Janice Parker v. Comcast Cable Corporation

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DIVISION I  CA 07­158  JANICE PARKER  December 5, 2007  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  ARKANSAS  W O R K E R S ’   C O M P E N S A T I O N  COMMISSION [NO. F405352]  COMCAST CABLE CORPORATION  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant  Janice  Parker  appeals  the  decision  of  the  Arkansas  Workers’  Compensation  Commission  denying  her  claim  for  benefits  based  on  a  finding  that  she  was  not  performing  employment  services  when  she  injured  her  back.    Appellant  contends  that  the  Commission’s  decision is not supported by substantial evidence and that the Commission erred by not admitting  her proffered exhibits into evidence.  We disagree and affirm.  Appellant had been working for appellee Comcast Corporation since 1997 as a customer  service representative when on May 8, 2004, she tripped and injured her back.  Appellant usually  worked on weekdays from 7:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., but she also worked overtime on weekends.  The  accident occurred on a Saturday morning just before 7:00 a.m. as appellant was preparing to work  an overtime shift from 7:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m.  Appellant testified that the building was locked on  the weekends and that it was necessary for her to use a key card to gain entry to the building.  Comcast as well as other tenants leased office space in this building that was open to the public during regular business hours.  After arriving that morning, appellant first went to get a soda in the Comcast break room  located  on  the  ground  floor,  where  she  also  had  to  use  her  key card  to  get  inside.  She  then  proceeded to the elevator and selected the third floor where her office in the call center was located.  Appellant tripped as she was alighting from the elevator on the third floor.  Appellant was not sure  why she had stumbled, but when she looked back at the elevator it was not level with the floor.  After gathering herself, appellant used her key card to enter the call center. She then clocked  in by entering her code into her telephone and began working.  Appellant notified her supervisor  about the incident, and she sought medical treatment with her regular doctor for lower lumbosacral  discomfort that afternoon and again on Monday.  An MRI of her lumbar spine, which revealed a large posterior disc protrusion with severe  stenosis at L4­5, was taken on May 12, 2004.  Appellant was referred to Dr. Scott Schlesinger, a  neurosurgeon, who performed a surgical decompression and discectomy at that level on June 8,  2004.  A subsequent MRI showed a recurrence of the disc herniation at L4­5, which was again  surgically repaired by Dr. Schlesinger on October 14, 2004.  In May 2005, Dr. Schlesinger reported  that appellant had reached maximum medical improvement with a permanent restriction of light  duty based on a functional capacity evaluation, and he assigned an anatomical impairment rating of  twelve percent.  Soon thereafter, appellant presented to Dr. Schlesinger with continued complaints of pain,  and another MRI was performed on June 3, 2005.  This MRI revealed a disc herniation at  L5­S1  with an extruded disc fragment that impinged on the S1 nerve root and thecal sac.  After discussing  treatment options with Dr. Schlesinger, appellant planned to have a discectomy. ­2­  CA 07­158  At appellee’s request, appellant was evaluated by Dr. Steven Cathey on August 23, 2005.  In a report of that date, Dr. Cathey concluded that the herniation at L5­S1 was a new finding that was  not related to the May 2004 injury at L4­5.  Although appellee had initially accepted appellant’s claim as compensable and had paid all  appropriate benefits, after deposing appellant it took the position that appellant had not sustained  a compensable injury on May 8, 2004, because she was not performing employment services at the  1  time of the accident.  Based on Dr. Cathey’s report, appellee maintained that, in any event, it was  not responsible for paying benefits associated with the herniation at L5­S1 because it was not related  to  the  accident  that  occurred  on  May 8,  2004.  Appellant  contended,  however,  that  she  was  performing employment services at the time of the May 2004 accident and that the herniation at L5­  S1 was a natural progression of the original injury.  After a hearing, an administrative law judge determined that appellant was not performing  employment  services at the  time of the  accident, and thus denied appellant’s claim for further  benefits.  In pertinent part, the law judge found:  The claimant was merely en route to her work station where she had  to sign in by telephone to begin her duties.  The claimant had not  actually begun any work activities at the time of the incident nor did  she have to pick up mail, invoices or other business papers on her  way to her office.  While the claimant was on the premises where her  employer is housed, she was in the public space of the elevator and  hallway before actually entering her work area.  On appeal, the Commission affirmed and adopted the law judge’s decision.  