Carolyn Walters Hockaday v. Phillip Eugene Walters
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
SAM BIRD, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CA07-185
O CTOBER 10, 2007
CAROLYN WALTERS HOCKADAY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WHITE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CIV2005-708]
V.
HON. BILL MILLS, JUDGE
PHILLIP EUGENE WALTERS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Carolyn Walters Hockaday appeals from an order of the White County Circuit Court
setting aside a quitclaim deed that conveyed ninety-six acres in White County to her from her
half-brother, Phillip Eugene Walters, appellee in this case. Appellant’s sole argument on
appeal is that the evidence was not sufficient to support the circuit court’s decision to set
aside the deed. We disagree and affirm the circuit court’s decision.
To summarize the essential facts, appellee owns approximately ninety-six acres in
White County with his ex-wife as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Appellant
alleges that appellee executed a quitclaim deed conveying the property to her on May 17,
2004, the date the deed was filed of record. On November 22, 2005, appellee filed a
complaint to set aside the deed, alleging that the deed was a forgery. He later amended his
complaint, alleging in the alternative that the deed was signed under undue influence and
duress and while he did not have the mental capacity to execute the deed. After a hearing on
the matter, the circuit court found that appellee was incompetent to execute the deed and set
it aside.
The determination of whether a deed is void because of the mental incapacity of the
grantor is measured by his or her mental ability at the time of the execution of the deed.
Andres v. Andres, 1 Ark. App. 75, 83, 613 S.W.2d 404, 409 (1981). If the grantor is mentally
competent at the time he executes the deed at issue, the deed is valid. Id.
In the oft cited case of Kelly’s Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555 (1855), the court
announced that if one is ‘of such great weakness of mind, as to be unable to
guard himself against imposition, or to resist importunity or undue influence,
a contract, made by him under such circumstances, will be set aside. And it is
not material from what cause such weakness arises. It may be from temporary
illness, general mental imbecility, . . . the infirmity of extreme old age.’ The fact
that a grantor is old and in feeble health is a circumstance bearing on the
question of mental capacity as is gross inadequacy of price. Campbell v. Lux,
146 Ark. 397, 225 S.W. 653 (1920), McEvoy v. Tucker, 115 Ark. 430, 171 S.W.
888 (1914).
Watson v. Alford, 255 Ark. 911, 912–13, 503 S.W.2d 897, 898 (1974). Each case presenting
a question of a grantor’s mental capacity is to be decided on its own particular facts and
circumstances. Id.
The standard of review of a circuit court’s findings of fact after a bench trial is
whether those findings are clearly erroneous. First Nat’l Bank v. Garner, 86 Ark. App. 213,
167 S.W.3d 664 (2004). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to
support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm
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conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we
give due deference to the trial judge’s superior position to determine the credibility of
witnesses and the weight to be accorded to their testimony. Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7,
12, 858 S.W.2d 130, 134 (1993).
Appellee lives on the property that was described in the quitclaim deed. He testified
that he had owned the property with his ex-wife since 1988 or 1989. He and his ex-wife
purchased it from his ex-wife’s mother. He testified that there was a mortgage on the
property in favor of Community Bank in the original principle amount of $32,093.28. He
stated that he made all of the mortgage payments through automatic withdrawal from his
checking account, both before and after the deed was allegedly executed.
This was
confirmed by testimony from the senior vice president of Community Bank. Appellee also
testified that he paid the property taxes and insurance on the property without any
contribution from appellant. He stated that, from the time of the deed until the time of trial,
appellant had not paid taxes or insurance on the property, made any payments on the note,
or taken possession of the property.
On May 17, 2004, the date the deed was allegedly executed, appellee was in the White
County Hospital awaiting heart surgery—originally scheduled for May 17, but which actually
took place several days later. Appellee testified that he did not remember signing the deed
or discussing a transfer of the property to appellant on that day or any other day. He said that
he did not learn of the existence of the deed until Memorial Day 2005 at a family gathering
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on the property. He testified that appellant told him at the gathering that he did not have
rights to anything but his clothes and to “get in his truck and get out.” Appellee’s son
testified that he witnessed this confrontation and that appellant said that she wanted an
inventory of everything on the property and that appellee owned nothing but his truck and
clothes. Appellee’s son testified that appellee appeared surprised and upset.
