Michael A. Hayes v. Sandra L. Otto

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  SARAH J. HEFFLEY, JUDGE  DIVISION I  CA 07­15  October 31, 2007  MICHAEL A. HAYES  APPELLANT  APPEAL  FROM  THE  PULASKI  COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CV 1998­3853]  V. HONORABLE HOBSON VANN SMITH,  JUDGE  SANDRA L. OTTO  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  IN  PART;  REVERSED  AND  REMANDED IN PART  The appellant, Michael A. Hayes, appeals from an order modifying custody and child support  and denying appellant’s request for injunctive relief.  Appellant contends on appeal that the trial  court erred in calculating child support; that the trial court erred by denying injunctive relief to  prohibit a doctor from treating the children; and that the trial court erred by failing to impose Rule  11 sanctions. We reverse and remand on the child support issue but affirm the remainder of the trial  court’s decision.  The marriage of appellant Michael Hayes and appellee Sandra Otto ended on February 22,  1998, with the filing of their divorce decree.  The decree set forth their agreement to share joint  custody of their son and daughter by alternating the time the children spent with each parent on a  week­to­week basis.  On February 22, 2006, appellee filed a motion to change custody of their son. As changed circumstances, appellee alleged that appellant had removed the child’s belongings from  his home, had refused to allow the child to live in his home, and had not exercised visitation since  the expulsion.  Appellant, who both then and now proceeds pro se,  filed an answer contesting the  change of custody and a counterclaim seeking an increase in child support.  Appellant subsequently filed a motion for injunctive relief, asking the trial court to enjoin  appellee  from  allowing  her  boyfriend,  pediatrician  Dr.  Ralph  W.  Herbert,  to  provide  medical  treatment to the children.  Appellant also filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the  Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.  In this motion, appellant asked that appellee and her attorneys  be sanctioned for their “improper behavior” in connection with motions previously heard by the trial  court in 2002 for an increase in child support, change of custody, and termination of alimony, as  well as two unrelated lawsuits filed by  appellant for abuse  of process against appellee and her  1  attorneys.  Both of these lawsuits were dismissed pursuant to Ark. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  In one  instance, appellant was sanctioned pursuant to Rule 11.  After conducting hearings, the trial court entered an order denying appellant’s request for  Rule 11 sanctions on May 3, 2006.  On August 2, 2006, the trial court entered an order granting  appellee’s request for her to become their son’s primary custodian, setting appellee’s child­support  obligation at $94 a week, and denying appellant’s motion for injunctive relief.  Appellant filed a  timely post­trial motion to amend the order, which was deemed denied after the passage of thirty  days pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. ­ Civil 4(b)(1).  This appeal followed.  Under his first point, appellant raises several arguments asserting that the trial court  erred 1  Appellant appealed one of the dismissals, but we dismissed the appeal in an unpublished  opinion issued on September 21, 2005, because the notice of appeal was not timely.  ­2­  CA 07­15  in calculating the amount of child support.  On this issue, the evidence was that, even though the  parties  were  equally sharing  custody of  the  children,  the  latest  support  order  entered  in  2002  provided that appellee would pay appellant $120 a week in child support given the disparity in the  parties’ incomes.  In 2002, the trial court had declined an increase in child support because appellee  was bearing the sole financial burden of saving for the children’s college education.  As of the time  of the  present  hearing,  appellee  was  contributing $450  a  month  toward  a  college  fund,  which  consisted of approximately  $38,000.  Also, appellee’s income had increased by $40,000 since the  divorce.  According to her affidavit of financial means, appellee’s net income per week was $1,662.  In her testimony, appellee asked to be relieved of paying child support since she had custody of one  child half of the time and would have full custody of the other child if the court were to grant her  motion for a change of custody.  Appellant testified that he was not currently employed and had not had a job in four years.  In 2002, appellant had been a student at Pulaski Technical College and had plans to finish his  education in Conway.  