Kevyn Allen v. John Allen (Deceased)
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DIVISION IV
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
DAVID M. GLOVER, JUDGE
CA06-136
September 6, 2006
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
SEVENTEENTH DIVISION
[ECN1989-5712]
KEVYN ALLEN
APPELLANT
V.
JOHN ALLEN (DECEASED)
APPELLEE
HONORABLE MACKIE M.
PIERCE, JUDGE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Kevyn Allen, appellant, and Dr. John Allen, deceased, were divorced by decree
filed of record July 9, 1990. At the time of the divorce, the parties’ child, Krystn, was
three years old. A property-settlement agreement was entered into by the parties, and the
agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree. Paragraph four of the agreement,
which forms the basis for this appeal, provided as follows:
4. LIFE INSURANCE - For the support of the child, Husband shall maintain a life
insurance policy on his life, in the minimum amount of $100,000.00, until the child
reaches majority, dies or marries, whichever is first to occur. The beneficiary of
said policy shall be the child or a trustee for the benefit of the child. Husband shall
immediately provide Wife with a copy of the insurance policy.
Other paragraphs in the agreement provided that Dr. Allen was required to pay child
support in the amount of $1,000 per month (paragraph two) and to carry Krystn’s health
insurance (paragraph three).
In an order filed on June 17, 1996, the trial court increased Dr. Allen’s childsupport obligation to $1,435 per month and found that Dr. Allen was in arrears on child
support in the amount of $705.
In the same order, the trial court further ordered
Dr. Allen, pursuant to paragraph four of the agreement, to keep the life-insurance policy
in the amount of $100,000 in full force and effect, with Krystn being the sole beneficiary;
to repay all outstanding loan balances secured by the life-insurance policy within thirty
days; and to refrain from encumbering the life-insurance policy for any reason.
In a subsequent order filed on May 13, 2002, the trial court held that there had
been a material change in circumstances that warranted a reduction in the amount of child
support paid by Dr. Allen.
In this order, the trial court reduced the child-support
obligation to the amount of the social-security benefit Krystn was receiving, which was
$745 per month, and held that Dr. Allen was not obligated to pay any support in excess of
what Krystn was receiving in these social-security benefits as of May 1, 2002. In the
same order, the trial court denied Dr. Allen’s separate motion to modify the life-insurance
provision (paragraph four) of the agreement, holding “that said provision is contractual
and non-modifiable.”
Dr. Allen died in June 2004, and Krystn did not turn eighteen until October 2004.
Upon Dr. Allen’s death, appellant Kevyn Allen discovered that, even though he had been
denied permission to alter the terms of the life-insurance provision in both the 1996 and
2002 orders, Dr. Allen, in November 2001, had changed the beneficiary of the lifeinsurance policy, placing one-half of the proceeds into a trust for Krystn which provided
that she meet certain requirements, and the other one-half of the proceeds into the JEA
Limited Partnership. Upon learning of this change in beneficiary, appellant Kevyn Allen
filed a petition requesting that the trial court enforce the property-settlement agreement in
the divorce decree; order that if payments of the life-insurance proceeds had been made to
other parties that those payments be set aside; and direct that payment of the proceeds be
made to Krystn Allen.
A hearing was held on appellant’s petition on September 19, 2005. At that hearing
appellant Kevyn Allen testified that the purpose of the life-insurance provision in the
agreement was that if Dr. Allen died, Krystn would receive the proceeds from the life
insurance policy to pay for her college, but then she admitted on cross-examination that
the $100,000 was not specifically for a college fund. She further testified that it was her
intent and Dr. Allen’s intent for Krystn to have the money upon his death for whatever
reason she might need. On cross-examination, Ms. Allen agreed that the insurance policy
was to cover Dr. Allen’s child-support obligation if he were to die before Krystn turned
eighteen; that Krystn received social-security benefits until she turned eighteen in October
2004; and that she, the appellant, was not making a claim for any child-support arrearage.