Appellee then testified that he was not certain when he was admitted to the hospital
for heart surgery. He remembered having severe chest pains and riding in an ambulance.
He also said that he did not remember anything about the day that the deed was executed and
that he did not remember signing a consent-to-operate form on the same day that he allegedly
signed the deed. Appellee’s son testified that appellee was heavily medicated and sedated
during much of his stay in the hospital and that appellee only vaguely recognized him when
he arrived at the hospital.
Appellant testified that, at the time the deed was executed, she lived in Norfolk,
Virginia, and was visiting appellee after hearing that he had been admitted to the hospital.
Appellant testified that she was appellee’s older half-sister and that she cared for appellee
after their parents died when appellee was sixteen and she was twenty-five. She said that
appellee had a learning disability and that it was difficult for him to read from a book and
learn. She admitted that, even if appellee had not been in the hospital, his learning
disabilities would have prevented him from understanding what he was signing if it were not
explained to him. She testified that she explained the deed in detail to him in the hospital.
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She also testified that she asked a notary at the hospital to come in and that the notary also
asked him questions before he signed the deed. Appellant denied that she told appellee on
Memorial Day that he did not own anything and to get off of the property. Finally, she stated
that she had made payments on the indebtedness on the property, but she did not have any
checks or documents reflecting these payments. She admitted that she did not pay anything
to appellee for the property at the time the deed was executed but claimed that she gave him
$500 in cash some time in 2001.
William Grady Walters, Jr., appellant’s brother and appellee’s half-brother, testified
that appellant was staying at his house when she came to visit appellee in the hospital. He
said that he went with appellant to the hospital and was in the room when appellee executed
the deed. He stated that appellant and the notary explained the document to appellee and that
appellee said that he agreed to the deed. He also testified that, while he did not know
specifically what the property was worth, the average for land in the area was $2,000 an acre.
After hearing the testimony, the circuit court found that appellee did not remember
signing the deed or discussing with appellant that he would transfer his property to her. The
court also found that, although appellant testified that appellee had agreed several years
earlier to convey the property to her, there was no writing evidencing this agreement. The
court noted that appellant did not pay anything to appellee for the property at the time the
deed was executed and that appellee continued making the mortgage payments and paying
the property taxes after the alleged conveyance. Finally, the court found that appellee “did
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not know what he was doing nor was he mentally able to fully appreciate the effect and
consequences of executing the Quitclaim Deed. The [appellee] did not possess the necessary
mental capacity, while he was in the hospital, to intelligently transact business because of the
stress and medication he was taking along with his diminished learning capacity.” The court
then held that appellee was incompetent to execute the deed and ordered that it be set aside.
We find that the evidence was sufficient for the circuit court to set aside the deed.
It was undisputed that, at the time the deed was allegedly executed, appellee was in the
hospital awaiting heart surgery. There was testimony that appellee was heavily sedated and
did not remember signing the deed or discussing a conveyance of his property with appellant
or anyone else. While appellant testified to the contrary, we give due deference to the trial
judge’s superior position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be
accorded to their testimony. Jones v. Jones, 43 Ark. App. 7, 12, 858 S.W.2d 130, 134 (1993).
Appellant testified that appellee suffered from learning disabilities and would have required
an explanation of the deed in order to understand it even in the best of circumstances. There
was no testimony that anything was given to appellee as consideration for the conveyance
at the time the deed was executed. Appellant’s own brother testified as to the great
inadequacy of consideration.
“Mental weakness, although not to the extent of incapacity to execute a deed, ‘may
render a person more susceptible of fraud, duress, or undue influence, and, when coupled
with any of these, or even with unfairness, such as great inadequacy of consideration, may
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make a contract voidable, when neither such weakness nor any of these other things alone,
. . . would do so.’” Cain v. Mitchell, 179 Ark. 556, 17 S.W.2d 282 (1929) (quoting Pledger
v. Birkhead, 156 Ark. 443, 246 S.W. 510 (1923)). We hold that the circuit court’s findings
are not clearly erroneous and affirm its decision to set aside the deed.
Affirmed.
H ART and G RIFFEN, JJ., agree.
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