Ronald Coats III v. State of Arkansas

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

DIVISION I

RONALD COATS III

APPELLANT

V.

STATE OF ARKANSAS

APPELLEE

CA 05-777

February 22, 2006

APPEAL FROM THE LONOKE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. JV2004-352]

HONORABLE TERESA H. SMITH

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

Terry Crabtree, Judge

By order dated April 18, 2005, the Lonoke County Circuit Court adjudicated appellant a delinquent by finding him guilty of second-degree criminal mischief. It is from this order that he appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the adjudication. We affirm.

At trial there was testimony from several witnesses that on September 17, 2004, appellant was in his truck "doing donuts" in the school parking lot. As a result, dust and rocks were being thrown from his truck and onto vehicles parked nearby. The rocks caused several dings in the windshield of Shala Strickland's truck, and by the next day a large crack had formed in her windshield.

A person commits the offense of second-degree criminal mischief if he recklessly destroys or damages any property of another. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-38-204(a)(1) (Repl. 2006). We review the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding using the same standard used in an appeal from a criminal conviction. Hunter v. State, 341 Ark. 665, 19 S.W.3d 607

(2000). When a defendant makes a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, the appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and affirms if there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. Baughman v. State, 353 Ark. 1, 110 S.W.3d 740 (2003).

Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction, because the State did not prove he caused the damage. Appellant and his witness, Kyle Frantel, testified that appellant was not doing donuts in the parking lot on the day in question. Further, appellant asserts that because none of the State's witnesses actually saw the rock that cracked Ms. Strickland's windshield, there was not evidence of sufficient force to compel a conclusion one way or the other. The State counters that appellant did not move for dismissal at the close of all of the evidence as required by Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(b) & (c) (2005).

Rule 33.1 is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. Jones v. State, 347 Ark. 409, 64 S.W.3d 728 (2002); Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-325(f) (Supp. 2005). Pursuant to Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(b), a motion for dismissal in a non-jury trial shall be made at the close of all of the evidence. Rule 33.1(c) of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part that "the failure of a defendant to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the times and in the manner required in subsections (a) and (b) above will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment." The record reflects that appellant failed to make any such motion; therefore his argument is not preserved for appeal, and we are precluded from conducting an appellate review.

Affirmed.

Gladwin and Robbins, JJ., agree.