Henrietta English, Employee v. Wal-Mart Associates, Inc., Employer, Claims Management, Inc., Insurance Carrier
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DIVISION III
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
S AM B IRD, Judge
CA06-220
O CTOBER 4, 2006
HENRIETTA ENGLISH, EMPLOYEE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION COMMISSION, [NO.
F403700]
V.
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC.,
EMPLOYER,
C L A IM S M A N A G EM EN T, IN C .,
INSURANCE CARRIER APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
Appellant Henrietta English appeals from a decision of the Workers’ Compensation
Commission denying her claim for benefits as a result of an accident that occurred while she
was working for appellee Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. She contends (1) that the Commission’s
decision that she failed to prove she sustained a compensable injury to her back was not
supported by substantial evidence; (2) that the Commission’s decision that she failed to prove
she sustained an aggravation of a pre-existing condition was not supported by substantial
evidence; and (3) that the Commission’s decision to deny temporary total disability benefits
was not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
At a hearing before the administrative law judge, English contended that on March
28, 2004, while stocking candy for Wal-Mart, she fell from a ladder and hit a display,
resulting in a new injury to her back or an aggravation of a prior degenerative condition.
Wal-Mart controverted the claim, contending that English could not establish a compensable
injury or aggravation rising out of or in the course of her employment, identifiable by time
and place of occurrence, and supported by objective, measurable physical findings.
English testified that she was employed with Wal-Mart on March 28, 2004, and that
she worked as a stocker in the candy section. At 6:15 or 6:30 a.m. on the morning of her
shift, English was stocking Easter baskets on the candy aisle when she “went up on the ladder
to put a box of chocolate candy up.” She said that the next thing she knew, she fell. She
claimed that she “screamed out” and that she hit a display box as she fell backwards. She
claimed that she hit her back, her buttocks, her side, and her arms on the floor. She said that
she was “pretty much flat” after the fall. She claimed that she was “screaming” and “crying”
and that another store employee, George Hunt, came to her “rescue.” English also claimed
that the store manager, Ramona Johnson, came to assist and that Hunt and Johnson tried to
get her up from the floor, but could not. According to English, Johnson “got a wheelchair”
because she could not get up.
English said that she requested an ambulance but never got one. She also claimed that
she was never offered medical treatment by her employer. She said that she went to the
hospital with a girlfriend who came and picked her up. She stated that she was “in a great
deal of severe pain” and that she “couldn’t hardly walk.”
English said that she was not having problems with her back before she fell on March
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28. She admitted that she had previous problems with her back but said that she had not seen
a doctor about her back since 1991. At some point between 1991 and the March 28, 2004,
accident, English had worked at a maximum-security prison, which required strenuous
physical activity. She claimed at the hearing that she was currently unable to “do anything
like [she] used to.” Specifically, she said that she could not play ball with her grandson, could
not roller skate with him, and was unable to work.
On cross-examination, English admitted that she had filed a prior workers’
compensation claim in 1991, but said that it was not a “similar” injury. She explained that
she went to the emergency room at 5:15 p.m. on the date of the 2004 accident, and that she
had gone home to “get some sleep” before having a girlfriend drive her to the emergency
room.
George Hunt testified that he was employed at Wal-Mart on the date of the accident
and that he assisted English after she fell. He said that another employee informed him that
English had fallen and he immediately contacted management and went to help her. When
he found her, English was “on the floor with her back up against the pallet and she was
grimacing like she was in a lot of pain.” He attempted to help her up, but could not, so he
helped get a wheelchair for her.
Ramona Johnson testified that she was the co-manager on duty on the date of the
accident. Johnson said that she did not recall English asking for an ambulance. She said that
she explained to English that if she went to the doctor or to the emergency room it might be
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an out-of-pocket expense, depending on whether the claim was covered under Wal-Mart’s
policy. Johnson said that when she saw English on the floor after the accident, she was
“moaning” and “seemed to be in pain.” She stated that English was aware that a member of
management would have to accompany her to the doctor or the emergency room.
