Kathy Crider v. John Ogles

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  WENDELL L. GRIFFEN, JUDGE  DIVISION III  CA07­236  KATHY CRIDER  APPELLANT  October 31, 2007  AN APPEAL FROM PULASKI  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CV2005­12765­2]  V.  HON. CHRIS PIAZZA, JUDGE  JOHN OGLES  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  1  On January 18, 2007, the Pulaski County Circuit Court granted appellee John Ogles’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  on  appellant  Kathy  Crider’s  claim  against  him  for  legal  malpractice  for  failing to  bring a  personal­injury  action  within  the  limitations  period.  It  concluded that appellant’s claim would have been unsuccessful, as she could not prove that  the owner of the premises where she tripped and fell knew or should have known that a  railroad tie was lying in the middle of the parking lot.  Appellant now contends that she was  not required to make such a showing because she alleged that the parking lot was poorly lit.  We affirm, holding that because Louisiana law required appellant to prove that the owner of  the premises knew or should have known of the hazardous condition of the parking lot, and  because she failed to present such evidence, appellant’s legal­malpractice claim based on  failure to timely file the lawsuit would not have succeeded. 1  The Ogles Law Firm, P.A., was also named a defendant in the legal­malpractice suit.  For  the sake of simplicity, however, we will only refer to Ogles as appellee.  According to her complaint filed October 11, 2005, appellant was injured at a motel  in Natchitoches, Louisiana, on September 29, 2003, when she tripped and fell over a railroad  tie in the parking lot.  She alleged that the accident was the result of inadequate lighting.  She  hired appellee to represent her, but appellee failed to file suit within the one­year statute of  limitations for personal injuries under Louisiana law.  On October 26, 2006, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that  appellant could not have prevailed in the personal­injury lawsuit even if he had filed it.  In  support of the motion, he submitted the depositions of appellant and her husband, James  Hall.  According to appellant’s deposition testimony, she and Hall arrived at the motel in  Hall’s commercial truck at 11:30 p.m.  She did not see any lights in front of the motel’s  office or in the motel’s parking lot.  She stated that she exited the truck a few minutes after  Hall parked the truck.  When asked to describe the fall, appellant testified, “It happened so  quick I’m really not sure myself.”  She stated that she had no memory between standing in  the parking lot next to the truck and waking up on the ground. When discussing what could  have caused her fall, appellant stated that Hall told her that it could have been because of a  railroad tie that was part of a nearby flower bed.  She noted that the flower bed was to the  left of where she fell and that, had she looked to her left, she would have seen the flower  bed.  In his deposition, Hall testified that, upon arriving at the motel, he exited the truck to  get a room.  After getting the room, he returned to the truck and heard appellant crying.  He  found appellant lying on the ground.  When looking for what she could have possibly tripped  over, he saw a piece of railroad tie in the parking lot.  He did not check to determine if any  railroad ties were missing from the flower bed, and he did not know how the railroad tie was  placed on the ground.  In  opposition  to  appellee’s  summary­judgment  motion,  appellant  presented  an 2  affidavit from Hall, wherein he stated that, while he did not see the accident, the only thing  in the area that could have caused it was a railroad tie.  He also stated that, while there was  sufficient lighting to see the ground and the truck, the lighting was insufficient to see the  railroad tie.  After  a  hearing  held  January  16,  2007,  the  court  granted  appellee’s  motion  for  summary  judgment,  finding  that  there  was  no  evidence  that  the  motel  owner  had  any  knowledge that the railroad tie was present.  It also found that it was questionable whether  appellee actually tripped over the railroad tie.  The court entered an order concerning its  ruling on January 18, 2007.  The  sole  issue  on  appeal  is  whether  the  circuit  court  properly  granted  appellee’s  motion for summary judgment on appellant’s legal­malpractice claim.  Summary judgment  should  be  granted  only  when  there  are  clearly  no  genuine  issues  of  material  fact  to  be  litigated  and  the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.  O’Marra  v.  Mackool, 361 Ark. 32, 204 S.W.3d 49 (2005); Riverdale Dev. Co. v. Ruffin Bldg. Sys. Inc.,  356  Ark.  90,  146  S.W.3d  852  (2004).  The  burden  of  sustaining  a  motion  for  summary  judgment is the responsibility of the moving party.  O’Marra, supra; Pugh v. Griggs, 327  Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997).  Once the moving party has established a prima facie  entitlement to summary judgment, the nonmoving party must meet proof with proof and  demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact.  O’Marra, supra; Pugh, supra.  