Dixie Griffin v. Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services

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Dixie GRIFFIN v. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH  AND HUMAN SERVICES  CA05­967  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered May 31, 2006  1.  PARENT & CHILD – PARENTAL RIGHTS TERMINATED – “PERMANENT PLACEMENT” COULD BE  EITHER  ADOPTION  OR  PERMANENT  CUSTODY.– The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  terminating  appellant’s parental rights to her oldest daughter and in granting permanent custody of her  daughter  to  a  family friend  under  Arkansas  Code  Annotated  section  9­27­338(c),  which  clearly anticipates that one of the “goals” can be a plan for permanent custody, and Ark. Code  Ann.  §  9­27­341,  which  only  requires  that  DHHS  be  “attempting  to  clear”  the  child  for  permanent placement to initiate termination proceedings; here, the goal of DHHS with regard  to  the  daughter  was  adoption  or  permanent  custody,  and  DHHS  was  only  pursuing  termination in order to clear a pathway for either resolution.  2.  PARENT & CHILD – ARK. CODE ANN. § 9­27­341 CLEARLY CONTEMPLATES TERMINATION OF  ONLY A SINGLE PARENT’S RIGHTS.– Where the trial court  terminated appellant’s rights to her  two other children, but chose to allow possible reunification with the legal father of one of  those children, the appellate court affirmed on the basis that there is no requirement that both  parents’  rights be terminated at the same time under Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­341, which  clearly contemplates termination of only a single parent’s parental rights. ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  GRIFFIN v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  Appeal from Pulaski County Circuit Court; Wiley Austin Branton, Jr., Judge; affirmed.  DeeNita D. Moak, for appellant.  Gray Allen Turner, Office of Chief Counsel, Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., for appellee.  LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge.  Appellant Dixie Griffin appeals from the decision of the  Pulaski  County Circuit Court terminating her parental rights to her three daughters. She  argues on appeal that termination was improper because the children were not being cleared  for permanent placement as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­341(a)(2) (Supp. 2005). We  affirm.  Because appellant does not argue on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to  support  the  termination,  only  a  brief  review  of  the  facts  is  necessary.  Appellant’s  three  daughters, D.H., age sixteen, M.S., age twelve, and A.G., age six, were first brought into the  custody of the Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) in  January  1  2004  after appellant was arrested for aggravated robbery and DHHS received reports that  her  home  was  a  “known  prostitution  and  drug  house.”  At  that  time,  D.H.’s  father  was  deceased, M.S.’s father’s whereabouts were unknown, and A.G.’s father, Otis Griffin, was  incarcerated following his fourth conviction for DWI. Over the course of this case, appellant  was repeatedly incarcerated on charges of aggravated robbery, theft of property, and forgery.  Testimony at the adjudication hearing revealed that appellant was a chronic  drug  abuser, that appellant frequently allowed prostitutes and drug dealers into her home, that  appellant did not provide for or care for her children on a regular basis, and that appellant  often verbally abused the girls. Testimony also revealed that Otis Griffin was an alcoholic  and drug abuser who often beat appellant while the girls were present.  Otis Griffin testified that, although he was only the legal father to A.G., he had been  like a father to the three girls for twelve years. He asked the court to consider him for the  girls’ placement. He admitted that he had been recently released from prison after serving 1  About three months prior to taking the children into custody, DHHS had opened a  protective services case on the family after receiving reports of inadequate supervision.  ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  GRIFFIN v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  2  eleven months, that he was a convicted sex offender,  and that he had a history of domestic  battery convictions.  Following the termination hearing, the court found that appellant was an unfit parent  who had not remedied the conditions that warranted removal of her children in January 2004.  The court found that the children were adoptable and that DHHS had proven by clear and  convincing evidence that it was in the children’s best interest for appellant’s rights to be  terminated. Because her mother’s rights had been terminated and her father was deceased,  the court granted permanent custody of D.H. to Wanda Hailey, a family friend who had been  3  caring for D.H. during the proceedings. The goal for M.S. was adoption.  