Cheryl Phillips testified that she was the assistant manager on duty on March 28,
2004. She said that she asked English about needing medical attention and that English did
not request it at that time, nor did English ask for an escort to the emergency room. Phillips
said that Wal-Mart contacted English three days after the accident and requested that she see
the company doctor, but she was “argumentative” and eventually “walked out” of the
doctor’s office. English did, however, subsequently visit the company doctor.
Medical records indicate that on the date of the accident, Dr. Bell, the emergency
room physician, diagnosed a “contusion” to the back and prescribed Flexeril. A few days
later, English was examined by Wal-Mart’s company doctor, Dr. Gerald Morris. He reported
that English said she was in “major pain” and rated her pain as a “10” on a scale of “1 to 10.”
He noted that an MRI performed on the date of the accident “did not show fracture or disc
injury,” other than some lower lumbar degeneration. He diagnosed English with “lumbar
strain,” prescribed pain medication, and recommended physical therapy. After several followup visits with Dr. Morris, English discontinued physical therapy. Dr. Morris noted that
English’s physical therapist said she had some “vague suspicions” that English was
complaining of agonizing pain, but made “purposeful movement.” Dr. Morris also noted that
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the therapist said English would often refuse to have the treatment suggested, but then would
agree to proceed with treatment while extremely emotional and “crying all the time.” English
was subsequently referred to Dr. Kenneth Rosenzweig, an orthopedic surgeon.
On April 20, 2004, English was evaluated by Dr. Rosenzweig. He noted that she
reported “extremely severe” pain that was “getting worse with time.” He ordered an MRI
based on English’s complaints of “radicular symptoms.” 1 His report indicated no prior neck
or back problems before the March 28 accident. In a letter dated June 1, 2004, Dr.
Rosenzweig responded as follows to the question of whether he observed any objective
findings to support an injury:
The physical examination suggested significant irritability consistent with sciatica,
possibly from a disk protrusion with nerve root impingement. The majority of findings
can have subjective overlay. Additional information such as an MRI is needed to
confirm whether this claimant truly sustained an injury pattern. She may have
sustained a contusion only and an exacerbation of underlying degenerative changes
or she may have truly sustained an injury from her claim. …
During a subsequent deposition, Dr. Rosenzweig was informed of English’s prior history of
back problems,2 and stated as follows when asked about her current injury:
Had I know[n] her history that she hand wrote was not an accurate reflection of her
past, I probably would have been a little more suspicious. And it’s certainly possible
that she had a minor event but having been through this before, she knew how to
participate in examination to reflect more of a major event.
1
According to English, this MRI was never performed.
2
As the law judge noted, the medical records in this case are “replete” with evidence
that English had received treatment for back injuries prior to the 2004 incident,
including a 1991 back injury for which she reported to the emergency room and for
which she sought workers’ compensation benefits, and a 2001 back injury for which
she was admitted to the hospital overnight.
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So I don’t know that I can answer with reasonable medical certainty yes or no.
On July 29, 2004, English went to Dr. Jon Dodson, a general practitioner. Dr. Dodson
reported that English suffered “injury” to her neck and back with “palpable muscle spasm.”
He noted English’s complaints of “severe pain,” with some pain radiating to her left leg. He
also noted “no upper extremity radicular symptoms” and described her past history as
“noncontributory.” He said that her symptoms were “consistent with a musculo-ligamentous
sprain of the cervical and lumbar spine and a herniated lumbar disc secondary to the recent
accident.” He ordered an MRI, but it was never performed. During a subsequent deposition,
Dr. Dodson opined within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that English’s fall
resulted in an aggravation of her pre-existing degenerative disk disease. However, he said
it was possible that he could change his opinion if he knew that she had suffered several
injuries other than those she related to him. English did not see Dodson after September of
2004.
In an opinion filed on July 13, 2005, the administrative law judge denied benefits to
English, stating as follows:
[English] has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she
sustained a compensable back injury, or aggravation, arising out of and during the
course and scope of her employment on March 28, 2004, or to establish a causal
connection between her employment and her injury, within a reasonable degree of
medical certainty.
