Richard Tomboli v. State of Arkansas

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DIVISION III  CACR07­441  RICHARD TOMBOLI  APPELLANT  November 28, 2007  AN APPEAL FROM LONOKE  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [CR2006­79]  V.  HON. PHILLIP T. WHITEAKER, JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  A  Lonoke  County  jury  found  Richard  Tomboli  guilty  of  theft  by  receiving  and  sentenced him to a thirty­year term in the Arkansas Department of Correction.  He appeals  from the conviction, asserting that the State presented insufficient evidence to show that he  possessed the stolen vehicle in question.  He also alleges that the trial court erred in allowing  victims of other thefts to testify about those thefts and in not allowing him to cross­examine  a witness regarding a third party who was also accused of theft by receiving.  We affirm,  holding (1) that the State presented sufficient evidence that appellant was in possession of  the stolen vehicle; (2) that, while the court erroneously permitted evidence of other thefts,  the error was harmless; and (3) that the trial court properly excluded questions regarding  thefts committed by a third party absent a connection to the present case. Factual and Procedural History  1  Appellant  was  charged  with  felony  theft  by  receiving  and  fleeing.  Evidence  presented at trial shows that in September 2005, Dale Lamb’s white 2004 Dodge Ram truck  was  stolen  from  his  fiancé’s  residence.  Police  recovered  a  white  2004  Dodge  Ram  in  November 2005.  The  truck recovered by police appeared to be Lamb’s truck, though a  pinstripe and a Razorback decal had been added.  Lamb’s insurance company paid on a theft  claim,  and  insurance  records  show  that  the  VIN  number  of  Lamb’s  truck  was  1D7HA16D14J171118.  The truck was recovered on the afternoon of November 20, 2005, by Deputy Steve  Benton of the Lonoke County Sheriff’s Office.  He initiated a traffic stop after seeing a white  Dodge Ram passing on a double­yellow line.  The truck stopped on Pickthorne Road, but as  Benton exited his patrol car and started toward the truck, the truck drove off.  When the truck  left, Benton returned to his patrol car and pursued the truck.  The truck later turned into a  hayfield, and Benton lost sight of it.  However, he later discovered the truck abandoned in  the  field.  Benton  checked  the  VIN  number  of  the  truck,  1D7HA16D14J171118,  and  discovered that the truck was stolen.  He found several items in the field close to or inside  the truck, including a claw hammer, a shoe, a hand saw, some business checks, a plastic  wedge, a “slim jim” (used for unlocking cars), a stun gun, a small can of mace, flashlights,  a radio antenna adaptor, bolt cutters, and a handsaw.  Several items were fingerprinted, and 1  Appellant was charged with several other misdemeanors; however, the theft­by­receiving  and fleeing charges are the only ones relevant here.  2  a print belonging to appellant was found on one of the checks.  In addition, during the chase,  Benton saw the driver throw a black bag out of the truck.  Police later recovered the bag, and  it contained an assortment of keys and key rings.  Benton identified appellant as the driver  of the truck.  He first identified appellant as the driver when presented  with  appellant’s  driver’s license photo the following day. Benton described the driver of the truck as a white  male with dark “spiky­type” hair.  The State also presented testimony of Amanda Garmen, who works for American  Storage in Sherwood.  According to her testimony, appellant rented two storage units.  She  testified  that  video  tape  from  November  2005  showed  appellant  arriving  at  the  storage  facility driving a white Dodge pickup truck.  On the day she saw the video, she saw a yellow  four­wheeler in the bed of the truck.  Over appellant’s objection, Detective Michelle Stracener testified that she and other  officers executed a search warrant on Tomboli’s storage units.  During the search, police  recovered a yellow four­wheeler, which was later returned to its owner; a set of golf clubs,  which was returned to its owner; a golf cart and another set of golf clubs, released to their  rightful owner; and two firearms.  Jerry Bradley testified that the checks recovered from the  stolen truck belonged to him and that he did not authorize appellant to use the checks.  Over  appellant’s objection, he testified that Stracener returned the golf clubs to him.  Appellant  made the same objection when Davis Kolasa testified about the theft of his four­wheeler.  Finally, the State presented the testimony of Kelli Martindill.  She identified herself,  appellant, and Ronnie Stover as the subjects of photographs found in the stolen truck.  On 3  cross­examination,  Martindill  testified  that  Stover  matched  the  description  of  appellant.  When appellant questioned Martindill about Stover’s criminal history, the State objected,  contending that Martindill had no personal knowledge of Stover’s record.  Appellant argued  that  the  evidence  was  admissible  under  a  “reverse”  Rule  404(b)  analysis,  but  the  court  sustained the State’s objection.  Appellant proffered that Martindill would have testified that  Stover was facing several criminal charges, including theft by receiving, for selling stolen  items over the Internet.  At the conclusion of the State’s case, appellant moved for directed verdict, arguing  that the State failed to prove that the vehicle he allegedly drove was the one stolen from  Lamb.  He emphasized the characteristics that distinguished Lamb’s vehicle from the one  found by police.  The court denied the motion, and appellant rested without presenting a  case.  