Don Price v. Rylwell, LLC and Pulaski Lands, LLC

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Don PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC and Pulaski Lands, LLC  CA05­908  __ S. W.3d ___  Court of Appeals of Arkansas  Opinion delivered May 17, 2006  PROPERTY, REAL  – SALE OR FORFEITURE  – CONVEYANCE OF FORFEITED PROPERTY WAS IN  COMPLIANCE  WITH  ARKANSAS  LAW.–  The  trial  court  did  not  err  in  determining  that  the  conveyance of three separate tracts of land, which had been forfeited to the State of Arkansas  for non­payment of taxes, was in conformity with Arkansas law where the State sent multiple  notices by certified mail to appellant regarding each of the three tracts, and a sale date of each  property was included in the first notice sent to appellant, and although the sales of the three  tracts actually took place later than the sale dates listed in the notices sent to appellant, the  notices sent to appellant were in compliance with the requirements set out in Arkansas Code  Annotated section 26­31­301.  Appeal from Pulaski County Circuit Court; Barry Alan Sims, Judge; affirmed.  Stuart Vess, for appellant.  Hurley & Whitwell, PLLC, by:  Stephen E. Whitwell, for appellee.  SAM BIRD, Judge.  Appellant Don Price appeals from a decree entered by the Pulaski  County Circuit Court that quieted title to three separate tracts of land in favor of appellees  Rylwell, LLC (Rylwell), and Pulaski Lands, LLC (Pulaski Lands). On appeal, Price contends  that there was insufficient evidence to support the decree. We affirm.  Price was the record owner of three separate tracts of land (referred to in the court’s ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 2  decree as Tracts 1, 2, and 3) in Pulaski County, Arkansas, that were forfeited to the State of  Arkansas for non­payment of taxes. Tract 2 was forfeited in 1997, and Tracts 1 and 3 were  forfeited in 1998. Each tract  was  certified to the State of Arkansas and sold as follows:  Rylwell purchased Tract 1 via a limited warranty deed issued on July 23, 2004; Rylwell  purchased Tract 2 via a limited warranty deed issued on July 21, 2003; and Pulaski Lands  purchased Tract 3 via a limited warranty deed issued on July 14, 2004.  On March 16, 2005, Rylwell and Pulaski Lands filed an action to quiet title to Tracts  1 and 2 in Rylwell and to Tract 3 in Pulaski Lands. Price filed an answer to the complaint  in which he denied its allegations, and he filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things,  that proper notice was not sent to or received by him. By a decree entered on May 2, 2005,  the trial court quieted title to Tracts 1 and 2 in Rylwell and to Tract 3 in Pulaski Lands, and  dismissed Price’s counterclaims.  Price’s sole contention on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support the  judgment quieting title in this case. To support this contention, Price makes three arguments:  first, that the notice regarding the sale of each parcel was deficient and did not comply with  the relevant statutory notice requirements; second, that the limited warranty deeds issued to  the purchasers are void because, at the time the deeds were issued, the sixty­day redemption  period following the Attorney General’s approval had not yet expired, as required by the  “Offer to Purchase” for each tract; and third, that the principles of unjust enrichment should  preclude  Rylwell  and  Pulaski  Lands  from “[preying]  on  the  misfortunate  by  purchasing  property forfeited to the State for nonpayment of taxes and selling the property to the original  owners.”  Standard of Review  Quiet title actions have traditionally been reviewed de novo as equity actions. City of  Cabot v. Brians, ___ Ark. App. ___, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Nov. 9, 2005). However, we will not  reverse the trial judge’s findings in such actions unless the findings are clearly erroneous. See  id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, we  are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id.  Notice  Price first claims that he was not provided with sufficient notice concerning the sale  of the properties as required by Ark. Code Ann. § 26­37­301 (Supp. 2005). Specifically, he  asserts that the notices sent by the State regarding Tracts 1, 2, and 3 did not contain the  actual sale date for each property as required  by statute. Arkansas Code Annotated section  26­37­301 states in part as follows:  (a)(1) Subsequent to receiving tax­delinquent land, the Commissioner of State Lands ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 3  shall notify the owner, at the owner’s last known address, by certified mail, of the  owner’s right to redeem by paying all taxes, penalties, interest, and costs, including  the cost of the notice.  (2) All interested parties known to the Commissioner of State Lands shall receive  notice of the sale from the Commissioner of State Lands in the same manner.  (b)(1) The notice to the owner or interested party shall also  indicate that the tax­  delinquent land will be sold if not redeemed prior to the date of sale.  (2) The notice shall also indicate the sale date, and that date shall be no earlier than  two (2) years after the land is certified to the Commissioner of State Lands.  According  to  the  record,  the  State  sent  three  notices  to  Price  via  certified  mail  concerning Tract 1. The first notice, dated April 2, 2001, was addressed to Don M. Price, at  a post office box address in Little Rock, and stated, in pertinent part, that the sale date of the  property would be April 8, 2003, and that “the sale date is scheduled for two years in the  future.” This notice was returned to the Land Commissioner’s office marked “Unclaimed.”  The  second  notice,  dated  March  5,  2003,  was  sent  to  Price  at  the  same  post  office  box  address as the first notice, and also stated that the property would be sold on April 8, 2003.  This notice was signed for by Don M. Price on March 18, 2003. The third notice, dated May  13, 2004, and addressed to Don Price at the same Little Rock post office box address, stated  that “unless all taxes, penalties, interest and costs are paid to this office, deed conveying title  to  a  new  owner  will  be  issued  on  7/12/2004.”  This  notice  was  returned,  marked ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 4  “Unclaimed.”  The  record  reflects  that  the  State  sent  five  notices  to  Price  via  certified  mail  concerning Tract 2. The first notice, dated April 4, 2000, was addressed to Don M. Price, at  the  same  Little  Rock  post  office  box  address  that  the  notices  relating  to  Tract  1  were  addressed, and stated, in pertinent part, that the sale date of the property would be April 17,  2002,  and  that  “the  sale  date  is  scheduled  for  two  years  in  the  future.”  This  notice  was  returned, marked “Unclaimed.” The second notice, dated January 18, 2002, was sent to Don  M. Price at the same Little Rock post office box address, and stated that the property would  be offered for sale on April 17, 2002, unless the taxes, penalties, interest and costs were paid  by that date. This notice was returned, marked “Unclaimed.” The third notice, dated May 27,  2003, was sent to Don Price at the same Little Rock post office box address, and stated that  a deed conveying the land to a new owner would be issued on June 26, 2003, unless all  taxes, penalties, interest and costs were paid by that date. This notice was returned, marked  “Unclaimed.” Finally, a fifth notice, also dated May 27, 2003, and identical in content to the  fourth notice, was mailed to Don M. and Mary Jane Price, directed to the attention of Sally  Leon at a post office box address in Tampa, Florida. This notice was signed for by “Mike  Ferrel.”  Finally, the record reflects that the State sent two notices to Price via certified mail ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 5  concerning Tract 3. The first notice, dated April 2, 2001, was addressed to Don M. Price at  the same Little Rock post office box address, and stated, in pertinent part, that the sale date  of the property would be April 8, 2003, and noted that this sale date was “scheduled for two  years in the future.” This notice was returned, marked “Unclaimed.” The second notice,  dated May 13, 2004, and addressed to Don M. Price at the same Little Rock post office box  address, stated that the land would be conveyed to a new owner on July 12, 2004, unless the  taxes, penalties, interest and costs were paid by that date. This notice was signed for by Don  M. Price. In cases involving redemption of tax­delinquent lands, our supreme court has stated  that strict compliance with the requirement of notice of tax sales is required before an owner  can be deprived of his or her property. Jones v. Double “D” Properties, Inc., 352 Ark. 39,  98 S.W.3d 405 (2003). Here, the State clearly complied with the statute: it sent multiple  notices by certified mail to Price regarding each  of  the  three tracts, and a sale date was  included in the first notice sent for each property. In addition, the first notice sent for each  property  specified  that  the  sale  date  was  “scheduled  for  two  years  in  the  future.”  Other  notices for each property also stated sale dates.  Although the dates on which the sales of the three tracts actually took place were later  than the sale dates listed in the notices sent to Price, we fail to see how this amounts to ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 6  noncompliance with the statute. Arkansas Code Annotated section 26­37­301 only requires  that the sale date of the property be included in the notice that is provided to the record  owner, which date shall be “no earlier than two (2) years after the land is certified to the  Commissioner of State Lands.