….
In this case, no objective medical findings exist to establish that a work-related
back injury, or aggravation of same, occurred on March 28, 2004. The only findings
that do exist were the results of admittedly subjective tests and were in reliance upon
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claimant’s history as told to her physicians by her. Moreover, based upon the medical
records, claimant obviously failed to disclose a complete, accurate medical history to
her treating physicians. Even Dr. Dodson – the only physician who did opine that
claimant sustained an injury or aggravation of her prior condition on March 28, 2004,
“within a reasonable degree of medical certainty” – acknowledged that his
conclusions were subjectively based and that his opinion regarding causation could
change if he were to obtain information that claimant had experienced additional prior
injuries with the same or similar symptoms.
A number of factors brought forth in this case work together to constrain
claimant’s credibility, in this examiner’s opinion. Those factors include: the lack of
any witness to claimant’s alleged fall, coupled with her refusal, initially, to see the
company doctor; the suspicions on the part of the physical therapist that claimant’s
efforts were not reliable; claimant’s obvious failure to disclose an accurate medical
history to her medical providers since this alleged incident; and, claimant’s ceasing
of medical care since September of 2004, while still complaining at the hearing that
she is unable to work and continues to require pain medication today.
In short, claimant has simply failed to prove by a preponderance of the
credible evidence that she sustained any compensable back injury, or
aggravation, on March 28, 2004.
In an opinion filed on December 16, 2005, the Workers’ Compensation Commission
adopted and affirmed the decision of the law judge. English now appeals the Commission’s
decision.
In reviewing decisions of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission, we
view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most
favorable to the Commission’s findings, and we affirm if the decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Dorris v. Townsends of Ark., Inc., 93 Ark. App. 208, ___ S.W.3d ___
(Nov. 30, 2005). Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable person might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Id. We will not reverse the Commission’s decision unless
we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have
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reached the conclusions arrived at by the Commission. Id. The substantial evidence standard
of review requires that we affirm if the Commission’s opinion displays a substantial basis for
the denial of relief. Id.
Furthermore, the determination of the credibility and weight to be given a witness’s
testimony is within the sole province of the Commission. Poulan Weed Eater v. Marshall,
79 Ark. App. 129, 84 S.W.3d 878 (2002). The Commission is not required to believe the
testimony of the claimant or any other witness, but may accept and translate into findings of
fact only those portions of the testimony it deems worthy of belief. Id. The Commission has
the authority to accept or reject medical opinions, and its resolution of the medical evidence
has the force and effect of a jury verdict. Id.
Whether Substantial Evidence Exists to Support Commission’s Determination that No
Compensable Injury Occurred
English first contends that there was no substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s determination that no compensable injury occurred. The statutory definition
of “compensable injury” includes the following:
An accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body … arising
out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results
in disability or death. An injury is “accidental” only if it is caused by a specific
incident and is identifiable by time and place of occurrence[.]
Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). Furthermore, a compensable injury must
be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Ark. Code Ann. §
11-9-102(4)(D). Objective findings are those that cannot come under the voluntary control
of the claimant. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(16)(A). Medical opinions addressing
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compensability must be stated within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Ark. Code
Ann. § 11-9-102(16).
The claimant must also prove a causal relationship between the employment and the
injury. Horticare Landscape Mgmt. v. McDonald, 80 Ark. App. 45, 89 S.W.3d 375 (2002).
However, objective medical evidence is necessary to establish the existence and extent of an
injury, but is not essential to establish the causal relationship between the injury and a
work-related accident. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. VanWagner, 337 Ark. 443, 990 S.W.2d 522
(1999).
To support this point, English claims that “the existence of other possible causes of
injury does not mean that she has failed to meet her burden of proof.” She then proceeds with
a lengthy discussion of how the accident on March 28, 2004, caused her injuries. She fails to
recognize, however, that the Commission—by adopting the law judge’s opinion—based its
decision on its finding that no compensable injury occurred.
