John Russell Sparks v. Sue Beth Sparks (Bates)

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ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION  DIVISION IV CA05­914  March 15, 2006  JOHN RUSSELL SPARKS  APPELLANT  AN APPEAL FROM HOWARD COUNTY  CIRCUIT COURT  [No. E­91­51]  v.  HONORABLE TED C. CAPEHART,  CIRCUIT JUDGE  SUE BETH SPARKS (BATES)  APPELLEE  AFFIRMED  Olly Neal, Judge  Appellant  John  Sparks  brings  this  one­brief  appeal  from an  order  of  the  Howard  County  Circuit  Court  finding  him  in  contempt  for  non­payment  of  child  support  and  incarcerating him until all delinquent payments and attorney’s fees were paid. Appellant  raises seven points on appeal. We affirm.  Appellant and appellee Sue Sparks Bates were divorced by decree of the Howard  County Chancery Court entered on June 26, 1991. The decree incorporated a stipulation  agreement providing that the parties would have joint custody of their two minor children,  Jared, born June 17, 1988, and Kayla, born October 19, 1989, with appellee to have primary  residential custody. Appellant was to pay $60 per week in child support and was awarded  visitation with the children.  On  September  19,  1994,  an  agreed  order  was  entered  by  the  Hempstead  County  Chancery Court resolving several petitions and counterpetitions seeking enforcement and 1  modification of the decree.  The order found that appellant was in arrears in the payment of  child support in the amount of $720 but that the parties agreed to compromise and settle  appellant’s monetary claims against appellee arising from the division of marital property in  exchange for forgiveness of this arrearage. The order also modified the decree to provide that  appellee  had  custody  of  the  minor  children,  subject  to  appellant’s  specified  visitation.  Appellant’s child­support obligation remained $60 per week. The case was transferred back  to the Howard County Chancery Court.  On November 25, 1998, appellee filed a motion for contempt, alleging that appellant  was $6,120 in arrears in his child­support payments. Appellant answered, admitting that he  was in arrears in his support payments. On March 30, 1999, the trial court entered an agreed  order finding that appellant had paid $3,000 towards the arrearage, that appellant was to  continue to pay current support of $60 per week, that appellant was to pay $60 per month  on  the  remaining arrearage  of  $3,000,  and  that  appellant  was  to  pay  $25  per  month  for  reimbursement of unpaid medical bills.  On January 21, 2005, appellee filed the petition leading to the present appeal. The  petition alleged that appellant was in contempt for failing to pay child support and dental  bills as ordered, stating that  the arrearage was “in excess of $11,000.” The petition also  alleged that the circumstances had changed and that appellant’s support obligation should  be modified. Appellee’s prayer for relief requested, in part, “that [appellant] be cited for  contempt of court and punished until he has complied with previous orders of this Court.”  Appellant filed an answer denying the material allegations of the petition. He also filed a  counterclaim seeking to reduce his child­support obligation, alleging that his income had 1  At appellant’s request, the case had been transferred to Hempstead County pursuant to  Ark. Code Ann. § 9­12­320 (Supp. 2005).  2  decreased. Appellant also sought to hold appellee in contempt for denying him visitation as  specified in the September 1994 order.  Appellee Sue Sparks Bates testified that she was attempting to enforce the divorce  decree because appellant was “some $11,000 in arrears.” She identified an unpaid dentist bill  in the amount of $300, together with a child­support check for $300 that had been returned  unpaid. The $300 unpaid check needed to be added to the arrearage, according to appellee.  She stated that appellant’s child­support obligation of $60 per week had not been adjusted  since the original divorce decree was entered and needed to be modified to reflect his current  income. Appellee also denied that she and appellant had an agreement for appellant not to  pay child support. She admitted that appellant performed electrical work at her businesses  but stated that she did not know the value of those services.  Appellee  stated  that  she  had  never  denied  appellant  extended  visitation  with  the  children,  asserting  that  appellant  “just  kind  of  quit  getting  them”  and  never  asked  for  extended visitation of fourteen days. She also testified that she owned a convenience store  and a fitness center and that the children work in the businesses. Appellee admitted that she  had sometimes scheduled the children to work during appellant’s visitation or that she may  have called them in during his visitation. She denied that the children’s working interfered  with appellant’s visitation but stated that, on one occasion, the children went to Hope rather  than go to their scheduled visitation.  