With regard to  A.G., the court did not terminate the rights of Otis Griffin. Rather, the court agreed to give  Otis more time to work with DHHS toward reunification. The court specifically noted that  there was confusion in the record over what services Otis had been and had not been offered.  Therefore,  the  court  wanted  to  extend  Otis’s  time  to  comply  to  ensure  his  rights  were  protected. Hence, the goal for A.G. was either permanent placement with Otis or adoption  if Otis’s rights were thereafter terminated.  We review cases involving the termination of parental rights de novo. Moore v. Ark.  Dep’t of Human Servs., __ Ark. App. ___, __ S.W.3d ___ (May 3, 2006). However, although  we review the factual basis for terminating parental rights under a clearly erroneous standard,  no deference is given to the trial court’s decision with regard to errors of law. See Sanford  v. Sanford, 355 Ark. 274, 137 S.W.3d 391 (2003). Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­341,  termination  is  only  appropriate  in  cases  where  “the  department  is  attempting  to  clear  a  juvenile for permanent placement.” Arkansas Code Annotated section 9­27­338(c) (Supp.  2005)  sets  forth  the  following  permanency  goals  (listed  in  order  of  preference)  to  be  considered by the circuit court: (1) return the child to the parent if it is in the child’s best  interest;  (2)  authorize  a  plan  for  termination  of  parental  rights;  (3)  authorize  a  plan  for  guardianship;  (4)  authorize  a  plan  for  permanent  custody;  (5)  continue  the  goal  of  reunification as long as the parent has complied with the case plan and reunification can take  place within a reasonable amount of time; (6) authorize a plan for another permanent living  arrangement. 2  Although it is not clear from the record, it appears that his conviction was based upon  his having sex with a child (either thirteen or fifteen) when he was twenty­five.  3  Along with the termination of appellant’s rights, the court also terminated the rights of  M.S.’s father, Christopher Sanders.  ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9  GRIFFIN v. ARKANSAS DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 4  Griffin first argues that the trial court erred in terminating her rights to her oldest  daughter because the trial court placed D.H. in the permanent custody of Wanda Hailey.  Griffin argues that there was no need to terminate her rights to D.H. because D.H. was not  adopted  by  Hailey.  Her  argument  requires  us  to  infer  that  “permanent  placement”  as  referenced  in  §  9­27­341(a)(2)  only  refers  to  adoption,  not  permanent  custodial  arrangements.  We decline to so hold. Section 9­27­338(c) clearly anticipates that one of the “goals”  can be a plan for permanent custody. Additionally, in our recent case Moore, supra, we  affirmed a termination where we had reservations that the child was not adoptable—because  of severe mental illness and abuse the child had suffered—and would instead need long­term  therapeutic foster care. Consequently, although the goal in Moore was adoption, the likely  outcome was a permanent custodial arrangement with a foster family. We also note that Ark.  Code  Ann.  §  9­27­341  only  requires  that  DHHS  be  “attempting  to  clear”  the  child  for  permanent placement to initiate termination proceedings. In the present case, DHHS’s goal  with  regard  to  D.H.  was  adoption  or  permanent  custody,  and  DHHS  was  only  pursuing  termination  in  order  to  clear  a  pathway  for  either  resolution.  Therefore,  we  affirm  on  appellant’s first point.  Appellant also argues that the court erred in terminating her rights to M.S. and A.G.  4  because the court chose to allow possible reunification with Otis.  Appellant argues that  because the court did not terminate Otis’s rights, it had no authority to terminate her rights.  However, this is of no moment because the statute clearly contemplates termination of only  a single parent’s parental rights. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9­27­341(c)(1)(2)(A)(i); see also  Moore, supra. Therefore, we affirm this case as to M.S. and A.G. on the basis that there is  no requirement that both parent’s rights be terminated at the same time.  Affirmed.  CRABTREE  and BAKER, JJ., agree. 4  In her brief, appellant believes that the court’s order allowed for Otis to gain custody  of both M.S. and A.G., however, upon reading the oral ruling and the written order, we  are satisfied that the court was only referring to Otis earning (possible) custody of A.G.,  his biological and legal child, not M.S.  ___________________________  VAUGHT, J. ­ 9 

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