After deliberations, the jury found appellant guilty of theft by receiving, but found him  not  guilty  of  the  fleeing  charge.  It  later  sentenced  him  to  thirty  years  in  the  Arkansas  Department of Correction.  Sufficiency of the Evidence  Appellant now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.  He argues that the State presented insufficient evidence that he was the person who was  driving the truck in November 2005.  Appellant contends that the only evidence connecting  him to the truck was a fingerprint on a check found outside the truck and a photograph of  him found inside the truck. Regarding the evidence that appellant was driving a white Dodge  truck to his storage units, he argues that the State failed to present any evidence identifying 4  the truck, and he urges us to take judicial notice of the fact that hundreds of Dodge trucks are  being driven in this State.  A motion  for  a  directed  verdict  is  a  challenge  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence.  Nelson v. State, 365 Ark. 314, 229 S.W.3d 35 (2006).  When a defendant makes a challenge  to sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the appellate court views the evidence in the light  most favorable to the State. Baughman v. State, 353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003). The test  for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether the verdict is supported by substantial  evidence. Id.  Substantial evidence is evidence forceful enough to compel a conclusion one  way or the other beyond suspicion or conjecture. Id. Only evidence supporting the verdict,  including evidence erroneously admitted, will be considered. Hicks v. State, 327 Ark. 652,  941 S.W.2d 387 (1997).  We affirm the conviction if there is substantial evidence to support  it. Id. Circumstantial evidence may constitute sufficient evidence to support a conviction, but  it must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused.  Whitt  v. State, 365 Ark. 580, 232 S.W.3d 459 (2006).  The question of whether the circumstantial  evidence excludes every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence is for the jury  to decide.  Id.  We hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to show that appellant was in  possession of Lamb’s stolen truck.  Before the trial court, appellant argued that the State  failed to prove that the truck found by Benton was the one stolen from Lamb.  However, the  State  presented  evidence  showing  that  the  VIN  numbers  of  Lamb’s  truck  and  the  truck  recovered from the scene were the same, and Lamb testified that the recovered truck was 5  similar to his own truck.  As for appellant’s argument that he was not the person driving the  truck, the evidence shows that his fingerprint was on an item found near the truck, and he  was in photographs found inside the truck. Appellant was seen driving a white Dodge truck  to his storage unit.  Finally, Benton identified appellant as the person he saw on the day that  the truck was recovered.  This evidence is sufficient to compel the conclusion that appellant  was in possession of Lamb’s stolen truck.  Evidentiary Rulings  Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce  testimony from victims of other thefts when he had not been charged with those thefts.  He  contends  that  the  State  introduced  the  evidence  only  to  show  that,  because  he  was  in  possession of other stolen property, he was in possession of the truck.  Appellant asserts that  this violates Ark. R. Evid. 404(b).  The State argues that the testimony proved identity and  absence of mistake.  Rule 404(b) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence (2007) provides:  Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of  a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be  admissible  for  other  purposes,  such  as  proof  of  motive,  opportunity,  intent,  preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.  The  admission  or  rejection  of  evidence  under  Rule  404(b)  is  left  to  the  sound  discretion of the trial court, and we will not reverse absent a showing of manifest abuse.  Holt v. State, 85 Ark. App. 308, 151 S.W.3d 1 (2004).  Evidence offered pursuant to Rule  404(b) must be independently relevant.  Id.  Evidence is independently relevant if it tends 6  to prove a material point and is not introduced solely to prove that the defendant is a bad  person.  Id.  The State argues that the Rule 404(b) evidence was admissible because the identity  of the driver of the truck was at issue.  It contends that the check with appellant’s fingerprint  and the truck were in close enough proximity to suggest that appellant was the driving the  stolen truck.  The State also suggests that the golf clubs stolen at the same time as the truck  and found in one of appellant’s storage units make it more likely than not that appellant was  the driver of the stolen truck.  While not explicitly argued by the State, a similar analysis  could apply to the recovery of the four­wheeler.  Because appellant was seen driving the  truck containing the four­wheeler to the storage facility, it makes it more likely that appellant  was the driver of the truck.  We agree with appellant that the trial court improperly allowed the State to introduce  evidence of the other thefts.  The fact that the items were stolen is not independently relevant  to appellant’s identity.  The connection to the items themselves was sufficient to establish  evidence of appellant’s identity.  There was no need for the State to present testimony from  the  victims  regarding  the  fact  that  the  items  were  stolen.  