Bobbie Jo Green, the Howard County Circuit Clerk, testified that, according to her  office’s  records,  appellant  was  $11,460  in  arrears  before  a  payment  was  made  on  the  morning of trial. She stated that her office attempts to log when a parent is given credit for  extended  visitation  but  the  last  time  that  appellant  asked  for  or  was  given  a  credit  for  extended visitation was in 2000. 3  Gwen Sparks, appellant’s wife, testified that she handled the payment of child support  and medical and dental bills for appellant during the seven years they have been married. She  stated that they had paid $5,859.91 in dental expenses and $6,417.30 in medical expenses  since 1999, but she did not know about the $300 dental bill appellee was claiming as unpaid.  To her knowledge, all medical and dental bills were current. She stated that, during the week  prior  to  trial,  appellant  went  to  the  child­support  office  to  seek  credit  for  the  extended  visitation appellant asserts he was denied. According to Mrs. Sparks’s testimony, appellant  was entitled to a credit of $1,260 for the total abatement of support during the periods of  extended visitation. She identified an exhibit showing the periods claimed for abatement and  a bill for $1,549.98 for electrical work by appellant at appellee’s businesses and stated that  appellant was seeking a setoff for this amount.  Mrs.  Sparks  further  testified  that  appellant  was  seeking  a  reduction  in  his  child­  support obligation based on his average monthly income of $757.14  for  the years 2002,  2003,  and  2004  and  identified  tax  returns  filed  for  those  years.  She  acknowledged  that  appellant was in arrears in his support payments. However, she disputed appellee’s testimony  concerning visitation, stating that appellant had not been allowed his full summer or holiday  visitation. Mrs. Sparks also stated that there were occasions during weekend visitation when  appellee asked that the children work at her businesses and that, on at least two occasions,  appellant refused. Finally, she admitted that appellant adopted her two children in 2004.  Appellant testified that he was aware of his obligation to pay child support of $60 per  week but asserted that he did not intentionally not pay his support. He also stated his belief  that he had an agreement with appellee not to pay support during the time he was having to  go to court over the adoption of Gwen Sparks’s children. Appellant testified that he believed  that appellee would notify him when he needed to catch up in his support payments. He  testified that he was seeking a reduction in his child support due to a reduction in his income 4  since the divorce in 1991. Appellant testified that he was a master electrician and that his  charge  for  a  service  call  had  recently  increased  to  $50.  Appellant  also  stated  that  he  sometimes bids on jobs, calculated at $40 per hour. He stated that he did not bill appellee for  the electrical work, stating that he did not consider it fair for appellee to pay him if he was  not paying appellee child support. He admitted that he did the work expecting to be paid. He  also said that the electrical work had nothing to do with his child support.  Appellant  said  that  he  was  asking  the  court  to  hold  appellee  in  contempt  for  interfering  with  his  visitation.  He  stated  that  he  has  not  exercised  consistent  weekend  visitation for a variety of reasons, including that the children were working for appellee, the  children  were  on  a  cruise  on  Father’s  Day,  and  attended  other  family  functions  with  appellee’s family. He also described an incident when his daughter wanted to go to Hope to  go bowling during his visitation period. He refused to allow her to go, but, he said, appellee  overruled his decision and allowed Kayla to go.  Kayla Sparks, the parties’ daughter, testified that appellee had not prevented her from  visiting with appellant. She said that her work for her mother’s businesses did not prohibit  her  visitation.  Although  she  had  spent  spring  break  with  her  father,  Kayla  stated  that  appellant had never asked her to spend several weeks in the summer with him. She could not  recall  whether  her  stepmother  asked  for  her  to  spend  spring  break  with  appellant.  She  admitted  that  there  were  times  when  her  mother’s  family  plans  prevented  visitation  but  denied that they were “numerous.” She also admitted that there were times when her mother  asked her to work at her business during visitation. She denied telling her father that she did  not want to visit.  