Elizabeth Hense v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services
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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
ROBERT J. GLADWIN, JUDGE
DIVISION III
CA07-290
September 5, 2007
ELIZABETH HENSE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DREW COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. JV-2006-124-5]
V.
A R K A N SA S D E P A R T M E N T O F
HEALTH and HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
HON. TERESA FRENCH,
JUDGE
AFFIRMED
Appellant Elizabeth Hense appeals an order from the Drew County Circuit Court in
which her minor grandson, J.H., over whom she maintained guardianship, was adjudicated
dependent-neglected. Appellant’s sole point on appeal is a challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting the order. We affirm.
Appellant is the grandmother and guardian of J.H., whose date of birth is December
10, 1996. This case began when appellee Arkansas Department of Health and Human
Services (ADHHS) sent a caseworker to Drew Central Elementary School on December 11,
2006, to investigate a report of suspected child abuse. J.H. was interviewed in the presence
of police representatives and his school principal, at which time he told investigators that on
the previous night appellant had instructed his fifteen-year-old cousin to tie J.H.’s hands
together. He explained that appellant had him tied up to keep him out of the refrigerator and
from eating sugar at night. Appellant’s cousin was also interviewed and corroborated his
story, including the fact that J.H. would get up at night and eat sugar.
Based upon the interviews, J.H. was placed in emergency custody on December 11,
2006. On December 14, 2006, a hearing was held, with appellant failing to appear, and it
was determined that probable cause existed to continue J.H. in ADHHS custody until the
adjudication hearing. The adjudication hearing was held on January 11, 2007.
According to his progress report, J.H. was found to have a borderline I.Q. He had
difficulty answering questions at the hearing and a poor ability to recall events. Appellant
testified at the hearing, explaining that she, J.H., and his cousin had been staying at her
daughter’s home on the night of December 10, 2006, so that she could look after her
daughter’s two babies while her daughter was ill. She stated that she had received two shots
earlier in the day, and apparently, the pain medication left her unable to adequately care for
J.H. and prevented her from accurately remembering all the events of the evening. Although
appellant denies in her brief that she instructed her older grandson to tie J.H.’s wrists
together, she testified at the adjudication hearing that, “I don’t know when I told his cousin
to tie his hands together, like I said, I passed out a little after nine.” She further testified that
on the following morning, her older grandson said to her, “Don’t you remember telling me
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to put the tape on his hands?” She further explained that she told him that she couldn’t
remember what she had said to him the previous evening because she was under the
influence of medication. Additionally, Investigator Libby Cox testified at the hearing that
appellant told her that, “she knew it happened, she knew it happened and she fell asleep and
she may have told him.” On January 11, 2007, the circuit court entered an order finding J.H.
dependent-neglected. This appeal followed.
In equity matters, such as dependency-neglect cases, the standard of review on appeal
is de novo, but we do not reverse the judge’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous or
clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Moiser v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs.,
95 Ark. App. 32, __ S.W.3d __ (2006). A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there
is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. However, a trial court’s conclusion
on a question of law is given no deference on appeal. Id.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-325(h)(2)(B) requires proof by a
preponderance of the evidence in dependency-neglect situations. Under Arkansas Code
Annotated section 9-27-313, a child can be taken into immediate custody by the State when
that child is in immediate danger. Promptly following that taking, a probable cause hearing
must be held and then an adjudication hearing. During the adjudication hearing, the State
is required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the allegations in the petition for
emergency custody were substantiated. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-327. Arkansas Code
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Annotated section 9-27-303(18) describes a “dependent-neglected juvenile” as one who is
at substantial risk of serious harm as a result of abandonment, abuse, sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, neglect, or parental unfitness. The statute describes “neglect” as:
(i) Failure or refusal to prevent the abuse of the juvenile when the person knows or
has reasonable cause to know the juvenile is or has been abused;
(ii) Failure or refusal to provide the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and education
required by law....
(iii) Failure to take reasonable action to protect the juvenile from abandonment, abuse,
sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, neglect, or parental unfitness when the existence
of this condition was known or should have been known;
(iv) Failure or irremediable inability to provide for the essential and necessary
physical, mental, or emotional needs of the juvenile....
(v) Failure to provide for the juvenile’s care and maintenance, proper or necessary
support, or medical, surgical, or other necessary responsibility; or
(vi) Failure, although able, to assume responsibility for the care and custody of the
juvenile or to participate in a plan to assume the responsibility; or
(vii) Failure to appropriately supervise the juvenile that results in the juvenile’s being
left alone at an inappropriate age or in inappropriate circumstances, creating a
dangerous situation or a situation that puts the juvenile at risk of harm.
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(36). Additionally, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27303(3)(A)(vii)(f) deals specifically with the act of binding of a juvenile’s limbs as abuse. It
provides, in part, that tying a child to a fixed or heavy object or binding or tying a child’s
limbs together, if done intentionally or knowingly, constitutes abuse whether or not physical
injury resulted therefrom.
Appellant contends that the proof offered by ADHHS fails to support the circuit
court’s findings for three reasons:
(1) the individual who performed the alleged act
constituting abuse was not an individual to whom the legislation was directed; (2) ADHHS
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failed to prove that appellant performed an intentional or knowing act that is prohibited by
the statute; (3) ADHHS failed to establish that J.H.’s hands were bound together.
Initially, appellant points out that the individual who allegedly bound J.H.’s hands, his
fifteen-year-old cousin, was under the age of eighteen years, and was not entrusted with
J.H.’s care, as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(A), which states in pertinent part:
“Abuse” means any of the following acts or omissions by a parent, guardian,
custodian, foster parent, person eighteen (18) years of age or older living in the home
with a child, whether related or unrelated to the child, or any person who is entrusted
with the juvenile’s care by a parent, guardian, custodian, or foster parent, including,
but not limited to, an agent or employee of a public or private residential home, child
care facility, public or private school, or any person legally responsible for the
juvenile’s welfare ....
