James J. Scott v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION III
CACR 08-385
No.
Opinion Delivered
JAMES J. SCOTT
APPELLANT
NOVEMBER 5, 2008
APPEAL FROM THE SCOTT
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
[NO. CR2006-38A]
V.
HONORABLE DEWELL FRANKLIN
AREY III, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
JOHN B. ROBBINS, Judge
Appellant James J. Scott pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine with intent
to deliver, and on December 27, 2006, he was placed on three years’ probation. On
February 28, 2007, the State filed a petition to revoke appellant’s probated sentence on the
following grounds: (1) failure to pay fines and court costs; (2) failure to report to his
probation officer in February 2007; (3) pending criminal charges. After a revocation hearing
held on November 6, 2007, the trial court found that Mr. Scott violated the conditions of
his probation. On that day appellant’s probation was revoked and a judgment was entered
sentencing him to ten years in prison, with four years suspended.
Mr. Scott posted an appeal bond on November 30, 2007. On December 4, 2007,
Mr. Scott filed a motion for new trial, wherein he claimed that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. A hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial
was held on January 3, 2008, and on that day the trial court entered an order denying the
motion. The trial court’s order recites, “After hearing the evidence and argument of counsel,
the court hereby denies the motion, on the grounds that the New Trial Statute applies only
to jury trials, and that Rule 37 relief requires that the defendant be in custody.”
Mr. Scott now appeals from his probation revocation entered November 6, 2007, and
the denial of his motion for new trial entered January 3, 2008. He contends that the trial
court erred in finding that there is a custody requirement on motions for new trial, and also
erred in concluding that his motion was restricted to jury trials. Mr. Scott asks this court to
reverse and remand for a substantive hearing on his motion for new trial. We affirm.
Appellant’s probation officer, Doug Hartman, testified at the revocation hearing.
Mr. Hartman stated that Mr. Scott failed to report as directed for his February 2007 office
visit. Mr. Hart acknowledged that Mr. Scott may have been in jail at that time, and that
since being released Mr. Scott made all of his monthly visits. Mr. Hartman also testified that
Mr. Scott has made no payments toward his fines and costs.
Officer John Miller testified about a traffic stop he made in Sebastian County on the
night of February 9, 2007. Officer Miller stated that he stopped a vehicle being driven by
Mr. Scott for going 62 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone. There were two other passengers in the
car. Mr. Scott could produce no identification, and according to Officer Miller he was
uncooperative and his speech was slurred and incoherent. Because of Mr. Scott’s erratic and
suspicious behavior, Officer Miller thought that his safety was in imminent danger and he
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forcibly arrested Mr. Scott. Officer Miller arrested appellant for reckless driving, disorderly
conduct, resisting arrest, DWI, and assault.
At the conclusion of the testimony in the revocation hearing, Mr. Scott’s counsel
argued:
Our defense has been based primarily, Judge, on the principle that this man has not
been convicted of anything. He’s not been convicted of anything. He’s entitled to
a trial. And it may be at that trial that he’ll be found not guilty. If he is and this court
sends him down to the penitentiary, he’s sitting there in penitentiary when he hasn’t
in fact been found guilty of anything. He has not been tried, Judge. They’re
premature on this. They should have waited until he was tried and convicted.
The trial court announced from the bench that it thought that there was sufficient evidence
that Mr. Scott committed an offense punishable by imprisonment in violation of his
probation, and the trial court further found that Mr. Scott committed a violation based on
the uncontroverted proof that he failed to pay fines and costs.
In his motion for new trial, Mr. Scott asserted that his motion was timely because it
was filed within thirty days pursuant to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.3(b).
Mr. Scott further indicated that he was filing his motion for new trial under the authority of
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-89-130 (Repl. 2005), which provides:
(a) A new trial is the reexamination of an issue of fact in the same court by
another jury after a verdict has been given.
(b) The application for a new trial must be made at the same term at which the
verdict is rendered, unless the judgment is postponed to another term, in which case
it may be made at any time before judgment.
(c) The court in which a trial is had upon an issue of fact may grant a new trial
when a verdict is rendered against the defendant by which his or her substantial rights
have been prejudiced, upon his or her motion, in the following cases:
(1) Where the trial in the case of a felony was commenced and completed in
his or her absence;
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(2) Where the jury has received any evidence out of court other than that
resulting from a view as provided in this code;
(3) Where the verdict has been decided by lot, or in any other manner than
by a fair expression of opinion by the jurors;
(4) Where the court has misinstructed or refused to properly instruct the jury;
(5) Where the verdict is against law or evidence;
(6) Where the defendant has discovered important evidence in his or her favor
since the verdict; and
(7) Where, from the misconduct of the jury or from any other cause, the court
is of opinion that the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial.