Lexie Allen Saunders, Dr. Allen’s daughter and appellant’s former stepdaughter,
testified that Dr. Allen had set up the trust for her half-sister Krystn’s benefit, using onehalf of the life-insurance proceeds. Regarding the terms, she stated that the trust provided
that until Krystn turned eighteen, $325 per month was to be paid to Kevyn Allen and
$344.69 in quarterly medical insurance; the trust then provided that the residual should be
paid to Krystn over the next four years in monthly installments so long as Krystn was
enrolled in college and maintained a “C” average; if Krystn dropped out of school, the
trust provided that no payment was to be made to her until the age of thirty, with the
trustee having the discretion to delay full disbursement of the funds until Krystn reached
the age of thirty-six; and the trust provided that if Krystn predeceased Dr. Allen or she
died before the complete distribution of the trust corpus that the remainder would be
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distributed to the JEA Limited Partnership.
Lexie also testified that the remaining
$50,000 from the life-insurance policy was distributed to the JEA Limited Partnership, a
partnership set up by Dr. Allen for his four daughters; however, Lexie stated that she did
not receive any money from the partnership.
Krystn Allen testified that she turned eighteen in October 2004 and was currently
enrolled at UCA as a sophomore. Krystn did not know her grade-point average for the
current semester, but she guessed that it was 2.5 or 3.0 her freshman year.
After the hearing, the trial court denied Ms. Allen’s petition. The trial court found
that paragraph four was contractual in nature, was not subject to modification by the trial
court, and was governed by the rules of contract law. The trial court also found that
Dr. Allen’s child-support obligation after his death was paid by the social-security
benefits Krystn received until her eighteenth birthday, and that there was no child-support
arrearage owed by Dr. Allen or his estate. In its order, the trial court specifically found:
4. The life insurance required to be maintained by Defendant for the benefit of the
minor child was to insure that the child received child support in the event of the
death of the Defendant prior to the child’s eighteenth birthday. This in fact
happened. The child then received the balance of the child support due; not from
any insurance policy, but from the Defendant’s estate.
5. The Plaintiff received the benefit of her bargain with the Defendant in the
property settlement agreement. There was no mention in paragraph 4 of any
additional obligation of Defendant nor was there any mention of any other issue
that was contemplated by the parties. The provision in question was for the
specific purpose of insuring payment of child support in the event Husband died
during the child’s minority.
6. The child support was paid. Even though the Defendant was technically in
contempt for not keeping the policy of $100,000.00 in effect for the benefit of the
child, neither the child nor the Plaintiff suffered any damages as a result of this
breach. Since there are no damages, Plaintiff and the child are not entitled to any
award from the Court.
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On appeal, Ms. Allen argues that the trial court erred both in its interpretation of
the property-settlement agreement and in its application of the law to the agreement.
Domestic-relations cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and this court will not
reverse a trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous; a finding is
clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on
the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. See Scott v. Scott, 86 Ark. App. 120, 161 S.W.3d 307 (2004). We agree that
the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous, and we reverse and remand.
Appellant relies heavily upon the case of Orsini v. Commercial National Bank, 6
Ark. App. 166, 639 S.W.2d 516 (1982), in asking this court to reverse the trial court’s
denial of her petition, and we find it to be persuasive. In that case, Ron Orsini agreed in
his 1974 divorce decree to maintain insurance on his life in the amount of $50,000, with
the beneficiary being Stacy Renee Orsini, his minor daughter with Mary Linda Orsini. At
the time Ron Orsini was murdered in March 1981, he had changed the beneficiary of two
$25,000 life-insurance policies to his new wife, Mary M. Orsini. Commercial National
Bank, guardian of Stacy Orsini’s estate, filed suit to collect the insurance proceeds, and
the trial court found in favor of the bank on the basis that Stacy was a third-party
beneficiary of the property-settlement agreement and as such had a vested interest in the
insurance proceeds.