Further,  we  reject  the  State’s  argument that evidence of other thefts was relevant to show that appellant knew that the truck  was stolen.  This is the very type of evidence Rule 404(b) was meant to exclude.  The trial  court abused its discretion in allowing the State to introduce that testimony.  Nevertheless, we affirm on this point because the error in admitting the improper Rule  404(b) evidence was harmless.  When the evidence of guilt is overwhelming and the error 7  is slight, we can declare that the error was harmless and affirm the conviction.  E.g., Barrett  v. State, 354 Ark. 187, 119 S.W.3d 485 (2003).  If evidence of the other thefts is excised  from the record, the jury still had before it testimony that a person identified as appellant was  seen driving away from Benton and later fled the stolen truck.  A check with appellant’s  fingerprint  was  found  near  the  truck,  thus  connecting  appellant  to  the  truck.    Further,  appellant was seen driving the truck to his storage units, and he was in photographs found  in the truck.  We hold that any error in allowing the victims to testify about the theft of their  property is slight in comparison to the overwhelming evidence of guilt.  Accordingly, we  affirm on this point.  Finally, appellant contends  that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to  allow him to introduce evidence that a third party had committed similar crimes.  He asserts  that questions regarding Stover’s criminal activity tended to show that another person could  have stolen or been in possession of Lamb’s truck.  While evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts by a party other than the defendant  may not be admitted to show that the party acted in conformity with a known character trait,  the  evidence  may  be  admitted  for  other  purposes,  such  as  to  show  motive,  opportunity,  intent, or identification of that other party, thus tending to negate the guilt of the defendant.  Price v. State, 365 Ark. 25, 223 S.W.3d 817 (2006).  For “reverse 404(b)” evidence to be  admissible, the crimes by the other person must be so closely connected in time and method  of operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of the defendant as the person who  committed the crime charged against him.  Larimore v. State, 317 Ark. 111, 877 S.W.2d 570 8  (1994) (citing State v. Bock, 229 Minn. 449, 39 N.W.2d 887 (1949)).  The only evidence appellant proffered to show that someone else committed the crime  was that Stover had been charged with other thefts.  He proffered no evidence showing that  Stover’s thefts were similar in time or method of operation to the theft of the truck.  In other  words, the only reason appellant presented this evidence was to show that, because Stover  was currently being charged with theft by receiving in a separate case, he must have been the  person to commit the theft in this case.  Again, this is the very type of evidence Rule 404(b)  seeks  to  exclude.  The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  excluding  testimony  regarding  Stover’s  crimes, and we affirm on this point as well.  Affirmed.  MARSHALL, J., agrees.  PITTMAN, C.J., concurs.  PITTMAN, C.J., concurring. I agree with the result reached in this case.  However, I do  not agree with the majority’s position that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the  stolen checks and golf clubs.  As  noted  by  the  majority,  evidence  of  other  bad  acts  by  a  defendant  may  be  admissible if independently relevant to a material issue in the case.  One permissible purpose  for which other crimes evidence may be admitted is to establish identity.  Ark. R. Evid.  404(b).  Here, appellant was tried for and convicted of theft by receiving a white Dodge pickup  truck.  A critical issue at trial was whether appellant was the person driving the stolen truck 9  when it was observed and pursued by the police.  Evidence was admitted that stolen checks,  bearing appellant’s fingerprints, were found near the stolen truck after the driver abandoned  the truck and fled.  Evidence was also admitted that stolen golf clubs were later found in a  storage room rented to appellant.  The checks and golf clubs had been stolen in a single theft  from a different victim, Dr. Jerry Bradley.  Proof of a physical connection between appellant and two sets of items taken in a  single crime, one of which was found in the vicinity of the stolen truck, is independently  relevant to the question of whether appellant was the driver of the stolen truck.  I cannot  agree with the majority that proof of appellant’s “connection to the [checks and golf clubs]  themselves,” without proof that they had been stolen, would have been anywhere near as  probative on the issue of the driver’s identity.  Appellant’s simple possession of golf clubs  in a different location would be irrelevant to any issue in this case.  It is the connection of  the  clubs  to  the  checks  found  at  the  scene  of  the  abandoned  truck  that  makes  the  clubs  relevant.  It was only through proof that the checks and clubs were taken in a single act of  theft  that  the  necessary  connection  between  the  checks  and  clubs  could  be  established.  Appellant’s continuing connection to golf clubs stolen at the same time as the checks makes  it  more  likely  that  appellant’s  connection  to  the  checks  was  not  simply  transitory  or  coincidental.  And it cannot be disputed that, as the strength of appellant’s connection to the  checks  grows,  so  does  the  strength  of  his  connection  to  the  truck.    I  find  no  abuse  of  discretion in the trial court’s admission of the evidence concerning the theft and recovery of  Dr. Bradley’s checks and golf clubs. 10  11

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