(emphasis added). Appellant asserts that in order to be covered by the definition, the person
who performs the act in question must qualify as a person from whom the legislation was
intended to protect the juvenile. It is undisputed that the cousin was fifteen years of age, and
evidence was presented that he was not held to be entrusted with J.H.’s care.
Secondly, appellant claims that ADHHS failed to establish that she possessed any
intent or knowledge of the alleged acts. She asserts that, pursuant to the statute, the burden
was on ADHHS to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she acted with intent
or knowledge to bind J.H.’s hands. The circuit court stated in its ruling that it found the case
manager and counselor, Michelle Shirey, to be a very credible witness, and based its ruling,
in part, upon Ms. Shirey’s testimony that appellant told the cousin to tape the child’s hands.
Appellant argues that Ms. Shirey said no such thing, and that only J.H., who was inconsistent
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and confused, along with Investigator Cox, made such allegations, which were far from
conclusive. Appellant herself adamantly denies the allegations, claiming that she had never
done so previously and that she would remember if she had done so on this occasion.
Accordingly, appellant claims that, at best, ADHHS presented only the mere possibility that
she directed the cousin’s actions, which does not meet the standard of proof required under
the statute.
Appellant argues that only the person who performs the abusive act can be held
responsible for the abuse; however, this argument was not properly preserved at the
adjudication hearing, and further, appellant fails to support the argument with relevant case
law. We do not consider issues on appeal without convincing argument or citation to
authority where it is not apparent without further research that the arguments are well-taken.
See Todd v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 85 Ark. App. 174, 151 S.W.3d 315 (2004).
ADHHS argues that there is testimony sufficient to support the circuit court’s ruling
that appellant instructed her fifteen-year-old grandson to bind J.H.’s wrists with duct tape.
Appellant’s in-court admission that her older grandson told her “Don’t you remember telling
me to put the tape on his hands?” is significant in and of itself, and is additionally bolstered
by her admission that “she knew it happened” as testified to by Investigator Cox. Further,
although appellant later attempted to retract certain comments, she initially responded to
questions at the hearing by stating, “I don’t know when I told his cousin to tie his hands
together, like I said, I passed out a little after nine.” ADHHS contends that appellant knew
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that she would be receiving medication on the day in question that would cause her to
become sleepy, and further, that she should have known that she could not properly supervise
J.H. or her other younger grandchildren after the medication had been administered. Because
she failed to make suitable arrangements for J.H. to have proper supervision, his wrists were
bound with duct tape, and he was left to sleep in that condition for the remainder of the night.
The attorney ad litem urges us to take the view that if appellant, as J.H.’s guardian and
care giver, directed someone else to bind J.H.’s hands together, then that direction should be
treated as if appellant had bound his hands herself. The attorney ad litem contends that
appellant’s directions to her older grandson constituted an intentional or knowing act under
the statute. Alternatively, the attorney ad litem claims that appellant ignores the other
independent ground for the adjudication of dependency neglect, specifically that she was
acknowledged to be the legal guardian; it was her responsibility to ensure J.H.’s health and
safety, and her failure to do so constituted neglect.
We agree. At a minimum, appellant admitted that she was responsible for the boy on
the evening in question and that she might have instructed his cousin to bind his wrists but
could not remember because of the influence of her medication. Her failure to prevent the
cousin from binding the child’s hands constituted neglect, which would independently
support a finding of dependency-neglect under Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(18)(A)(v). A
parent has a duty to protect a child, and can be found to be unfit even though she did not
directly cause the child’s injury. See Todd, supra. Even if appellant did not specifically
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instruct her older grandson to bind J.H.’s wrists, sufficient evidence remains to support a
finding that she was unfit to care for J.H. and that she failed to provide adequate supervision.
ADHHS asserts, and we agree, that a parent or guardian who is intoxicated or under the
influence of drugs to such an extent that she is rendered unconscious and experiences a
memory lapse related to that time period cannot properly supervise a child.
Finally, appellant argues that ADHHS failed to conclusively show that J.H.’s hands
were actually bound, showing, at most, that his hands had one or two pieces of tape on them.
She claims that J.H.’s testimony was certainly confusing regarding this issue, and that neither
Ms. Shirey’s or her testimony established that the child was “bound.” Accordingly, she asks
that the dependent-neglect ruling of the circuit court be determined to be clearly erroneous
on this basis alone.
The attorney ad litem argues that this contention is not supported by the proof
presented at the adjudication hearing. The record indicates that Ms. Shirey testified that J.H.
told her that he had his hands taped together with just one or two pieces of tape so that he
would not get into the refrigerator and get into the sugar, and also that he slept like that
overnight. We decline to say that it was clearly erroneous for the circuit court to have
considered that one or two pieces of duct tape would be sufficient to bind his wrists together.
Although J.H. was found not to be generally credible, he did testify that he remembered
someone tying his hands with duct tape, which was consistent with other witnesses’
testimony. Again, even appellant testified that when she woke up, she “did not know when
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J.H.’s hands got tied or taped together.” We disagree that it was mere speculation for the
circuit court to have determined that J.H.’s hands were still bound when appellant saw him
the following morning.
At a minimum, ADHHS proved that appellant committed neglect in not protecting
J.H.’s health and safety, which is in and of itself, grounds for the dependency-neglect
adjudication. We affirm.
Affirmed.
G RIFFEN and V AUGHT, JJ., agree.
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