Tasha Orr, Personal Representative of the Estate of Melvin Woodson, Jr., Deceased v. Timothy Calicott, M.D. and Stephen Hudson, M.D.
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DIVISION IV
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
R OBERT J. G LADWIN, Judge
CA05-594
M AY 3, 2006
TASHA ORR, personal representative of
the Estate of MELVIN WOODSON, JR.,
deceased
APPELLANT
V.
APPEAL FROM THE LEE COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT
[NO. CIV 2002-19]
HON. HARVEY YATES,
JUDGE
TIMOTHY CALICOTT, M.D. and
STEPHEN HUDSON, M.D.
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
Appellant Tasha Orr, individually and as court-appointed personal representative of
the estate of her infant son Melvin Woodson, Jr., filed a complaint in the Lee County Circuit
Court alleging that appellees Dr. Timothy Calicott and Dr. Stephen Hudson 1 committed
medical negligence and wrongful death. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss in which they
alleged that venue was improper in Lee County because treatment was rendered at Conway
Regional Medical Center located in Faulkner County and because Woodson was a resident
of Faulkner County. Following a hearing on appellees’ motion, the trial court initially denied
it. Appellant then filed a second amended complaint, and appellees filed another motion to
dismiss for lack of venue, alleging that they had discovered additional information that
contradicted appellant’s claims that venue was proper in Lee County. Following a second
hearing, the trial court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss. Appellant filed a timely notice
of appeal from that order and raises four points for our review: (1) the trial court erred in
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Appellant moved for a voluntary nonsuit against defendants Conway Regional
Medical Center and Dr. Samual William Winston, and the trial court granted her motion.
granting appellees’ motion to dismiss on the venue issue; (2) the trial court erred by
improperly weighing the affidavit testimony of affiants who did not testify at either hearing;
(3) the trial court erred in considering documents and other items not properly admitted into
evidence; (4) the trial court erred in admitting a note from the Department of Finance and
Administration. We affirm.
Melvin Woodson, Jr., was born on August 17, 1999, at Helena Regional Medical
Center in Phillips County, where he was hospitalized soon after his birth for dehydration.
In early March 2000, appellant took her six-month-old son to Dr. Winston in Phillips County.
Dr. Winston changed Woodson’s baby formula due to the baby’s history of problems with
lactose intolerance and difficulty gaining weight. On March 14, 2000, appellant took her son
to the emergency room at Conway Regional Medical Center in Faulkner County because he
was experiencing recurrent vomiting and diarrhea, elevated temperature, cough, and
congestion. Appellee Dr. Calicott instructed appellant to decrease the volume of Woodson’s
feedings and suction his nose prior to all feedings, and then he discharged the infant. On
March 15, 2000, appellant returned to the hospital and saw appellee Dr. Hudson, who
suspected that Woodson was infected with a resistant microorganism for which he prescribed
antibiotics. Once again, the infant was discharged. Early on the morning of March 16, 2000,
appellant awoke to find that Woodson was not breathing. He was taken back to the hospital
where, shortly after arrival, Dr. Hudson pronounced that the infant was dead. Dr. William
Sturner, Chief Medical Examiner at the Arkansas State Crime Laboratory, was involved in
Woodson’s autopsy. According to Sturner’s affidavit, Woodson died as a result of moderate
to severe dehydration.
On February 19, 2002, appellant filed a complaint against appellees, Conway Regional
Medical Center, and Dr. Winston. On May 20, 2002, appellees filed a motion to dismiss for
lack of venue. Attached to that motion were admission records from Conway Regional
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Medical Center in which appellant’s and her infant son’s address was listed as 2840 Dave
Ward, Apt. D-3, Conway, Arkansas 72032, and a Conway telephone number was provided.
In a reply to appellant’s response to their motion to dismiss, appellees attached a rental
application executed by appellant on March 3, 2000, and an apartment lease contract
executed on March 10, 2000, with Salem Park Apartments at 2840 Dave Ward Drive. The
lease was for a term of one year and listed Woodson and her older son Demarius Orr as
occupants of the apartment.