The  trial  court  ruled  from the  bench,  finding that  appellant  was  in  arrears  in  the  amount of $11,700, including a $300 check returned due to insufficient funds. The court  allowed appellant a setoff of $1,549.98 for electrical work performed on appellee’s business. 5  The  trial  court  further  found  that  appellant’s  testimony  concerning  appellee  denying  visitation was not credible, stating that it was an afterthought trying to get out of paying child  support. As to appellant’s income, the trial court stated that appellant’s testimony that his net  income as a master electrician was $136 to $147 per week for some weeks was not credible.  Appellant  was  imputed  with  a  net  income  of  $250  per  week,  resulting  in  his  support  obligation remaining at $60 per week, to continue after the parties’ older child reached the  age of eighteen. Finally, the trial court ordered appellant incarcerated until he paid the full  amount  of  the  arrearage.  The  trial  court  set  review  hearings.  These  findings  were  memorialized by written order entered on May 18, 2005. Appellant’s motion for temporary  stay and petition for writ of certiorari and habeas corpus were denied by the supreme court  on May 19, 2005. This appeal followed.  For reversal, appellant raises seven points: (1) the trial court violated his due­process  rights  by  imposing  incarceration  as  a  penalty  for  contempt  without  a  specific  pleading  requesting  this  relief;  (2)  the  trial  court  erred  in  holding  appellant  in  contempt  and  incarcerating him without specific findings of willful disobedience and ability to pay; (3) in  the alternative, the trial court’s implicit findings that appellant had the ability to pay and was  in willful contempt of court were against the preponderance of the evidence; (4) the trial  court’s ruling that appellee was not in violation of the court’s previous order on visitation  was against the weight of credible evidence; (5) the trial court’s refusal to grant appellant  child­support abatement credit for the visitation he was denied was against the weight of  credible evidence; (6) the trial court’s ruling that appellant’s income was understated was  without  evidentiary  support;  and  (7)  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  appellant’s  request  for  a  retroactive reduction in child support was against the weight of credible evidence.  As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether appellant was subject to civil  contempt  or  criminal  contempt.  In  determining  whether  a  particular  action  by  a  judge 6  constitutes criminal or civil contempt, the focus is on the character of relief rather than the  nature of the proceeding. Fitzhugh v. State, 296 Ark. 137, 138, 752 S.W.2d 275, 276 (1988).  Because civil contempt is designed to coerce compliance with the court’s order, the civil  contemnor may free  himself or herself by complying with the order. See id. at 139, 752  S.W.2d at 276. This is the source of the familiar saying that civil contemnors “carry the keys  of their prison in their own pockets.” Id. at 140, 752 S.W.2d at 277 (quoting Penfield Co. v.  S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 593 (1947)). Here, the trial court ordered appellant incarcerated until  he purged himself of the contempt by paying all of the past­due support, an attorney’s fee,  and costs. This indicates a finding of civil contempt. Another factor indicating that this was  a  civil  contempt  is  the  fact  that  the  trial  court  scheduled  periodic  reviews  to  determine  whether appellant had the ability to pay. See Alexander v. Alexander, 22 Ark. App. 273, 742  S.W.2d 115 (1987).  Appellant’s  first  point  is  that  the  trial  court  violated  his  due­process  rights  by  imposing incarceration as a penalty for contempt without a specific pleading requesting this  relief.  We  cannot  address  this  issue  because  it  was  not  made  to  the  trial  court.  It  is  elementary that an issue, even a constitutional issue, must first be raised before the trial  court. Ivy v. Keith, 351 Ark. 269, 92 S.W.3d 671 (2002). Here, that was not done.  Because appellant’s second and third points are argued in the alternative, we also  discuss them together. Appellant argues that the trial court erred  in  holding appellant in  contempt and incarcerating him without specific findings of willful disobedience and ability  to pay or, in the alternative, the trial court’s implicit findings that appellant had the ability  to pay and was in willful contempt of court were against the preponderance of the evidence.  Our standard of review for civil contempt is whether the finding of the circuit court is clearly  against the preponderance of the evidence. See Omni Holding & Dev. Corp. v. 3D.S.A., Inc., 7  356 Ark. 440, 156 S.W.3d 228 (2004); Gatlin v. Gatlin, 306  Ark. 146, 811 S.W.2d 761  (1991).  