He testified that he had attained an associates degree but had not gone to  school in Conway because he had immersed himself studying the law in pursuit of the legal actions  he had brought against appellee and her attorneys. He planned to apply for a job, but he was not sure  when.  To help ends meet, he had inherited $19,000 from an uncle and had borrowed $10,000 from  his mother.  For the past eight months, his live­in girlfriend had been paying the utility bills.  In setting the amount of support, the trial court reduced appellee’s stated net weekly income  of $1,662 to $1,558 by giving her credit for the monies she was contributing to the children’s ­3­  CA 07­15  2  college  fund.  Because  a  weekly  income  of  $1,558  exceeds  the  chart  amount,  the  trial  court  multiplied that figure by 15%, as required by Administrative Order No. 10, and set appellee’s child  support obligation for the parties’ daughter at $233 a week.  The trial court then imputed an income  of $300 a week to appellant.  In reference to the chart, the trial court set appellant’s child­support  obligation for their daughter at $70 a week. The trial court then offset appellee’s obligation of $233  a week by appellant’s obligation of $70 a week, and thus ordered that appellee owed appellant $163  a week for the support of their daughter.  As for appellant’s child support obligation with respect to  their son, whose custody was changed to appellee, the trial court again imputed an income of  $300  a week to appellant and set his obligation for the son at $70 a week.  The court then offset this  amount ($70) against appellee’s obligation ($163) and ordered appellee to pay appellant $94 a week  in child support.  Appellant first argues that the trial court failed to comply with Administrative Order No. 10  in setting the amount of child support.  Section I of the Administrative Order provides:  All orders granting or modifying child support (including agreed  orders) shall contain the court’s determination of the payor’s income,  recite  the  amount  of  support  required  under  the  guidelines,  and  recite whether the court deviated from the Family Support Chart.  If  the order varies from the guidelines, it shall include a justification of  why  the  order  varies  as  may  be  permitted  under  Section  V  hereinafter.  It shall be sufficient in a  particular case to rebut the  presumption that the amount of child support calculated pursuant to  the Family Support Chart is correct, if the amount so calculated, after  consideration of all relevant factors, including the best interests of  the child, is unjust or inappropriate.  We review chancery cases de novo, but we will only reverse if the trial court’s findings are 2  Administrative Order 10 at Section III provides that for purposes of computing child  support payments, a month consists of 4.334 weeks.  When this multiplier is applied to $450, it  yields a result of $104. $1,662 minus $104 equals $1,558.  ­4­  CA 07­15  clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.  Akins v. Mofield, 355 Ark.  215, 132 S.W.3d 760 (2003).  In a child­support determination, the amount of child support lies  within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the lower court’s findings will not be reversed  absent an abuse of discretion.  Id.  Appellant complains that the trial court erred by applying his income to the chart  for each  child individually, rather than as two dependents.  We agree.  The trial court imputed an income of  $300 a week to appellant, which translates into  a chart amount of $70 for one dependent.  Here, the  trial court used that amount and doubled it for the two children to arrive at a combined weekly  obligation of $140.  However, after an obligor’s income is determined, that income is applied to the  chart based on the proper number of dependents.  Cole v. Cole, 89 Ark. App. 134, 201 S.W.3d 21  (2005).  The chart amount for two dependents at a weekly income of $300 is $102.    With proper  calculation, appellee’s child support should have been $131 ($233 ­ $102).  Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by deducting from appellee’s net weekly  earnings  the  amount  she  is  contributing  to  the  children’s  college  fund.    Section  II  of  the  Administrative Order allows deductions for (1) federal and state income tax; (2) withholding for  Social Security (FICA), Medicare, and railroad retirement; (3) medical insurance paid for dependent  children; and presently paid support for other dependents by court order.  We must agree with  appellant that there is no deduction listed for voluntary contributions to a college fund, and thus  conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a dollar­for­dollar deduction for this  contribution in assessing appellee’s net income.  Although Section V of the Administrative Order  permits a court to consider educational expenses and the creation of a trust fund for the children in  deciding whether deviating from the chart amount is appropriate, the trial court did not deviate from ­5­  CA 07­15  the chart amount in this instance.  