(d) The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no
trial had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew, and the former verdict
cannot be used or referred to in evidence or in argument.
In particular, Mr. Scott based his motion on subsection (c)(7) of the above statute, claiming
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the revocation hearing. Appellant
submitted that his trial counsel was under the gross misunderstanding of the law that a
revocation could not occur unless there was a conviction, and that as a result his counsel
failed to prepare and present a defense to the State’s allegations. Mr. Scott contended in his
motion that his trial counsel should have called as witnesses his passengers in the vehicle, who
would have testified that he was not intoxicated and did not resist arrest or commit any other
offense punishable by imprisonment. Appellant asserted that had these witnesses been called
there was a reasonable probability that the result would have been different.
Mr. Scott was permitted to proffer the testimony of several witnesses at the hearing
on his new-trial motion. Mr. Scott himself testified that his trial counsel advised him not to
testify at the revocation hearing and told him that his probation could not be revoked
because he had not yet been convicted of the alleged criminal charges. Mr. Scott further
stated that on the night of the traffic stop he was not intoxicated and did not assault the
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police officer. Mr. Scott also stated that his fines had been paid by his step-grandfather.
Appellant’s step-grandfather testified that he had paid appellant’s fines, and he also was privy
to a conversation wherein Mr. Scott’s counsel advised that appellant’s defense would be that
there had not yet been a criminal conviction. Mr. Scott’s father testified that he was also
present during this consultation with the attorney.
Brenda Keeney was a passenger in appellant’s car on the night he was stopped. She
stated that she was available to be called as a witness at the revocation hearing and would
have testified. Ms. Keeney stated that Mr. Scott was not drinking or using drugs that night,
and that he did not assault or otherwise provoke the officer.
Mr. Scott’s trial counsel also gave proffered testimony at the hearing on the motion
for new trial. He did recall a meeting with Mr. Scott and his father and step-grandfather, but
denied advising that the defense would be a lack of a criminal conviction. However,
appellant’s trial counsel did acknowledge making this argument to the trial court at the
revocation hearing because he thought the State was premature in trying to revoke
appellant’s probation.
Mr. Scott’s argument on appeal is that the trial court erroneously refused to consider
the merits of his claim that he was entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Mr. Scott contends that, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, there is no custody
requirement, and his motion for new trial was applicable to his revocation hearing because
the relevant statute is not limited to only jury trials.
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We need not reach the merits of appellant’s arguments because even if the trial court
erred in refusing to consider his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he suffered no
prejudice. At the conclusion of the revocation hearing, the trial court discussed the alleged
criminal violations, and then announced:
But the conditions also required the Defendant to pay his fines, costs, and fees. And
the testimony has been that that’s not happened at all. And as you know, [defense
counsel], the State bears the burden of only proving one violation. So even if there
hasn’t been a conviction on the criminal charges, clearly the fees, fines and costs have
not been paid. And I think that proof was uncontroverted. Based on that I’m going
to find that the State met its burden of proving that the Defendant has inexcusably
failed to comply with the condition of his probation.
In Mr. Scott’s motion for new trial, he claimed, “The ineffectiveness of counsel is this: Trial
counsel erroneously believed that a revocation could not occur unless there was a conviction
on the Sebastian County offenses.” In his appellate brief, appellant makes exactly the same
claim. Mr. Scott did proffer testimony at the hearing on his motion for new trial that his
fines and costs had been paid. However, in neither his motion for new trial nor his argument
on appeal does Mr. Scott make any argument relating to the effectiveness of his counsel as
it relates to the unpaid fines and costs.
The State need only prove one violation of the conditions of probation in order to
revoke. Ross v. State, 22 Ark. App. 232, 738 S.W.2d 112 (1987). Moreover, it has
consistently been held that we will not reverse in the absence of prejudice. See Stivers v.
State, 354 Ark. 140, 118 S.W.3d 558 (2003). In the present case, even had the trial court
reached the substance of Mr. Scott’s argument and agreed that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to call witnesses to rebut the criminal allegations, Mr. Scott would nonetheless
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not have been entitled to a new trial. This is because the revocation was also specifically
grounded on appellant’s failure to pay fines and costs, and appellant has made no argument
below or an appeal that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present proof of his having
made the required payments. Mr. Scott’s probation would have been revoked even had he
successfully refuted the proof of his committing new crimes, and because he suffered no
prejudice we affirm his revocation as well as the trial court’s denial of his motion for new
trial.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and HEFFLEY, JJ., agree.
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