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 26­37­301(b)(2). The notices sent to  Price are in compliance with these requirements. The fact that the actual sale of the tracts did  not take place until sometime after the sale dates set forth in the notices is not fatal to the  sales. In fact,  Ark. Code Ann. § 26­37­202(b) (Repl. 1997) provides that, when no bid is  received at the sale that is at least equal to the assessed value of the land, the Commissioner  is authorized to enter into negotiations for the sale of the land in question, subject to the  approval of the Attorney General.  In  carrying out  the  negotiated  sales  of  these  three  tracts,  the  Land  Commissioner  received written offers from prospective purchasers. According to the record, the “Offer to  Purchase” received from Rylwell for Tract  1  contained a certification by the State Land  Commissioner that the property was “offered for sale but not sold at an auction legally held  on  4/8/2003”;  the  “Offer  to  Purchase”  received  from  Rylwell  for  Tract  2  contained  a  certification  that  it  was  “offered  for  sale  but  not  sold  at  an  auction  legally  held  on  4/17/2002”; and the “Offer to Purchase” received from Pulaski Lands for Tract 3 contained  a  certification  that  it  was  “offered  for  sale  but  not  sold  at  an  auction  legally  held  on ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 7  4/8/2003.” The offer for Tract 1 was filed on April 16, 2004, and approved by the Attorney  General on June 2, 2004; the offer for Tract 2 was filed on April 24, 2003, and approved by  the Attorney General on June 13, 2003; and the offer for Tract 3 was filed on April 13, 2004,  and approved by the Attorney General on June 2, 2004.  Here, it is clear from the record that the three tracts in question were offered for sale  at public auctions on the dates stated in the notices, but that the tracts did not sell on those  dates. Therefore, the tracts were later sold by the Commissioner through negotiated sales that  were subsequently approved by the Attorney General. Obviously, when no legally­sufficient  bid was received on the public sale date set forth in the notices, a negotiated sale necessarily  took  place  on  a  later  date.  We  find  no  error  by  the  trial  court  in  determining  that  the  conveyance of each tract in this case was in conformity with Arkansas law.  In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful of the recent decision by the United States  Supreme Court holding that the procedure used by Arkansas’s Land Commissioner to give  notice  of  tax  forfeiture  sales  to  property  owners  after  the  initial  notice  is  returned  “Unclaimed,” is not sufficient to meet constitutional due­process requirements. See Jones  v. Flowers, 547 U.S. ___ (Apr. 26, 2006). However, appellant here does not argue that the  Land  Commissioner’s  method  of  giving  notice  of  the  tax  forfeiture  sales  to  him  was  constitutionally inadequate. Appellant argues, rather,  that the content of the notices was ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 8  inadequate to apprise him of when his properties would be sold and that the properties were  not  sold  on  the  sale  dates  stated  in  the  notices.  Appellant’s  argument,  however,  is  not  supported by the record, which clearly shows that the notices to appellant contained the sale  dates, and that the tracts were offered for sale at public auctions on those dates.  Sixty­Day Redemption Period  Price next asserts that the limited warranty deeds issued to Rylwell for Tracts 1 and  2 and the limited warranty deed issued to Pulaski Lands for Tract 3 are void because, at the  time  the  deeds  were  issued,  the  sixty­day  redemption  period  following  the  Attorney  General’s approval had not yet expired, as required by the  “Offer to Purchase” for each  1  tract.  We will not address the merits of this argument because the trial court did not rule on  this issue. Our supreme court has repeatedly stated that a party’s failure to obtain a ruling is  a  procedural  bar  to  consideration  of  the  issue  on  appeal.  Cox  v.  Miller,  ___  Ark.  ___,  ___S.W.3d ___ (June 23, 2005).  Unjust Enrichment 1  Arkansas Code Annotated section 26­37­202(e) (Repl. 1997) sets forth the requirements  for a record owner’s redemption of forfeited property within thirty (30) days after the  date of sale. There is no statutory requirement allowing for a sixty­day redemption  period.  ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5  PRICE v. RYLWELL, LLC  Cite as 91 Ark. App.  ___ (2006)  Page 9  Finally, Price argues that the principles of unjust enrichment should preclude Rylwell  and Pulaski Lands from “[preying] on the misfortunate by purchasing property forfeited to  the State for nonpayment of taxes and reselling the property to the original owners.” Again,  Price failed to obtain a ruling on this matter; thus, he is precluded from raising it on appeal.  See Cox, supra.  For  the  reasons  discussed  herein,  we  hold  that  the  trial  court’s  decision  was  not  clearly  erroneous, and we affirm.  Affirmed.  GLOVER  and CRABTREE, JJ., agree. ___________________________  BIRD, J. ­ 5 

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