Ronald Lee Mishion v. State of Arkansas

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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  ROBERT J. GLADWIN, JUDGE  DIVISION III  CACR07­321  DECEMBER 12, 2007  RONALD LEE MISHION  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  SEBASTIAN  COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT  [NO. CR­2005­488/2005­857]  HON. NORMAN WILKINSON,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Appellant Ronald Lee Mishion appeals the revocation of his suspended sentence by  the  August  24,  2006  order  of  the  Sebastian  County  Circuit  Court.    On  appeal,  Mishion  contends that the State failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he violated  the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence and that the trial court erred in allowing  certain testimony, which Mishion claims denied him his constitutional right to confront the  witnesses against him. We affirm.  Mishion  pled  guilty  to  one  count  of  aggravated  assault,  a  Class  D  felony,  on  September  19,  2005,  for  which  he  was  given  a  sixty­month  suspended  imposition  of  sentence.  One condition of his suspended sentence was the requirement of good behavior. On February 14, 2006, Mishion pled guilty to second­degree sexual assault, a Class B felony,  for which he was given a 120­month suspended imposition of sentence.  One condition of  that sentence was that he not violate any federal, state, or municipal law.  On  March  17,  2006,  the  State  filed  a  petition  to  revoke  Mishion’s  suspended  sentences.  The petition alleged that he had failed to comply with the rules and regulations  of the probation office by failing to report and by failing to cooperate and comply with the  conditions of the Department of Community Correction Sex Offender Program.  Before the  petition could be heard, it was amended on June 2, 2006, to include three allegations of rape  committed in Oklahoma during the months of February and March 2006.  At the revocation hearing, witnesses for the State included Detective Sampson of the  Fort Smith Police, who testified that he had arrested Mishion at the parole officer’s office  1  on  a  charge  of  failure  to  register  as  a  sex  offender  ;  a  crime  analyst  for  the  Stillwater,  Oklahoma  Police  Department,  who  testified  that  based  on  conversations  she  had  with  Mishion,  he  had  violated  the  sex­offender­registration  law  in  Oklahoma  by  moving  to  Oklahoma City and then to Arkansas without informing her; and Mishion’s parole officer,  who testified that Mishion failed to report to her on March 9, 2006, as she had instructed him  to do, and that when he did report on March 16, 2006, he was arrested.  She claimed that 1  Detective Sampson testified that he was made aware after the arrest that Mishion  had registered as a sex offender in open court when he pled guilty to the second­degree  sexual assault charge in February 2006.  ­2­  CACR07­321  Mishion never attended any of the counseling that he was required to do and that he was  made aware that it was a violation to be around minors.  Because the child victim was not present to testify against Mishion, the trial court  ruled that witnesses could not testify about the rape­crime allegations in Oklahoma without  violating  Mishion’s  right  to  confront  his  accusers,  but  could  testify  as  to  Mishion’s  confession  regarding  those  crimes  “if  you  can  convince  me  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence on what you have referred to as his confession that he violated the terms of his  suspended sentence.”  The State was allowed to examine Michael Williams, an Oklahoma  City police officer, who testified that he did not interview the child victim due to her young  age, and that anyone under thirteen­years old would be interviewed by hospital personnel.  Detective Sampson also testified that Mishion told him he had had sex with the young lady  who had made the allegations against him.  Sampson stated that Mishion explained that he  was watching the young lady and a friend of hers in almost a baby­sitting capacity.  The  mother left and that is when Mishion claims that the intercourse with the young lady took  place.  Mishion indicated to Sampson that he had sex three times with the young lady, and  he claims that it was consensual.  The circuit court found, based on Mishion’s confession to the rapes, that he violated  the terms of his suspended sentences by engaging in sex with a twelve­year­old.  The court  also revoked his suspended sentences for failing to properly register as a sex offender in both  Oklahoma and Arkansas.  Mishion was sentenced to a term of ten years with an additional  ten years’ suspended imposition of sentence for the violations.  This appeal follows. ­3­  CACR07­321  In Jones v. State, 355 Ark. 630, 633, 144 S.W.3d 254, 255­56 (2004), our supreme  court explained:  We  note  at  the  outset  our  well­settled  law  regarding  revocation  of  probation  or  suspended sentence.  To revoke probation or a suspended sentence, the burden is on  the State to prove the violation of a condition of the probation or suspended sentence  by a preponderance of the evidence.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­4­309(d) (Supp. 2003).  See  also Williams v. State, 351 Ark. 229, 91 S.W.3d 68 (2002); Bradley v. State, 347 Ark.  518, 65 S.W.3d 874 (2002).  On appellate review, the trial court’s findings will be  upheld  unless  they  are  clearly  against  the  preponderance  of  the  evidence.  Id.  Because  the  burdens  are  different,  evidence  that  is  insufficient  for  a  criminal  conviction may be sufficient for revocation of probation or suspended sentence.  Id.  Thus, the burden on the State is not as great in a revocation hearing. Id.  Furthermore,  because the determination of a preponderance of the evidence turns on questions of  credibility  and  weight  to  be  given  to  the  testimony,  we  defer  to  the  trial  judge’s  superior position.  Id.  Patterson v. State, ___Ark. App. ___ S.W.3d ___ (May 30, 2007).  Mishion contends that the State failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence  that he violated the terms and conditions of his suspended sentence.  He argues that it was  alleged  that  he  failed  to  do  his  counseling,  but  there  was  no  testimony  that  counseling  sessions  had  been  established  at  the  time  of  his  arrest.  He  claims  that  this  is  important  because he was arrested on March 16, which is less than thirty days after he pled and was  sentenced on the charge.  He further argues that he was informed by his parole officer of the  rules on March 3, 2006, and the allegations of the contact with the alleged minor all occurred  before that date.  He claims that he did register as a sex offender at the time of his plea in  open  court,  and  he  registered  in  Oklahoma  as  a  sex  offender  on  February  23,  2006.  Therefore, he contends that the evidence is not sufficient to compel a reasonable mind to  reach a conclusion one way or another without resting on conjecture. ­4­  CACR07­321  However,  we  hold  that  the  State  proved  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence  that  Mishion inexcusably failed to comply with the written terms and conditions of his suspended  sentence.  In order to revoke a suspended sentence, the State need only prove one violation.  E.g., Brock v. State, 70 Ark. App. 107, 14 S.W.3d 908 (2000).  Mishion registered as  a sex offender in Stillwater, Oklahoma, on February 23, 2006.  He subsequently moved to  Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and then back to Ft. Smith, Arkansas, between February 23,  2006, and March 15, 2006.  He did not notify the Stillwater police of either of the moves as  2  required by Oklahoma law.  By failing to properly register, Mishion violated the terms and  conditions of his suspended sentences.  Because the State need only prove one violation of  the terms and conditions of the suspended sentences, this court declines to address Mishion’s  other arguments.  Affirmed.  HART  and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree. 2  Oklahoma law requires an offender to register with both the Oklahoma  Department of Correction and local law enforcement no less than three days prior to  abandoning or moving from the address of the previous registration.  See Okla. Stat. tit.  57, § 57­583(B)(3) (2006).  ­5­  CACR07­321 

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