Our supreme court has held that the failure of the trial court to state its findings of fact  and conclusions of law does not render a contempt order void. Widmer v. State, 243 Ark.  952, 422 S.W.2d 881 (1968); Johnson v. Johnson, 243 Ark. 656, 421 S.W.2d 605 (1967).  Appellant cites Whitworth v. Whitworth, 331 Ark. 461, 961 S.W.2d 768 (1998), in support  of his argument. There, the trial court never made a finding on the issue, nor was it asked to  do so. Instead, the trial court simply ordered Whitworth “incarcerated until such time as he  purges himself of paying the [wife’s house payments, one­half of the value of husband’s  business, and reimbursement for insurance premiums].” 331 Ark. at 465, 961 S.W.2d at 770.  The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court for its findings on Whitworth’s ability  to pay. Whitworth does not apply in this case because, here, the trial court, in its written  order, specifically found appellant in contempt. Further, the trial court implicitly found that  appellant had the ability to pay the support when it imputed income of $250 per week to  appellant.  We cannot say that the trial court was clearly erroneous in its finding that appellant  had the ability to pay and willfully failed to do so. We affirm on these points.  In his fourth point, appellant argues that the trial court erred in not finding appellee  in  contempt for violating the visitation provisions of the decree. The standard of review  where the trial court has refused to punish a contemnor is abuse of discretion. See Jones v.  Jones, 320 Ark. 449, 898 S.W.2d 23 (1995); Gerot v. Gerot, 76 Ark. App. 138, 61 S.W.3d  890 (2001). Appellee’s testimony is contradictory because she testified that she never denied  appellant  his  extended  visitation,  stating  that  appellant  never  asked  for  the  visitation.  However,  she  also  admitted  that  there  was  some  interference  in  that  she  scheduled  the  children  to  work  during  appellant’s  visitation.  The  trial  court  specifically  found  that 8  appellant’s testimony that appellee denied him visitation was not credible. It is the province  of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve any conflicting  testimony.  Crismon  v.  Crismon,  72  Ark.  App.  116,  34  S.W.3d  763  (2000);  Shoptaw v.  Shoptaw, 27 Ark. App. 140, 767 S.W.2d 534 (1989). Since the question of preponderance  of the evidence turns largely on the credibility of the witnesses, we defer to the superior  position of the trial court. Watts v. Watts, 17 Ark. App. 253, 707 S.W.2d 777 (1986). We  affirm on this point.  In appellant’s fifth point, he contends that the trial court erred in not allowing a total  abatement of child support for periods when he had visitation with the children in excess of  seven days. First, Section VI of Administrative Order No. 10 provides that, before there can  be an abatement, the extended period must be at least fourteen days, not seven. Second, that  same section provides that any abatement should not exceed 50% of the support obligation.  Third, the terms of Section VI provide that the trial court “may” prorate any reduction. See  Guest v. San Pedro, 70 Ark. App. 389, 19 S.W.3d 62 (2000). Under these circumstances, we  cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the abatement.  Because appellant argues his sixth and seventh points together, we do likewise. In  those points, appellant contends that there is no evidentiary support for the trial court’s ruling  that  appellant  understated  his  income  and  that  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  a  retroactive  reduction in child support was against the weight of the evidence. Our standard of review for  an appeal from a child­support order is de novo on the record, and we will not reverse a  finding of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. McWhorter v. McWhorter,  346 Ark. 475, 58 S.W.3d 840 (2001).  The trial court was not in error. According to appellant’s Exhibit 3, his net income is  $757 per month. The child­support guidelines for that level of income with two children  provide for an obligation of $262 per month. Appellant’s current support obligation is in line 9  with that amount ($60/week x 4.334 weeks = $260.04/month). It is unclear from the record  whether  the  issue  of  the  amount  of  child  support  for  one  child  is  ripe  for  decision.  Documents in the record indicate that Jared will not turn eighteen until June 2006. However,  both parties testified that Jared turned eighteen in June 2005. Arkansas Code Annotated  section  9­14­237(b)  (Supp.  2005)  discusses  how  to  calculate  the  obligor’s  remaining  obligation after a child turns eighteen.  Affirmed.  GLADWIN and GRIFFEN, JJ., agree. 10 

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