In an affidavit filed on June 10, 2002, appellant stated that she and her son had been
in Conway for less than a week at the time of his death. She stated that she and Melvin
Woodson, Sr., had gone to Conway to look for employment but that she had maintained her
residence in Lee County. She stated that most of her personal possessions remained in Lee
County and that she rented a furnished apartment in Faulkner County. Appellant stated that
while she looked for work in Conway, she continued to return to Lee County to launder
clothes and visit her family. According to her affidavit, she had remained a voter and
continued to receive mail in Lee County. Appellant stated that she considered Lee County
to be her residence for all practical purposes and that her only connection to Conway and
Faulkner County was that she had gone there to look for work. Appellant stated that at the
time she took her son to Conway Regional Medical Center, his Medicaid card, which was
issued by Lee County, indicated that her son’s residence was in Lee County. She stated that,
following her son’s death, he was buried in Lee County. Appellant submitted her voter
registration records for the court’s consideration.
A hearing was held on August 19, 2002, at which Lee County Clerk Pat Wilson
testified that she kept a record of the county’s registered voters. She stated that appellant’s
address of Highway 121 South in Lexa was a Lee County address. Following the hearing,
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the trial court filed a letter opinion on December 30, 2002, in which it denied appellees’
motion to dismiss. The trial court made the following findings:
That plaintiff had been a resident and lived at a Lexa, Arkansas address in Lee County
for some 12 years. That a few days before the death of Melvin Woodson, Jr.,
plaintiff, Tasha Orr and Melvin Woodson, Sr., along with Melvin Woodson, Jr., had
traveled from Lee County to Faulkner County to look for work. They continued to
maintain their residence in Lee County and left personal belongings such as furniture
and clothing in Lee Co. They returned to Lee County on weekends and Tasha Orr
continued to be a registered voter in Lee Co. and still does. Melvin Woodson, Jr. was
buried in Lee Co. and the probate of his estate was opened in Lee Co.
Basically, the only contact with Faulkner County was the renting of an apartment in
Conway a few days before the events in issue and looking for employment there.
On October 24, 2003, appellant moved for a voluntary nonsuit against Conway
Regional Medical Center and Dr. Winston, which was granted. Appellant filed a second
amended complaint against appellees. In addition to the previous exhibits, appellant attached
an affidavit from Lisa Johnson, an employee at the Lee County Assessor’s Office. Johnson
stated that, according to her records, appellant had assessed her personal property in Lee
County each year from 1998 to 2004.
Appellees filed another motion to dismiss for lack of venue, alleging that they had
discovered information that contradicted appellant’s claim that she was a Lee County
resident. In addition to their previous exhibits, appellees submitted case details from the
Office of Child Support Enforcement, consisting of, among other things, a note signed by
Karen Liesche as “Document Examiner II,” and dated November 2, 2004, in which she stated
in reference to the number 231 on some documentation, “This is the county code for Faulkner
County.” In addition, appellees submitted a copy of a brochure for Salem Park Apartment
Community. They also presented appellant’s deposition testimony dated October 15, 2003,
in which she stated that after she left the emergency room on March 15, 2000, she, Melvin
Woodson, Sr., and Woodson, Jr., went to sleep that night in the same bed and that her other
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son slept in his own bed. She also stated that the television had remained on all night.
Finally, appellees included a Lee County voter registration card.
Several affidavits were submitted. In her affidavit dated November 12, 2004,
appellant stated that, following Woodson’s birth, she applied for and was issued a Medicaid
card in Lee County and that it was the only card Woodson had during his life. Appellant
denied appellees’ assertion that she had filed an application for or sought assistance from the
Faulkner County Child Support Unit to obtain child-support benefits or establish her son’s
paternity. Appellant also stated that she had always assessed in Lee County, that she was
registered to vote in Lee County, and that her driver’s license was issued out of Lee County.