The trial court also held that the change of beneficiary was in
violation of the agreement and decree; that Ron had breached his fiduciary relationship to
Stacy; and that a constructive trust was to be instituted upon the proceeds of the lifeinsurance polices. This court affirmed the imposition of a constructive trust upon the lifeinsurance proceeds, holding that the property-settlement agreement and its incorporation
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into the divorce decree constituted sufficient evidence to support the finding that Stacy
was a third-party beneficiary of the agreement and that the language was specific enough
for the trial court to find that the two policies were intended to be maintained with Stacy
as the named beneficiary. In support of the holding that the trial court properly impressed
a constructive trust upon the insurance proceeds, this court quoted from Gutierrez v.
Madero, 564 S.W.2d 185, 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), “Equity regards as done that which
ought to have been done.
The imposition of a constructive trust on the insurance
proceeds for the benefit of the minor children is necessary to place the parties in the
position they would be in had Rudy Gutierrez not violated the decree.”
If a trial court approves and incorporates an independent property-settlement
agreement into a divorce decree, the agreement may not be subsequently modified by the
trial court; however, it is subject to interpretation by the court. Rogers v. Rogers, 83 Ark.
App. 206, 121 S.W.3d 510 (2003). In the present case, paragraph four in the Allens’
property-settlement agreement mandated that Dr. Allen maintain at least $100,000 in life
insurance with Krystn as beneficiary or in trust for her benefit for her support until she
reached the age of eighteen, died, or married, whichever occurred first. Although the trial
court on two occasions had refused Dr. Allen’s request to modify the life-insurance
paragraph in the agreement, Dr. Allen ignored those orders and changed the beneficiaries
as he saw fit. He died three months before Krystn turned eighteen, which triggered this
petition challenging his actions. After the hearing on Ms. Allen’s petition to enforce the
agreement, the trial court determined that Ms. Allen had received the benefit of her
bargain in the agreement with Dr. Allen, finding that the purpose of the life-insurance
paragraph was to insure that Dr. Allen paid his child support, and that the child support
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was in fact paid by social-security benefits. The trial court also held that neither Krystn
nor Ms. Allen suffered any damages as a result of Dr. Allen’s breach because Krystn did
in fact receive her child support until she turned eighteen.
We hold that the trial court’s decision was clearly erroneous because the trial court
modified the parties’ independent agreement.
We further hold that damages were
suffered as a result of Dr. Allen’s breach of the agreement. The trial court reasoned that
the insurance provision was included in the agreement to insure that child support was
paid if Dr. Allen died during Krystn’s minority, but nothing in paragraph four provides
that it is for the procurement of child support. Rather, child-support obligations were
addressed in paragraph two of the agreement.
If the parties had intended for the
insurance to merely secure the child-support payments, they could have easily provided
for that contingency in the agreement. They did not do so. Likewise, if Dr. Allen had
done what he was contractually obligated to do, Krystn would have received the $100,000
life-insurance proceeds at the time of his death, which event occurred before she turned
eighteen.
Appellee argues that if Krystn is allowed to receive the insurance proceeds, she
will be unjustly enriched because her child support has already been paid. We disagree,
and we hold that Orsini, supra, supports this position.
Dr. Allen entered into an
independent property-settlement agreement to keep at least a $100,000 life-insurance
policy on his life with Krystn as the beneficiary until she turned eighteen. The agreement
did not provide for decreasing amounts of insurance in proportion to the child support
remaining to be paid as Krystn got older. Notwithstanding, Dr. Allen deliberately and
unilaterally changed the insurance beneficiaries in November 2001, prior to the trial
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court’s issuance of the second order in May 2002. The insurance paragraph was all or
nothing. The bright line in this case was whether Krystn was eighteen or not at the time
Dr. Allen died.
Dr. Allen died three months before Krystn turned eighteen.
She is
entitled to the benefit of the bargain made between her parents in their propertysettlement agreement.
Reversed and remanded.
P ITTMAN, C.J., and G LADWIN, J., agree.
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