Patsy White v. Troy Denton

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Not Designated for Publication DIVISION II  CA07­258  November 28, 2007  PATSY WHITE  APPELLANT  APPEAL FROM  THE  POLK  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV­2006­003]  V. HON. J. W. LOONEY,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  TROY DENTON  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Patsy White appeals from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Troy Denton,  finding that White’s law suit was “precluded” by collateral estoppel and res judicata.  On  appeal, White argues that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment. We affirm.  White is the fee­simple owner of timberland in Polk County, subject to a life estate in  the property held by her brother, Kenneth T. Halcumb.  In the summer of 2004, Halcumb  contracted with Denton to cut and remove timber from the property.  On December 3, 2004,  White sued her brother for conversion of the timber and for damage to the property.  She  alleged that the property sustained damage in excess of $100,000 plus more than $25,000 in  clean­up  and  replanting  costs.  She  also  prayed  for  treble  damages  for  the  value  of  the  converted timber. Pursuant to her complaint against Halcumb, White obtained a $31,202.80  judgment on December 12, 2005.  In that judgment, the trial court denied White’s prayer for  treble damages, finding that Arkansas Code Annotated section 18­60­102 (Repl. 2003) was  not applicable.  It also failed to award damages for clean up or replanting of the timber. White  did  not  appeal.  A  satisfaction  of  judgment  was  entered  three  days  after  the  entry  of  the  judgment.  On  January  10,  2006,  White  filed  a  complaint  against  Denton  for  trespass  and  conversion of her timber.  She again sought treble damages for the wrongful removal of the  timber.  Denton timely answered, admitting that he had cut timber on the property upon which  Halcumb  resided,  but  generally  denying all  of  White’s  other  allegations.    Denton  filed  a  motion for summary judgment  on March 13, 2006, asserting that White’s complaint was  barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  He contended that White’s claim was resolved by a  judgment in her suit against Halcumb. After a hearing, the trial court agreed and dismissed  White’s complaint.  On  appeal,  White  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  granting  summary  judgment.  Citing the Arkansas Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, codified at Ark.Code Ann. §§ 16­  61­201 through 16­61­212 (Repl. 2005), she argues that recovery of a judgment against one  joint tortfeasor did not discharge the other joint tortfeasor.  She asserts that Denton acted  “jointly” with Halcumb to commit the torts of trespass and  conversion of her timber, but  contends that Denton is “independently liable” for those acts.  White argues that her cause of  action against Denton is not barred by res judicata because “she has not had a full opportunity  to  pursue  [Denton]  as  a  joint  tortfeasor.”    Citing  Womack  v.  Maner,  227  Ark.  786,  301  S.W.2d 438 (1957), she asserts that “no valid contract could be interpreted to have existed  between Denton and Halcumb,” and therefore Denton was not “in privity” with Halcumb. ­2­  CA07­258  She acknowledges that she received as damages the amount of money, that Halcumb sought  to collect from the timber, but asserts  that  the judgment “did not include or address” the  remaining alleged damages that she claimed.  We find this argument unpersuasive.  When we review  the grant of summary judgment where there is not a question of  whether factual issues exist, but rather whether it was proper for the trial court to apply the  doctrine of res judicata,  we simply determine whether appellee was entitled to judgment as  a matter of law.  Ruth R. Remmel Revocable Trust v. Regions Fin. Corp., 369 Ark. 392, ___  S.W.3d ___ (2007).  The term res judicata encompasses both issue and claim­preclusion.  Id.  Under  claim preclusion,  a  valid  and  final  judgment  rendered  on  the  merits  by  a  court  of  competent jurisdiction bars another action. Id.  Res judicata bars not only the relitigation of  claims that were actually litigated in the first suit but also those that could have been litigated.  Id. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata provides that a valid and final judgment rendered  on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars another action by the plaintiff or his  privies against the defendant or his privies on the same claim or cause of action.  See id.  When a case is based  on the same events as the subject matter of a previous lawsuit, res  judicata will apply even if the subsequent lawsuit raises new legal issues and seeks additional  remedies. Id. The key question regarding the application of res judicata is whether the party  against whom the earlier decision is being asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate  the issue in question. Id.  In the first place, we note that the Arkansas Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is not  applicable to the case at bar.  As stated in the Commissioners’ Prefatory Note to the 1939 ­3­  CA07­258  uniform  act,  the  purpose  of  the  statute  was  to  establish  a  “common  policy”  for  “loss  distribution among joint tortfeasors.”  It does not, as White suggests, give a plaintiff the right  to sue each of multiple tortfeasors individually for the same damages.  Scogin by Scogin v.  Tex­Ark Joist Co., 281 Ark. 175, 662 S.W.2d 819 (1984) (holding the Uniform Contribution  Among  Joint  Tortfeasors  Act  does  not  preclude  application  of  the  doctrine  of  collateral  estoppel).  The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the policy of limiting litigation to  one fair trial on an issue.  Id.  We note that White did recover a judgment for the very claims  that she subsequently attempted to assert against Denton.  If she was unsatisfied with the  amount of the judgment, her remedy was appeal.  As our supreme court stated in Francis v.  Francis, 343 Ark. 104, 31 S.W.3d 841 (2000),  The  test  in  determining  whether  res  judicata  applies  is  whether  the  matters  presented in a subsequent suit were necessarily within the issues of the former  suit and might have been lititigated therein . . . [W]hen the case at bar is based  on the same events and subject matter as the previous case, and only raises new  legal issues and seeks additional remedies, the trial court is correct to find the  present case is barred by res judicata.  Here, White’s suit against Denton arose from the same wrongful cutting of her timber and the  damages that she seeks are identical.  Arguably, she asserts a somewhat different legal theory,  negligence, as a basis for imposing liability against Denton, however, under the holding in  Francis, that fact is of no moment.  Likewise, White’s reliance on Womack, supra, for the proposition that Halcumb and  Denton were not in privity, is misplaced.  In Womack, the supreme court declined to reverse  a trial court’s decision denying recovery of bribe money that the appellant had paid to avoid ­4­  CA07­258  prosecution of his gambling enterprise.  In that case, the supreme court stated, “the general  rule is, that where an illegal contract has been made, neither the courts of law nor of equity  will interpose to grant any relief to the parties, but will leave them where it finds them.”  In  the instant case, White was not a party to the contract, and there was no finding that the  contract between Denton and Halcumb was an illegal contract.  Accordingly, Womack is  completely inapposite.  Moreover, we note that in Francis, supra, our supreme court stated,  “the true reason for holding an issue to be res judicata is not necessarily the identity or privity  of the parties, but instead to put an end to the litigation by preventing a party who has had one  fair trial on a matter from relitigating the matter a second time.”  Accordingly, we hold that  the trial court did not err in its application of the doctrine of res judicata to dismiss White’s  lawsuit.  Affirmed.  GLOVER and MILLER, JJ., agree. ­5­  CA07­258 

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