Lucia Cox v. Arkansas Department of Human Services
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DIVISION III
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
JOHN MAUZY PITTMAN, CHIEF JUDGE
CA06-361
November 1, 2006
APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. J-04-238]
LUCIA COX
APPELLANT
HON. MICHAEL MEDLOCK,
JUDGE
V.
AFFIRMED
A R K A N SA S D E P A R T M E N T O F
HUMAN SERVICES
APPELLEE
This is a mother’s appeal from the termination of her parental rights. Her child, E.H.,
was horrifically injured at eight weeks of age. At the emergency room, the child was
diagnosed with shaken-baby syndrome involving blindness and massive, irreversible brain
damage. The child’s father, who stated that he “discovered” the injuries, was criminally
charged. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights without requiring the
Arkansas Department of Human Services to provide reunification services based on finding
that the child had been subjected to aggravated circumstances (serious physical injury at the
hands of a family member), that the mother was complicit because she failed to protect the
child, and that reunification services would likely be unsuccessful. On appeal, appellant
argues that the trial court erred in not requiring ADHS to provide reunification services, and
that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights. We affirm.
Although termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy in derogation of the
natural rights of the parents, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or
destruction of the health and well-being of the child. Crawford v. Department of Human
Services, 330 Ark. 152, 951 S.W.2d 310 (1997).
Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §
9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2002), the facts warranting termination of parental rights must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence. In reviewing the trial court's evaluation of the
evidence, we will not reverse unless the trial court clearly erred in finding that the relevant
facts were established by clear and convincing evidence. Anderson v. Douglas, 310 Ark.
633, 839 S.W.2d 196 (1992). Clear and convincing evidence is the degree of proof that will
produce in the fact-finder a firm conviction regarding the allegation sought to be established.
Id. Furthermore, we will defer to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of the
witnesses. Crawford v. Department of Human Services, supra.
Here, termination of parental rights was based on the trial court’s findings that the
child was rendered dependent-neglected by life-threatening abuse perpetrated by the child’s
parents; that the child’s injuries were the direct result of appellant’s failure to protect the
child; that the explanation of the injuries is inconsistent with the actual injuries inflicted on
the child; and that termination of parental rights was therefore in the child’s best interest.
Under Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-27-341(b)(3), termination of parental rights must be
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based upon a finding that it is in the best interest of the juvenile and a finding that one or
more enumerated grounds for termination of parental rights exists. One such ground is that:
(vi)(a) The court has found the juvenile dependent-neglected as a result
of neglect or abuse that could endanger the life of the child, sexual abuse, or
sexual exploitation, any of which was perpetrated by the juvenile's parent or
parents.
(b) Such findings by the juvenile division of circuit court shall
constitute grounds for immediate termination of the parental rights of one (1)
or both of the parents....
Giving deference to the superior opportunity of the trial judge to assess credibility, we
think that the evidence in this case supports such a finding. There was medical evidence to
show that the child was regularly subjected to severe physical abuse, that there were multiple
episodes, and that, when he was ultimately hospitalized at eight weeks of age, there was
evidence of prior intentionally-inflicted physical injuries, including multiple bone fractures,
that had not been treated and did not match the histories given by the parents. Appellant
admitted that she knew that the father was a violent man, that they “argued a lot,” and that
he had beaten and bruised her during their arguments. There was also evidence that appellant
noticed bruises on the child on multiple occasions after the child had been left in the father’s
care; on one such occasion, she observed bruising on the child’s legs and, after confronting
the father, accepted his dubious explanation that the bruises were inflicted when the father
was “pushing his legs up to get him to go to the bathroom.” Appellant admittedly took no
action to protect the child from the father. Furthermore, after the child was admitted to the
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hospital at eight weeks of age with massive brain injuries, appellant falsely told criminal
investigators that she never noticed any previous bruising on the child.
A parent has a duty to protect a child, and can be found to be unfit even though she
did not directly cause her child’s injury. Todd v. Arkansas Department of Human Services,
85 Ark. App. 174, 151 S.W.3d 315 (2004). We hold that the evidence supports the trial
court’s findings that the child’s life-threatening injuries were the direct result of appellant’s
failure to protect him and that this physical abuse was inflicted by a parent. Because these
circumstances constitute grounds for immediate termination of parental rights, appellant’s
argument regarding the failure of ADHS to provide reunification services is moot, and we
therefore do not address it.
Affirmed.
B IRD and N EAL, JJ., agree.
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CA06-361
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