We  determine if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidence presented  by the moving party in support of its motion leaves a material fact unanswered, viewing the  evidence  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  the  nonmoving  party,  resolving  all  doubts  and  inferences against the moving party.  O’Marra, supra; George v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass’n Inc.,  337 Ark. 206, 987 S.W.2d 710 (1999); Adams v. Arthur, 333 Ark. 53,  969  S.W.2d  598  (1998).  Our review is not limited to the pleadings, but also focuses on the affidavits and 3  other documents filed by the parties.  Hisaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 353 Ark. 668,  122 S.W.3d 1 (2003); Brown v. Wyatt, 89 Ark. App. 306, 202 S.W.3d 555 (2005).  After  reviewing the undisputed facts, we will reverse a grant of summary judgment if, under the  evidence, reasonable men might reach different conclusions from those undisputed facts.  Hisaw, supra; Brown, supra.  The supreme court explained the necessary proof for a legal­malpractice claim in  Nash v. Hendricks, 369 Ark. 60, 68, ___ S.W.3d ____ (2007) (citations omitted):  An attorney is negligent if he or she fails to exercise reasonable diligence and  skill on behalf of a client. To prevail on a claim of attorney malpractice, a plaintiff  must prove that the attorney’s conduct fell below the generally accepted standard of  practice and that such conduct proximately caused the plaintiff damages. To prove  damages  and  proximate  cause,  the  plaintiff  must  show  that,  but  for  the  alleged  negligence  of  the  attorney,  the  result  in  the  underlying  action  would  have  been  different. In this respect, a plaintiff must prove a case within a case, as he or she must  prove the merits of the underlying case as part of the proof of the malpractice case.  An attorney is not liable to a client when, acting in good faith, he or she makes mere  errors  of  judgment.  Moreover,  an  attorney  is  not,  as  a  matter  of  law,  liable  for  a  mistaken opinion on a point of law that has not been settled by a court of the highest  jurisdiction and on which reasonable attorneys may differ.  Here, the circuit court granted summary judgment because it found that appellant  could not prove that the result of her claim would have been different had appellee filed her  claim in Louisiana court.  With these standards in mind, we must also determine whether  2  appellant could have established negligence under Louisiana law.  To prevail in the typical slip­and­fall case against a merchant under Louisiana law,  a plaintiff must establish the traditional elements of duty, breach, causation, and damages,  as well as the elements of proof under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2800.6 (1997).  See Davis v.  M&E Food Mart, Inc, 829 So. 2d 1194 (La. Ct. App. 2002).  Section 9:2800.6 provides in  pertinent part: 2  There is no real discussion in the parties’ briefs as to whether Arkansas or Louisiana law  would apply here.  Both appear to agree that we should apply Louisiana negligence law.  We  agree, and we do so.  4  A. A merchant owes a duty to persons who use his premises to exercise reasonable  care to keep his aisles, passageways, and floors in a reasonably safe condition. This  duty  includes  a  reasonable  effort  to  keep  the  premises  free  of  any  hazardous  conditions which reasonably might give rise to damage.  B.  In  a  negligence  claim brought  against  a  merchant  by  a  person  lawfully  on  the  merchant’s premises for damages as a result of an injury, death, or loss sustained  because  of  a  fall  due  to  a  condition  existing in  or  on  a  merchant’s  premises,  the  claimant shall have the burden of proving, in addition to all other elements of his  cause of action, all of the following:  (1) The condition presented an unreasonable risk of harm to the claimant and that risk  of harm was reasonably foreseeable.  (2) The merchant either created or had actual or constructive notice of the condition  which caused the damage, prior to the occurrence.  (3) The merchant failed to exercise reasonable care. In determining reasonable care,  the absence of a written or verbal uniform cleanup or safety procedure is insufficient,  alone, to prove failure to exercise reasonable care.  A merchant is “one whose business is to sell goods, foods, wares, or merchandise at  a fixed place of business” and includes within that definition “an innkeeper with respect to  those areas or aspects of the premises which are similar to those of a merchant.” La. Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §  9:2800.6(C)(2).  The  statute  defines  constructive  notice  as  “[proof]  that  the  condition existed for such a period of time that it would have been discovered if the merchant  had  exercised  reasonable  care.”    La.  Rev.  Stat.  Ann.  §  9:2800.6(C)(1).    A  party  cannot  prevail  under  §  9:2800:6  if  he  or  she  is  unable  to  establish  the  length  of  time  a  foreign  substance or item remained on the ground before the accident. See Terry v. Wal­Mart Stores,  Inc., 780 So. 2d 1251 (La. Ct. App. 2001).  Appellant argues that § 9:2800.6 is inapplicable if she can show that her accident was  the result of the “direct and simultaneous negligence of an employee of the defendant.”  In  support, she cites Crooks v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 620 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App.  1993), where a store customer tripped and fell after a store employee pulled a vacuum hose  in her path.  