA with his own funds. However, he did not
claim the Arvest IRA as his separate property in the divorce. Rather, the decree provided
that all IRAs were marital property to be divided equally. Leonard was therefore bound,
under the terms of the decree, to divide the Arvest IRA with Betty. Further, Leonard
acknowledged at the contempt hearing that the handwritten agreement’s reference to
dividing accounts at other institutions could only have meant an Arvest account. Under
these circumstances, the trial court did not err in holding Leonard in contempt for
disobeying the decree.
B. Property taken from the garage
The divorce decree awarded Betty the contents of the home place and provided
that the garage tools and other personalty would be sold and the proceeds divided evenly.
Betty testified that, when Leonard broke into the residence, he took several items from the
garage, including a chain saw, car parts, a Christmas tree, lamp, VCR, and television, with
a total value of $1437.50. The court awarded Betty $1437 for Leonard’s contempt in
taking the property.
Leonard argues on appeal that the court should have awarded Betty half the $1437
because, under the decree, the garage items were to be divided equally. However, the
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court found that the articles taken from the garage may have included Betty’s non-marital
property and household furnishings, which were awarded to her separately. Moreover, the
court was not bound in this contempt proceeding to make an equal division of marital
property. The court could reasonably have awarded damages to Betty not only for the
value of the purloined items but as compensation for the inconvenience she suffered when
the items were taken.
C. Rental payments
After Leonard broke into the house while Betty was receiving cancer treatment in
Texas, he rented the house and received $4650. He paid none of it to Betty, claiming he
spent more than that to repair and refurbish the house for rental. The court awarded Betty
$2325 as half the rents, ruling that the repairs were not authorized and that Leonard made
them “at his peril.” We find no error. Leonard not only gained unauthorized possession of
the house but took it upon himself to rent the house and make repairs. He did not receive
permission from the court or Betty’s consent before proceeding, which prevented Betty
from having input on the necessity of the rental and repairs. One who officiously confers a
benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution therefor. See Childs v. Adams, 322 Ark.
424, 909 S.W.2d 641 (1995).
D. Truck-sale proceeds
The decree stated that the parties “have an indebtedness on the 2000 GMC vehicle,
and [Leonard] will continue to make the payments on the GMC, pending the sale. After
the debt has been paid, the proceeds of sale shall be equally divided.” Leonard made
payments of $2398 on the truck, then sold it. Afterwards, he paid off the debt and was left
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with $2710. He refused to share the full amount with Betty, claiming that he should first
be reimbursed for the payments he made pending the sale. The court ruled that Leonard
sold the truck in violation of the decree, which specified a mutually agreeable sale, and
that Leonard was not entitled to a set-off because the decree was silent on his recouping
any truck payments made prior to sale. The court awarded Betty $1355 as half the sale
proceeds.
We agree with the court’s ruling. The divorce decree ordered Leonard to make the
truck payments and contained no provision for their reimbursement. Had Leonard wanted
credit for the payments, he could have ensured that the decree so provided. Instead, the
decree simply stated that, after Leonard made the payments and the truck was sold, the
proceeds would be divided equally after the debt was paid. When Leonard refused to
divide the net proceeds after the sale, he disregarded the decree, and the court was within
its authority to compel his obedience. See Johnson v. Johnson, 343 Ark. 186, 33 S.W.3d 492
(2000).
Leonard argues that the decree was not silent on his receiving credit for the truck
payments, citing an exhibit that states, “each to pay one-half” of certain debts, including
the truck. We disagree that this phrase changes the decree’s language expressly giving
Leonard the responsibility for making the pre-sale truck payments.
II. Petition to terminate alimony
Modification of alimony must be based on a change in the circumstances of the
parties. Hass v. Hass, 80 Ark. App. 408, 97 S.W.3d 424 (2003). The burden of showing a
change in circumstances is always upon the party seeking modification. Id. A court’s ruling
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regarding a change in circumstances is a finding of fact that will not be reversed unless
clearly erroneous. See id.
Betty testified at the September 2005 divorce hearing that the previous month’s gas
and mineral royalties on the couple’s properties totaled $1600. She asked the court to
award her full rights to future royalties in lieu of a monthly dollar amount of alimony, and
the court did so, taking into account Betty’s poor health, the length of the marriage, and
the disparity in the parties’ incomes. Betty also testified that her doctors told her she would
qualify for Social Security disability payments. The court ordered Leonard to pay Betty’s
health insurance premiums until she obtained Social Security benefits.
In December 2006, Leonard moved to terminate alimony because the royalty
payments had increased and Betty was receiving Social Security benefits. A trial exhibit
showed that several royalty payments in 2006 and 2007 were much greater than $1600,
though others were comparable or even less. The court ruled that circumstances had not
changed because it awarded royalties to Betty “knowing full well that the royalties could
be expected to fluctuate.” Further, the court found that, considering all the reasons
alimony was awarded in the first place, there was no reason to terminate it.
We cannot say that the trial court clearly erred. If the court knew when it awarded
alimony in the form of royalty payments that the royalties would fluctuate, such
fluctuation would not constitute a material change in circumstances or a fact not known at
the time of the initial order. See generally Meins v. Meins, 93 Ark. App. 292, 218 S.W.3d
366 (2005). Moreover, the court ruled that the same factors that merited an award of
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alimony to Betty in the initial decree — poor health, length of marriage, disparity in
earnings — still held true.
Leonard argues that the court’s refusal to terminate alimony was a punitive
measure. Our review of the record reveals no evidence of this. The court considered the
traditional factors in making its ruling.
III. Attorney fees
Leonard argues for the first time in his reply brief that the court’s award to Betty of
$6500 in attorney fees was excessive. We do not address arguments raised for the first time
in a reply brief. Rolling Pines v. City of Little Rock, 73 Ark. App. 97, 40 S.W.3d 828 (2001).
Affirmed.
HEFFLEY, J., agrees.
HART, J., concurs.
HART, J., concurring. I concur but write separately to note that the circuit court
simply distributed the property in question as contemplated by the divorce decree. First,
the division of the IRA was provided for by the decree, and the circuit court divided it
accordingly. Second, as for the rental payments, since the decree placed appellee in
possession of the residence, she was entitled to—at a minimum—half the rents. Appellant’s
act of entering the home in appellee’s absence and voluntarily expending funds to repair
the home did not entitle him to any reimbursement, as he was at best a volunteer and at
worst a trespasser. Third, the truck-sale proceeds were also distributed in accordance with
the decree, and the decree did not provide appellant with a setoff for truck payments.
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Fourth, the court determined that the property taken from the garage belonged to appellee
and awarded the value agreed upon by the parties. The only “sanction” imposed by the
court was the $150 it awarded because appellant took a washer and dryer, which appellant
does not appeal. Accordingly, I would affirm for reasons other than those given by the
majority.
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