We note English’s argument that there were objective findings of an on-the-job injury,
as well as objective findings of a progression of worsening symptoms from her pre-existing
degenerative disk disease. She asserts that the presence of degenerative disk disease at any
level is indicative of an “unstable situation in the back,” and that “any specific trauma can
cause … a worsening situation.”
Here, the Commission adopted the law judge’s opinion that the only findings in this
case were subjective and “in reliance upon claimant’s history as told to her physicians by her.”
There was evidence before the Commission that English failed to inform her physicians of her
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prior history of back injury, and that even the opinion of Dr. Dodson—the only physician to
opine within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that English had sustained an injury
from the March 2004 accident—might have changed had he known of her prior history. This
failure, along with the facts that there were no witnesses to the March 28, 2004 incident, that
English initially “walked out” of the company doctor’s office, that English’s physical therapist
had “vague suspicions” about the reliability of English’s efforts, and that English’s last
documented medical care was in September 2004, clearly diminished English’s credibility in
the opinion of the law judge and the Commission.
The Commission also noted that the first reported observable muscle spasm in
English’s back was four months after the alleged injury and that all physicians who treated
her more contemporaneously to the alleged incident denied the presence of muscle spasms or
any other objective finding. The Commission’s decision, adopted from the law judge, noted
the following medical evidence: Although the emergency room physician diagnosed a
contusion to the back on March 28, 2004, he observed no bruising or muscle spasms, and
there was no notation of swelling in the emergency room records; Dr. Morris’s notes of April
2, 2004, reflected no mention of any obvious objective findings such as bruising, swelling,
or spasms; Dr. Rosenzweig, who examined English on April 20, 2004, stated that he observed
no bruising, swelling, or muscle spasms.
Thus, substantial evidence supports the Commission’s finding that English “failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she sustained a compensable back injury, or
aggravation, arising out of and during the course of her employment.” We hold that the
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Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of English’s claim for a
compensable injury.
Whether Substantial Evidence Exists to Support Commission’s Determination that
No Aggravation Occurred
English also contends that there was no substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s determination that no aggravation occurred. The employer takes the employee
as he finds her, and employment circumstances that aggravate pre-existing conditions are
compensable. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550
(1996). However, an aggravation is a new injury with an independent cause and, therefore,
must meet the requirements for a compensable injury. Crudup v. Regal Ware, Inc., 341 Ark.
804, 20 S.W.3d 900 (2000).
English argues that “medical evidence supported by objective findings is not essential
in every case,” and further asserts that this court has “never required that a doctor be absolute
in an opinion” or that the magic words “within a reasonable degree of medical certainty” even
be used by the doctor; rather, she insists that this court has simply held that a medical opinion
be more than “speculation.” However, she offers no authority for these assertions, and such
arguments are clearly misguided when it comes to proving a compensable injury or
aggravation. Our law plainly states that “[a] compensable injury must be established by
medical evidence supported by objective findings.” Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D). As
stated above, an aggravation must meet the requirements for a compensable injury; thus, an
aggravation must also be established by objective medical evidence.
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English additionally relies upon Williams v. L&W Janitorial, Inc., 85 Ark. App. 1, 145
S.W.3d 383 (2004), to support this point. However, in that case, we held that an admittedly
compensable injury suffered by the claimant was a factor in her need for additional surgery
and, thus, she was entitled to benefits. Here, according to the Commission, there was no
compensable injury. Thus, Williams is inapposite to this case.
As discussed above, the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the
denial of English’s claim for a compensable injury. It therefore follows that the Commission’s
decision also displays a substantial basis for the denial of her claim for an aggravation.
Temporary Total Disability Benefits
As her third point, English claims that there was no substantial evidence to support the
Commission’s decision to deny temporary total disability benefits. Because we have decided
that the Commission’s decision displays a substantial basis for the denial of English’s claim
for a compensable injury or aggravation, we need not address this contention. Moreover, the
law judge’s opinion, which was adopted by the Commission, did not address temporary total
disability benefits.
For these reasons, we affirm.
Affirmed.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and N EAL, J., agree.
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