According to Marzella Robins’s affidavit, she rented a home to appellant on Highway
121 South in Lexa and that appellant continued to pay rent on the home in Lexa even though
appellant, her children, and Melvin Woodson, Sr., had traveled to Conway to look for work.
Robins stated that appellant’s furniture and much of her and her children’s personal
belongings and clothing remained at the home in Lexa. According to Robins, appellant
returned to Lexa on weekends to launder clothes and visit her family.
Alice Orr, appellant’s grandmother, submitted an affidavit in which she stated that
appellant resided in Lee County both before and after her son’s death and that appellant’s son
was buried in Lee County. According to Orr, appellant stayed at her home in Lexa where she
mourned for Woodson for an extended period of time following the infant’s death. Orr also
stated that appellant attended Sequel Baptist Church on Highway 121 every weekend and on
religious holidays.
Roy Stanley, president of Lindsey Management Company, Inc., which is the managing
agent for Salem Park Apartments in Conway, submitted an affidavit stating that Salem Park
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had never offered furnished apartments to its residents. He maintained that the only
furnishings in the apartments were bar stools.
An affidavit from Susan Stacks, an employee at the Faulkner County Assessor’s
Office, was presented. She stated that she had found nothing in her records to indicate that
appellant had ever assessed personal property in Faulkner County.
In another affidavit dated November 12, 2004, appellant stated that her income tax
returns indicated that her home address was in Lee County. She stated that she has a bank
account in Marianna, Arkansas, which is in Lee County. In response to Stanley’s affidavit,
appellant stated that the apartment at Salem Park was furnished with two beds and that her
beds remained at her home in Lee County. She stated that the apartment had a washer and
dryer and that her washer and dryer remained at her home in Lee County. Appellant stated
that her Lee County address was noted on records from Helena Regional Medical Center.
A hearing was held on November 12, 2004, at which time a fax was received from the
Department of Finance and Administration, dated November 12, 2004, in which Sharon
Chew from the driver’s license division stated:
I am writing in regards to address information that you requested on Tosha Lesha Orr.
Ms. Orr has resided at the following addresses.
September 25, 1998
11755 Hwy 121 S. Lexa, AR 72355
August 4, 2000
2840 Dave Ward Dr. #D3 Conway, AR 72032
September 6, 2002
11713 Hwy 121 SDR #D3
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted appellees’ motion to dismiss
for lack of venue. The trial court found:
Upon considering the matters previously brought before the Court and additional
evidence concerning the Medicaid and Child Support Records for Faulkner County,
the Department of Finance and Administration Records including reconsideration of
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the lease agreement for the apartment in Conway and the affidavit of Roy Stanley, the
weight of the evidence on the issue of venue is that Melvin Woodson, Jr., resided in
Faulkner County at the time of his death.
Act 649 of 2003 provides that any action for medical injury against a medical care
provider shall be filed in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred, but that
act does not apply to causes of action accruing prior to the effective date of the act, which
was March 25, 2003. Because the events at issue in this appeal occurred in March 2000, we
turn to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-60-112 (1987), as it existed prior to the passage of Act 649 of
2003. According to Ark. Code Ann. § 16-60-112(a), “All actions for damages for personal
injury or death by wrongful act shall be brought in the county where the accident occurred
which caused the injury or death, or in the county where the person injured or killed resided
at the time of injury.” Our supreme court has interpreted the statute to include causes of
action for medical malpractice. See Goodwin v. Harrison, 300 Ark. 474, 780 S.W.2d 518
(1989).