Hence this appeal.  Appellant first argues that the evidence does not support the Commission’s decision that she  was not performing employment services at the time of the accident.  In reviewing decisions from 1  Appellee did not seek reimbursement of any benefits it had paid.  ­3­  CA 07­158  the  Workers’  Compensation  Commission,  we  view  the  evidence  and  all  reasonable  inferences  deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings, and we affirm if the  decision is supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Xtreme Pizza, 97 Ark. App. 206, ___ S.W.3d  ___ (2006).  Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as  adequate to support a conclusion. Mays v. Alumnitec Inc., 76 Ark. App. 274, 64 S.W.3d 772 (2001).  When an appeal is taken from the denial of a claim by the Commission, the substantial­evidence  standard of review requires that we affirm if the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis  for the denial of relief.  McDonald v. Batesville Poultry Equipment, 90 Ark. App. 435, 206 S.W.3d  908 (2005).  In order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the course of  employment.  Ark. Code Ann. § 11­9­102(4)(A)(I) (Supp. 2007).  A compensable injury does not  include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were  not  being  performed.    Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  11­9­102(4)(B)(iii).  An  employee  is  performing  employment services when he or she is doing something that is generally required by his or her  employer.  Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. v. Coker, 98 Ark. App. 400, ___ S.W.3d ___ (2007).  We use the same test to determine whether an employee is performing employment services as we  do when determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of employment.  Pifer v. Single Source Transportation, 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002).  The test is whether the  injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee was  carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest, directly or indirectly.  Id. ­4­  CA 07­158  2  Prior to Act 796 of 1993, the premises exception to the going­and­coming rule  provided  that, although an employee at the time of injury had not reached the place where his job duties were  discharged, his injury was sustained within the course and scope of his employment if the employee  was injured while on the employer’s premises or on nearby property either under the employer’s  control  or  so  situated  as  to  be  regarded  as  actually or  constructively a  part  of  the  employer’s  premises.  Hightower v. Newark Public School System, 57 Ark. App. 159, 943 S.W.2d 608 (1997).  In Hightower, however, we held that the statutory requirement of the 1993 Act that an employee  must be performing employment services at the time of the injury eliminated the premises exception  to the going­and­coming rule.  In the instant case, the appellant was injured getting off an elevator in a common area of the  building in which Comcast was one of the tenants, but before she reached her work station to clock  in and begin work.  Appellant’s injury may have been compensable under the former premises  exception, but the critical inquiry under current law is whether she was performing employment  services when the injury occurred.  See Moncus v. Billingsley Logging, 366 Ark. 383, ___ S.W.3d  ___ (2006); Hightower, supra.  Applying the current standard in Hightower, supra, we affirmed the Commission’s decision  that the employee was not performing employment services when she slipped and fell on ice in the  employer’s parking lot.  Similarly in Srebalus v. Rose Care, Inc., 69 Ark. App. 142, 10 S.W.3d 112  (2000), we held that an employee who stepped in a pothole on the employer’s parking lot did not 2  The going­and­coming rule ordinarily denies compensation to an employee while he is  traveling between his home and his job, reasoning that employees having fixed hours and places of  work are generally not considered to be in the course of their employment while traveling to and  from work.  Wright v. Ben M. Hogan Co., 250 Ark. 960, 468 S.W.2d 233 (1971).  ­5­  CA 07­158  sustain an injury covered under workers’ compensation.  In other circumstances, we  have  considered injuries  sustained by employees who were  entering the workplace to have occurred while the employee was performing employment services.  In Shults v. Pulaski County Special School District, 63 Ark. App. 171, 976 S.W.3d 399 (1998), the  employee was responsible for checking the alarm system when he arrived at work, and he fell while  entering the building to perform that task.  In reversing the Commission’s denial of benefits, we  recognized that merely entering the employer’s premises was not sufficient to bring an employee  within the employment­services provision.  However, we held that the employee in that case was  not merely entering the premises when the injury occurred but that he was engaged in an activity  (checking the alarm) that carried out the employer’s purpose and advanced the employer’s interests.  