Rather, the trial court considered the contribution in calculating  appellee’s net weekly income.  This was error.  Appellant also raises the point that the trial court erred by imputing an income to him of  $600 a week.  He argues that this amount is excessive.  We disagree with appellant’s interpretation  of the trial court’s ruling.  The trial court imputed an income of only $300 a week.  There is no merit  in this point.  Appellant further claims that the trial court’s decision in 2002 regarding child support was  incorrect.  Appellant, however, failed to appeal from that order; he is thus precluded from raising  this issue at this late date.  Appellant also asserts that the trial court should have added the contributions of appellee’s  employer to her retirement fund and her tax refunds in calculating appellee’s net income.  We  observe that appellant presented evidence of these matters after the hearing.  Although a trial court  has the discretion to reopen the record before the entry of the final order, Tackett v. First Savings  of Arkansas, 306 Ark. 15, 810 S.W.2d 927 (1991), the trial judge declined to consider this evidence  because in his estimation he had been conservative in imputing the income appellant was capable  of earning.  We find no abuse of discretion.  In sum, on the issue of child support, we reverse and remand because the trial court failed  to comply with Administrative Order No. 10.  On remand, the trial court may consider its decision  in light of any changed circumstances that arose during the pendency of the appeal.  Appellant’s second issue is that the trial court erred by failing to prohibit appellee from  allowing Dr. Herbert to provide medical treatment for the children.  Appellant’s quarrel with Dr.  Herbert does not lie in his competency as a physician.  Instead, appellant’s objection is based on his ­6­  CA 07­15  personal animosity towards the doctor because the doctor testified unfavorably to him at the 2002  hearing, and because the doctor enlisted the aid of the prosecuting attorney to stop what the doctor  perceived as harassment by appellant of him and the employees at his clinic.  As a general proposition, a court of equity may fashion any remedy that is justified by the  proof and may require a person to do a specific act by the issuance of a mandatory injunction.  Cox  v. Cox, 17 Ark. App. 93, 704 S.W.2d 171 (1986).  Here, the testimony was that the children had  another regular pediatrician, but that Dr. Herbert had tended to the needs of the children at home on  a couple of occasions in the past year. Appellant agreed that he would not be opposed to Dr. Herbert  treating the children in an emergency, and the trial court’s order did provide for appellee to “take  reasonable steps to make sure the minor children are treated by their normal doctor.”  We can find  no error in the trial court’s decision.  Appellant’s last argument is that the trial court erred by denying his motion for Rule 11  sanctions.  We are not able to decide this issue.  The trial court denied the motion for sanctions by  an order dated May 3, 2006.  In his notice of appeal, appellant stated only that he was appealing the  August 2, 2006, order setting child support and denying his motion for injunctive relief.  Rule 3(e)  of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure ­ Civil provides that a notice of appeal “shall designate  the judgment, decree, order or part thereof appealed from.”  Orders not mentioned in a notice of  appeal are not properly before the appellate court for review.  See Conlee v. Conlee, 366 Ark. 398,  ___ S.W.3d ___ (2006); Arkansas Dep’t of Human Services v. Shipman, 25 Ark. App. 247, 756  3 S.W.2d 930 (1988).  3  Rule 11 sanctions are collateral to the merits of an underlying action.  Crockett & Brown,  P.A. v. Wilson, 314 Ark. 578, 864 S.W.2d 244 (1993).  As such, the challenging party must file a  notice of appeal from an order granting or denying sanctions. Craig v. Carrigo, 353 Ark. 761, 121  ­7­  CA 07­15  Appellant has also asked for sanctions against appellee and her attorneys in this appeal  pursuant to Ark. R. App. P. ­ Civil 11.  Appellant takes issue with the assertion in appellee’s brief  concerning the  matter  of child  support  that  “[i]n  all  likelihood,  the  Court  considered  that  the  Appellant has never held a paying job and was unemployed at the hearing.”  Appellant states in his  motion that he was employed during the marriage and at the time of the divorce.  While appellee’s  assertion may have been overstated, we do not find it to be so egregious as to warrant sanctions.  Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.  GLADWIN  and BIRD, JJ., agree. S.W.3d 154 (2003).  ­8­  CA 07­15 

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