Pamela T. Shelnut v. State of Arkansas
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NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
D.P. MARSHALL JR., Judge
DIVISION IV
CACR06-1298
26 September 2007
PAMELA T. SHELNUT,
APPELLANT
AN APPEAL FROM THE SALINE
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[CR2005-684B-2]
v.
STATE OF ARKANSAS,
APPELLEE
THE HONORABLE GRISHAM A.
PHILLIPS, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Pamela Shelnut appeals her conviction for rape as an accomplice and the denial
of her motion for a new trial. We reject all of Shelnut’s arguments and affirm.
George Keen started raping Shelnut’s then-nine-year-old daughter, SH, in late1999 or early-2000 after he moved in with the family. Shelnut and Keen married in
February 2000. Keen continued to rape SH repeatedly until 2005, when SH confided
in her stepmother who reported the rape to counselors and the police. A jury
convicted Shelnut of rape as an accomplice, finding that she knew, or had reason to
know, that Keen had raped her daughter, but failed to prevent it despite her legal duty
to do so. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-14-103(a)(3)(A) (Repl. 2006); 5-2-402(2) (Repl.
2006); 5-2-403(a)(3) (Repl. 2006). After Shelnut’s trial, Keen pleaded guilty to raping
SH.
First, Shelnut’s argument that the prosecution should have charged her with
Permitting Abuse of a Minor under Ark. Code Ann. § 5-27-221 (Repl. 2006), rather
than rape, fails. The prosecutor had discretion to charge her with either crime, and
the evidence satisfied the rape statute’s elements. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-103; Simpson
v. State, 310 Ark. 493, 498, 837 S.W.2d 475, 478 (1992).
Shelnut is also mistaken when she argues that she did not have a legal duty to
protect SH from rape. In Hutcheson v. State, this court affirmed an accomplice-to-rape
conviction in similar circumstances. 92 Ark. App. 307, 213 S.W.3d 25 (2005). In that
case, and others, Arkansas courts have recognized parents’ duties to protect their
children from harm, including sexual abuse. Hutcheson, 92 Ark. App. at 314–16, 213
S.W.3d at 30–31; Burnett v. State, 287 Ark. 158, 162, 697 S.W.2d 95, 98 (1985),
overruled on other grounds by Midgett v. State, 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 (1987);
Williams v. State, 267 Ark. 527, 528–29, 593 S.W.2d 8, 9 (1980). This precedent
governs. Even if it did not exist, however, we would have no hesitancy in holding
that our common law obligates parents to protect their children.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, substantial evidence supports
Shelnut’s conviction. Hutcheson, 92 Ark. App. at 313, 213 S.W.3d at 29. Keen raped
SH repeatedly during the five years that Shelnut was married to and lived with him.
SH testified that she told her mother the first time that Keen raped her and at least
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twice after later rapes. Shelnut admitted at her trial that she knew Keen was raping
SH, yet Shelnut refused to call the police. She even took thirteen-year-old SH to get
an abortion when they suspected that she was pregnant. SH testified that Shelnut
knew that it would be Keen’s baby and that Shelnut acted like she was upset with SH
for the pregnancy. Even then, Shelnut did not report his crime. After Shelnut left
Keen, she allowed him to visit the family’s home frequently, forcing SH to move in
with her grandmother to get away from him. All of these circumstances provide
substantial evidence for the conviction.
Shelnut’s second point on appeal—that the State neglected its duty to obtain and
disclose exculpatory evidence—is likewise unconvincing. Shelnut’s ex-husband, Joe
Hester, overstated in his trial testimony how much he had paid Shelnut in child
support. His testimony undercut her argument that she let Keen return to her home
only because he drew a disability check and the children felt sorry for him. The State,
Shelnut says, should have obtained accurate child-support-payment records to present
at trial. She argues that the State’s use of Hester’s inaccurate testimony to impeach her
credibility violated her due-process rights.
The State has a duty to obtain and disclose exculpatory evidence. Ark. R.
Crim. P. 17.1(d) & 17.3. Shelnut, however, did not make a contemporaneous
objection when Hester testified at her trial. She did not cross-examine him about the
amount of child support he paid, nor did she dispute his testimony when she took the
witness stand. Shelnut’s failure to object waived any error here. Brenneman v. State,
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264 Ark. 460, 470–71, 573 S.W.2d 47, 52–53 (1978). More importantly, Shelnut was
equally able to figure out exactly how much Hester paid her. The State did not
violate Shelnut’s due-process rights by failing to do so. Morris v. State, 302 Ark. 532,
539, 792 S.W.2d 288, 292 (1990).
Shelnut cannot prevail on her third argument either. She asserts that the circuit
court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a new trial, which was based on
what she characterizes as newly available exculpatory evidence. Because Keen pleaded
guilty to rape after her conviction, she asserts, he no longer retains his right against selfincrimination and his testimony is newly available for her defense. At her trial,
however, Shelnut never subpoenaed Keen or proffered evidence of what she expected
his testimony to be. She did not object to going to trial without Keen, nor did she
move for a continuance of her trial until after he had entered his plea. Finally, in her
post-trial motion, Shelnut made no proffer of what Keen’s testimony would be or how
it could affect the outcome of this case. The circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Shelnut’s motion for a new trial. Misskelley v. State, 323 Ark. 449, 478–79,
915 S.W.2d 702, 717–18 (1996) (standard of review).
Affirmed.
BAKER and MILLER, JJ., agree.
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