In Foster v. Express Personnel Services, 93 Ark. App. 496, 222 S.W.3d 218 (2006), Foster  worked in accounts receivable  on  the second floor of the  employer’s premises, and her duties  included processing credit card receipts and e­checks that she had to retrieve from the cashier’s desk  in a separate area.  Employees entered the building through the service bay, and there were times  when Foster was questioned by other employees in the service­bay area.  Her duties also required  her  to  visit  the  service­bay  area  as  needed  at  other  times  during  the  work  day,  and  she  was  considered to be on the job when she entered the service­bay doors.  On the day of the accident,  Foster slipped and fell just after she had  arrived at work and was walking in the service­bay area on  her way to the cashier’s desk to collect credit card receipts.  On these facts, we held that Foster was  entitled to benefits because she was injured in an area where employment services were expected  of her.  Also in Caffey v. Sanyo Manufacturing Corp., 85 Ark. App. 342, 154 S.W.3d 274 (2004), ­6­  CA 07­158  the employee was required to produce an identification badge when she entered the employer’s  parking lot and then had to walk to a second guard shack to display her badge before entering the  plant to clock in.  The employee fell in the hallway just five feet shy of the clock­in station and some  200 feet from her work station.  We held that the employee’s claim was compensable because these  preliminary requirements advanced the employer’s interest.  Appellant asserts that the facts of this case compare favorably with those in Caffey,  likening  her use of a key card to the security requirements of the employer in that case.  However, we cannot  equate the requirement of undergoing security checks with the necessity of swiping a key card to  unlock a door.  In our view, appellant was merely on her way to work, and there was no testimony  that she had any job­related responsibilities as she walked through the building.  The facts of this  case are more like those in Hightower, supra, and Srebalus, supra, and it is our conclusion that  substantial  evidence  supports  the  Commission’s  decision  that  appellant  was  not  performing  employment services when she tripped while emerging from the elevator.  We thus reject the notion that the requirement of having to unlock the door renders this  claim  compensable.  Had  appellant  tripped  during  regular  business  hours  when  the  door  was  unlocked, there would be no question that appellant’s claim would not be compensable. We decline  to create a distinction that would render a claim compensable just because the door to the building  was locked.  Moreover, to accept appellant’s argument would erode the legislature’s intent to do  away with the premises exception.  Appellant also contends that this case is controlled by the decision in Wallace v. West Fraser  South, Inc., 365 Ark. 68, 225 S.W.3d 361 (2006), in which the supreme court reversed the denial  of benefits when the employee was injured while returning from an authorized break.  In this regard, ­7­  CA 07­158  appellant points out that she, too, had gone to the break room immediately prior to her accident.  Wallace, however, is clearly distinguishable because here the appellant was not on a break when she  went to get a soda ­ she had yet to begin her work day.  Appellant also asserts that the disc herniation found at L5­S1 was causally related to the May  2004 accident.  Because we are affirming the Commission’s decision that this incident did not arise  out of and in the course of appellant’s employment, it is not necessary for us to address this issue.  Appellant’s final argument is that the Commission erred by excluding exhibits concerning  a complaint made to OSHA about the elevator and appellee’s response to a letter received from  OSHA.  Appellant contends that the exhibits were “direct evidence to the appellee’s notification of  faulty  equipment  (elevator)  by  OSHA”  and  showed  “reasonable  and  logical  workplace  injury  prevention and remedies; relevant evidence that shows the nature and condition of the employee’s  workplace; that the site of the injury was considered an on­the­job injury by Employer; federal  protection of the right of employee(s) to engage in (legal) notification(s) of the faulty equipment to  a  governmental  agency  (OSHA)  without  fear  of  workplace  or  legal  ramifications;  employers  (Comcast) response to a legal inquiry from a governmental agency (OSHA), which could impact  past, present and future safety of appellant’s workplace.”  Appellant does not explain why these  matters  are  relevant  to  a  workers’  compensation  claim.  When  an  appellant  fails  to  make  a  convincing argument or to cite authority in support of it, we will not address the argument on appeal.  Jones Truck Lines v. Pendergrass, 90 Ark. App. 402, 206 S.W.3d 272 (2005).  We note only that  we have held that employees in workers’ compensation cases no longer have standing to assert  safety violations with the passage of Act 796 of 1993.  Vittitow v. Central Maloney, Inc., 69 Ark.  App. 176, 11 S.W.3d 12 (2000). ­8­  CA 07­158  Affirmed.  GLOVER  and BAKER, JJ., agree. ­9­  CA 07­158 

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