The jury found in favor of the store after being instructed on the law found in 5  §  9:2800.6.  The  Louisiana  Court  of  Appeals  reversed,  finding  that  the  general  rules  of  negligence were applicable to that case, as the accident occurred due to a specific act of a  store employee and not solely a result of a condition found on the premises.  Contrary to appellant’s argument, however, appellant is not alleging a specific act of  negligence.  Rather, she is alleging that her accident occurred because of a lack of lighting  on the premises.  Inadequate lighting is a condition of the premises, not a specific act of  negligence that would render the provisions of § 9:2800.6 inapplicable.  See also Riolo v.  National Tea Co., 726 So. 2d 515 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (applying § 9:2800.6(B) when the  plaintiff alleged that the hazardous condition was caused by plastic bags littering the parking  lot).  Next, appellant relies on Bostwick v. M.A.P.P. Industries, Inc., 707 So. 2d 441 (La.  Ct. App. 1997), for the proposition that inadequate lighting may be a defective condition  which causes a fall for which an owner may be liable.  However, the testimony there showed  that the fall resulted from stairs breaking under the victim’s foot.  While the victim testified  that  the  stairway  was  not  lighted,  that  condition  was  insignificant  compared  with  other  3  evidence in that case.  Bostwick is distinguishable from the instant case. 3  The court summarized the victim’s testimony as follows:  Here,  plaintiff  testified  that  as  he  stepped  on  the  first  stair  it  “gave  way”  beneath him causing his fall down the first half­flight of stairs. He testified that he  tried to catch himself, but that there was no handrail to grab. It was about 5:30 P.M.  and there was no light in the stairwell. When plaintiff tried to regain his balance and  stand on the landing, he was dizzy and his feet got tangled in clear plastic sheeting  that had blown off the window, causing him to fall down the second half­flight of  stairs. Robert Anderson, a civil engineer, testified as an expert for plaintiff. He stated  that the stairs were in extremely poor condition. They differed significantly in height  variation, violating local code ordinances. The lighting was poor and there was no  handrail.  He  acknowledged  that  they  were  some  of  the  worst  stairs  that  he  had  inspected. The defense produced no expert regarding the condition of the stairs.  Bostwick, 707 So. 2d at 446.  6  Finally, appellant compares the instant case to Simmons v. King, 833 So. 2d 1148 (La.  Ct. App. 2002), which also involved a person tripping and falling over a railroad tie.  In that  case, however, the railroad tie had been intentionally bolted to the asphalt.  The court applied  La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2317.1 (1997), which governs “Damage caused by ruin, vice, or  4  defect in things.”  A defect under art. 2317.1 “is a flaw or condition of relative permanence  in the thing as one of its qualities.”  Dauzat v. Thompson Constr. Co., Inc., 839 So. 2d 319,  322­23  (La.  Ct.  App.  2003).  A  temporary  condition  may  be  a  hazard,  but  it  does  not  constitute a defect as contemplated by that statute.  Id.; see also Mitchell v. Travelers Ins.  Co., 464 So. 2d 404 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that rice on the floor of a store does not  render a premises defective for the purposes of art. 2317.1).  In addition, Louisiana law  distinguishes between a hazardous condition “on” the premises, warranting application of  §  9:2800.6,  as  opposed  to  a  defect  “in”  the  premises,  making art.  2317  applicable.  See  Coleman v. Wal­Mart Stores, Inc., 721 So. 2d 1068 (La. Ct. App. 1998).  A railroad tie in the middle of a parking lot would be a hazardous condition “on” the  premises, not a defective premise.  In addition, defective lighting is not a “flaw or condition  of relative permanence.”  Simmons and art. 2317.1 are inapplicable here.  We hold that the provisions of § 9:2800.6 would have been applicable to appellant’s  claim had appellee filed her lawsuit.  Under the provisions of that statute, appellant would  have  been  required  to  show,  among  other  things,  that  the  motel  knew  of  the  hazardous  condition in the parking lot or that it would have discovered the hazardous condition had it 4  The provision reads:  The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its ruin,  vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew or, in the exercise of reasonable  care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that  the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he  failed to exercise such reasonable care. Nothing in this Article shall preclude the court  from the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in an appropriate case.  7  exercised reasonable care.  Because appellant has presented no evidence regarding how long  the railroad tie was on the ground in a hazardous condition, she could not meet her burden  of proof under Louisiana law.  Thus, the circuit court properly granted appellee motion for  summary judgment.  Accordingly, we affirm.  Affirmed.  HART and BIRD, JJ., agree. 8 

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