Roderick M. Bradford v. State of Arkansas

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS  NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE DIVISION III  CACR07­191  November 7, 2007  RODERICK M. BRADFORD  APPELLANT  V. APPEAL  FROM  THE  ARKANSAS  C O U N T Y   C I R C U I T   C O U R T ,  NORTHERN DISTRICT [NO. CR­2005­  80]  HON.  DAVID G. HENRY,  JUDGE  STATE OF ARKANSAS  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  The appellant, Roderick M. Bradford, was charged with possession of cocaine with  intent  to  deliver,  possession  of  drug  paraphernalia,  and  unauthorized  use  of  another’s  property  to  facilitate  a  crime.  All  of  the  charges  were  tried  in  a  single  trial.    The  jury  acquitted appellant  of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug  paraphernalia, and convicted him of unauthorized use of another’s property to facilitate a  crime.  On  appeal,  appellant  argues  that  the  evidence  was  insufficient  to  support  his  conviction  and  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  permitting  a  police  officer  to  testify  that  a  confidential informant made a controlled drug buy from appellant’s residence.  We affirm.  Arkansas’s Criminal Gang, Organization, or Enterprise Act provides in part that a  person commits the offense of unauthorized use of another person’s property to facilitate a  crime when he knowingly uses the property of another person to facilitate in any way the  violation of a predicate criminal offense without the owner’s knowledge.  Ark. Code Ann.  §  5­74­105(a)(1)  (Repl.  2005).    A  “predicate  criminal  offense”  means  any  violation  of  Arkansas law that is a crime of violence or pecuniary gain.  Ark. Code Ann. § 5­74­103(4)  (Repl. 2005).  There was evidence at trial that appellant lived in a rental house with his  brother  Donald.  After a confidential informant performed a controlled buy of cocaine  from  the  rental house, police obtained a search warrant.  While conducting the search, police found  that a security camera monitored the only approach to the residence.  Donald had a quantity  of cocaine and over $5000 in cash on his person.  Another man in the house had a bag of  marijuana in his possession.  No drugs were found on appellant’s  person, but he did have  over $1000 in cash, including two $500 bundles secured by rubber bands.  In addition, a  digital scale was found adjacent to appellant’s identification card on the bar.  Appellant  admitted that he lived in the house with his brother.  Walter Kibble, the owner of the rental  house, testified that he did not know about and would not have permitted any drug­related  activity at the house.  Appellant argues that, because the jury acquitted him of the charges of possession of  cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia, there was no “predicate  criminal offense” to support his conviction for unauthorized use of another’s property to  facilitate  a  crime.    The  essence  of  his  argument  is  that  his  conviction  must  be  reversed  because the jury’s verdicts were inconsistent.  We find no error.  First, it is uncertain that appellant’s argument, which was never presented to the trial ­2­  CACR07­191  court, is properly before us.  In considering a similar issue regarding inconsistent verdicts in  Meadows v. State, 360 Ark. 5, 199 S.W.3d 634 (2004), our supreme court raised but did not  decide the question of whether an objection at trial was necessary to preserve the argument  for appellate review.  In any event, as was the case in Meadows, supra, appellant’s argument  is without merit.  A  jury verdict need not be consistent.  It may convict on some counts but not on  others,  and  may  convict  in  different  degrees  on  some  counts  because  of  compassion  or  compromise, and not solely because there was insufficient evidence of guilt. Jordan v. State,  323 Ark. 628, 917 S.W.2d 164 (1996).  The appellant in United States v. Powell, 469 U.S.  57 (1984), had been convicted of soliciting a  conspiracy by telephone to possess and to  distribute cocaine but was acquitted of the lesser­included offense of conspiracy to possess  and to distribute cocaine.  She attacked her conviction for the telephone solicitation counts,  arguing  that  she  had  been  acquitted  of  one  of  the  elements  of  that  offense  because  the  verdicts were inconsistent.  The Supreme Court disagreed and held that inconsistent verdicts  were permissible in the same trial where there is a conviction on the compound offense but  acquittal on the predicate offense.  The law is clear that a defendant may not attack his conviction on one  count  because  it  is  inconsistent  with  an  acquittal  on  another  count.    Res  judicata concepts are not applicable to inconsistent verdicts; the jury is free to  exercise its historic power of lenity if it believes that a conviction on one count  would provide sufficient punishment.  McVay  v.  State,  312  Ark.  73,  77,  847  S.W.2d  28,  30  (1993)  (quoting  United  States  v.  Romano,  879  F.2d  1056  (2d  Cir.  1989)  (citations  omitted)).  Here,  as  in  Powell,  supra, ­3­  CACR07­191  appellant’s  acquittal  on  the  predicate  offenses  of  possession  of  contraband  does  not  invalidate his conviction on the compound offense of unauthorized use of another’s property  to facilitate a crime.  Appellant next argues that the trial court erred in permitting a police officer to testify  regarding the activities of a confidential informant because to do so would deprive appellant  of his right to confront and cross­examine the confidential informant.  This issue was not  raised at trial.  A party is bound by the scope and nature of the arguments made at trial and  cannot change grounds for an objection or argument on appeal.  Linn v. State, 84 Ark. App.  141, 133 S.W.3d 407 (2003).  Appellant’s objection at trial was squarely and solely based  on his assertion that the police officer’s testimony was hearsay.  A hearsay objection is not  sufficient to preserve a Confrontation Clause argument for appeal.  Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark.  120, 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995); Killcrease v. State, 310 Ark. 392, 836 S.W.2d 380 (1992).  An  argument not made at trial is not preserved for appellate review.  Linn v. State, supra.  Affirmed.  GRIFFEN and MARSHALL, JJ., agree. ­4­  CACR07­191 

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