Anthony Jackson v. State of Arkansas
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOHN B. ROBBINS, JUDGE
DIVISION II
CACR 06-1368
SEPTEMBER 19, 2007
ANTHONY JACKSON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CR-2004-172]
V.
HONORABLE PHILLIP THOMAS
WHITEAKER, JUDGE
STATE OF ARKANSAS
APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Anthony Jackson appeals the revocation of his probation as entered by the
Lonoke County Circuit Court. Appellant had pleaded guilty to felony non-support in 2004,
and in exchange for that plea, he received a ten-year probationary term. In 2006, the State
filed a petition to revoke on the basis that he had failed to abide by certain conditions to
which he agreed. The trial court revoked his probation and sentenced appellant to a fiveyear prison term. Appellant contends that the State did not prove that he was provided
written conditions under which he was being given a probated sentence in accordance with
Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-303 (Repl. 2006). This, he asserts, deprived the trial court of the
authority to revoke his probation. We disagree and affirm.
In Ross v. State, 268 Ark. 189, 594 S.W.2d 852 (1980), the supreme court held that:
All conditions for a suspended sentence, including any requirement of good behavior,
must be in writing if the suspended sentence is to be revokable. Therefore, courts have
no power to imply and subsequently revoke [for violation of] conditions which were
not expressly communicated in writing to a defendant as a condition of his suspended
sentence. This result not only comports with any due process requirements owed to
a defendant upon the imposition of a suspended sentence but may serve to deter
criminal conduct which a defendant might otherwise commit but for a full
appreciation of the extent of his jeopardy.
268 Ark. at 191, 594 S.W.2d at 853; see also Neely v. State, 7 Ark. App. 238, 647 S.W.2d 473
(1983).
If a probationer is given written conditions of behavior, then under Ark. Code Ann.
§ 5-4-309(d) (Repl. 2006), a circuit court may revoke a defendant's probation at any time
prior to the expiration of the probation period if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant had inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his probation. See
also Davis v. State, __ Ark. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Jan. 4, 2007). In the probation revocation
proceedings, the State had the burden of proving that Jackson violated the terms of his
probation, as alleged in the petition, by a preponderance of the evidence, and this court will
not reverse that decision unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Id.
In this case, appellant was summoned to a probation-revocation hearing on August 29,
2006, wherein his probation officer testified that he was familiar with the conditions of
probation “attached to the Judgment and Commitment Order” and that he had discussed the
conditions that appellant “would have signed in court.” The probation officer explained that
appellant was to refrain from testing positive for illegal drugs, pay weekly child support, pay
supervision fees, maintain gainful employment, and pay restitution, court costs, and fines. The
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probation officer then stated the ways in which appellant had violated the terms heretofore
enumerated.
At the conclusion of the State’s presentation, appellant’s counsel moved for a directed
verdict, including an argument that the State “failed to provide the Court sufficient evidence
showing that Mr. Jackson was given written terms of conditions of his probation, specifically
enumerating those terms and conditions that he is here being violated on. ... [D]efendant has
to be given written terms of his conditions of probation.” The State responded that the trial
judge could take judicial notice of the court file that included his probation conditions, as well
as the probation officer’s testimony. Defense counsel objected to the trial court taking judicial
notice of anything. The judge announced his ruling, finding that appellant had not complied
with the conditions of his probation. The judge ruled on neither the defense objection to a
lack of written conditions, nor the State’s request for taking of judicial notice. A judgment
followed, as did a notice of appeal.
Whether there is proof that a probationer received written conditions of probation is
a procedural matter, and not one of the sufficiency of the evidence, because the purpose of
providing the conditions in writing is to prevent confusion on the probationer’s part. See
Nelson v. State, 84 Ark. App. 373, 141 S.W.3d 900 (2004). This procedural issue was raised
to the trial court. See Whitener v. State, __ Ark. App. __, __ S.W.3d __ (Oct. 25, 2006).
The judge correctly revoked appellant’s probation, although we affirm for a different
reason. Our appellate courts, even in criminal proceedings, are permitted to go to the record
to affirm. See Johnson v. State, 366 Ark. 286, __ S.W.3d __ (2006). This is particularly so
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where there exists a document in the record to support doing so. See Washington v. Thompson,
339 Ark. 417, 6 S.W.3d 82 (1999); Heagerty v. State, 335 Ark. 520, 983 S.W.2d 908 (1998);
Haynes v. State, 314 Ark. 354, 862 S.W.2d 275 (1993). The record in fact reflects that
written conditions were given to appellant, which contain initials and a signature purportedly
of appellant executed on August 20, 2004. This combined with the probation officer’s
testimony, provided evidence that such written conditions existed and the specific conditions
therein. There was no procedural or due process error in this instance.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the revocation of appellant’s probation.
G LOVER and B AKER, JJ., agree.
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