Brandi Smyth v. Jefferie Carpenter

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION JUDGE BRIAN MILLER  November 14, 2007  DIVISION II  CA07­83  November 14, 2007  BRANDI SMYTH  APPELLANT  v.  AN APPEAL FROM THE SALINE  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CV03­15­2]  JEFFERIE CARPENTER  APPELLEE  HONORABLE GARY ARNOLD,  JUDGE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Brandi Smyth presents two points in her appeal of the Saline County Circuit  Court’s denial of her motion for new trial.  She first asserts that the court erred in finding that  the jury’s verdict was not clearly contrary to the preponderance of the evidence.  She next  asserts  that  the  court  erred  in  failing  to  address,  in  its  order,  whether  she  was  fully  compensated for her damages.  We disagree and affirm.  Smyth was injured in a May 10, 2002 automobile accident with Jefferie Carpenter.  After the accident, x­rays of Smyth’s knee and back, revealing no fractures, were taken in  the emergency room of a local hospital.  Two weeks later, Smyth was treated by her personal  physician, Dr. David Stewart, who diagnosed Smyth with a ligament strain/contusion to her  right knee. Dr. Stewart prescribed physical therapy and pain medication.  He released Smyth  CA07­83  from treatment on August 13, 2002.  Approximately five months after being released by Dr.  Stewart, Smyth returned to Dr. Stewart complaining of knee and back pain.  She requested  and received a referral for an MRI, which returned a negative result.  On  January  7,  2003,  Smyth  sued  Carpenter  for  negligence,  claiming  $5905.77  in  medical expenses, $580 in prescription medication costs, and $409 in lost wages.  She also  sought damages for pain and suffering.  Carpenter admitted liability for the accident, and the  case proceeded to trial on the issue of damages.  There was evidence that the accident occurred at a low speed and caused little damage  to the parties’ vehicles.  The evidence also established that Smyth had problems with her  neck and back prior to her accident with Carpenter.  The testimony also established that  Smyth’s claim for lost wages was based upon her inability to work for five days.  The days  she missed from work, however, all occurred after Dr. Stewart released her from treatment,  and  after  she  accepted  employment  with  the  attorney  who  brought  her  lawsuit  and  this  appeal.  The jury returned a verdict for Smyth in the amount of $2544.  Pursuant to Ark. R.  Civ. P. 59(a)(5) and (6), Smyth moved for a new trial, claiming that the verdict failed to  sufficiently compensate her for her damages and that the verdict was clearly contrary to the  preponderance of the evidence.  The trial court denied the motion, and Smyth now appeals.  Smyth argues that the jury’s verdict failed to fully compensate her for her damages  and that it was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  When the primary issue  is the alleged inadequacy of the damage award, we will affirm the denial of a motion for new 2  CA07­83  trial absent a clear and manifest abuse of discretion.  Fritz v. Baptist Mem’l Health Care  Corp., 92 Ark. App. 181, 211 S.W.3d 593 (2005); see Kempner v. Schulte, 318 Ark. 433,  885 S.W.2d 892 (1994); Smith v. Petit, 300 Ark. 245, 778 S.W.2d 616 (1989).  When a  motion for new trial is based upon the allegation that the verdict is clearly contrary to the  preponderance of the evidence, we affirm the denial of the motion if the jury’s verdict is  supported by substantial evidence.  Schmidt v. Stearman,  Ark. App.  ,  S.W.3d  (Mar. 14, 2007); see Chapman v. Ford Motor Co., 368 Ark. 328, 194 S.W.3d 765 (2006);  Thomas v. Olson, 364 Ark. 444, 220 S.W.3d 627 (2005).  In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial based on a claim that the  damage award is inadequate, an important consideration is whether a fair­minded jury might  reasonably have fixed the award at the challenged amount.  Kempner, supra.  Further, the  jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight and value of their  evidence.  Id.  It may believe or disbelieve the testimony of any one or all of the witnesses,  though  such  evidence  is  uncontradicted  and  unimpeached.  Id.  The  reasonableness  and  necessity of medical expenses are questions of fact to be decided by the jury.  Id.  Because  the  jury’s  verdict  was  reasonable  and  was  not  clearly  contrary  to  the  preponderance of the evidence, the trial court did not err.  Furthermore, we cannot say that  the jury resorted to speculation and conjecture in reaching its verdict. See Griffin v. Woodall,  319 Ark. 383, 892 S.W.2d 451 (1995).  As set forth above, the jury was not required to  believe that all of Smyth’s injuries were caused by the accident with Carpenter, especially  considering her history of neck and back problems.  The jury was also allowed to consider 3  CA07­83  that all of the days that Smyth missed from work occurred after she was released by Dr.  Stewart and that she requested the MRI, which returned a negative result.  For all of these  reasons, we hold that substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict and that the trial court  did not abuse its discretion when it denied Smyth’s motion for new trial.  Affirmed.  HART  and GLOVER, JJ., agree. 4  CA07­83 

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