Our supreme court in Leathers v. Warmack, 341 Ark. 609, 19 S.W.3d 27 (2000),
stated:
Under our case law, the distinction between the terms “domicile” and “residence” is
often subtle; however, our supreme court has consistently held that the terms are not
synonymous. A person’s “residence” is the place of actual abode, not a home that a
person expects to occupy at some future time. This court has defined “place of
abode” as “something more than a place of temporary sojourning,” implying a degree
of permanence. “[A] given place may be a ‘place of abode’ of a party, though he may
be actually absent therefrom for a long period of time. No particular length of time
is necessary to establish residence. Rather, the key consideration is whether the place
is an “established abode, fixed permanently for a time for business or other purpose,
although there may be an intent existing all the while to return at some time or other
to the true domicile[.]” Each case must be decided on its own facts.
Leathers, 341 Ark. at 618, 19 S.W.3d at 33-34 (citations omitted).
First, appellant argues that it was appellees’ burden to prove that she and her son were
not residents of Lee County and that the only exhibit actually submitted by them as evidence
was the letter from the Department of Finance and Administration. Appellant also points out
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that the only testimony offered was from Wilson, whose testimony was uncontroverted.
Although it is listed as her third point on appeal, we find it necessary to address it along with
the first point, as the two arguments are linked. In her third point on appeal, appellant
contends that the trial court considered and weighed documents that were not introduced into
evidence or offered for introduction into evidence.
In a letter filed on December 10, 2004, trial judge Harvey L. Yates stated:
The Court heard arguments and accepted exhibits in support of said arguments
concerning the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
on November 12, 2004. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the Motion
as submitted and rendered a decision on November 18, 2004.
The Court has not accepted any other exhibits since then and the record will consist
of those matters presented up to the conclusion of the hearing on November 12, 2004.
The record on appeal demonstrates that the exhibits attached to the pleadings by both
parties were presented as evidence by them at the hearing. In any event, the purpose for the
contemporaneous-objection rule is to give the trial court the opportunity to know the reasons
for disagreement with its proposed action before or at the time the court makes its ruling. See
Mackey v. State, 329 Ark. 229, 947 S.W.2d 359 (1997); see also Withers v. State, 308 Ark.
507, 825 S.W.2d 819 (1992) (finding that Withers’s argument that there was a lack of
evidence as to his prior convictions because the State failed to introduce a pen-pack was not
preserved for review where no objection was made to the trial court).
When venue is questioned, there must be a determination on the facts; unless the
pleadings on their face show that an action was commenced in the wrong county, a defendant
objecting to the venue has the burden of proving the essential facts. Ison Properties, L.L.C.
v. Wood, 85 Ark. App. 443, 156 S.W.3d 742 (2004). An appellate court will not reverse a
trial court’s findings of fact, whether they are based on oral or documentary evidence, unless
they are clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. See Ark. R.
Civ. P. 52(a); Two Brothers Farm, Inc. v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 57 Ark. App. 25, 940 S.W.2d
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889 (1997). However, whether venue is appropriate in a particular county is a matter of law.
River Bar Farms, L.L.C. v. Moore, 83 Ark. App. 130, 118 S.W.3d 145 (2003).
Here, appellant executed a one-year lease for an apartment in Faulkner County several
days prior to Woodson’s death. The apartment contained, at a minimum, two beds and a
television, and appellant agreed to pay Salem Park Apartments an additional sum of money
per month for the use of a washer and dryer in the apartment. Moreover, each time appellant
took Woodson to the emergency room at Conway Regional Medical Center, she listed her
Faulkner County address and telephone number on the hospital’s admission reports. Also,
records from the Office of Child Support Enforcement indicated that a case had been opened
for Woodson in Faulkner County.
The law as it existed in March 2000 provided appellant with two choices for filing her
lawsuit in terms of venue: either where the alleged wrongful conduct occurred that resulted
in Woodson’s death or where Woodson resided at that time. We find no error in the trial
court’s granting of appellees’ motion to dismiss for lack of venue as venue was appropriate
only in Faulkner County.
Appellant’s second argument on appeal is that it was improper for the trial court to
weigh the affidavits without having the opportunity to assess the credibility of the affiants
through testimony. Besides the fact that appellant failed to voice any objection, there is no
indication that the trial court found that the affidavits lacked credibility. In any event, the
affidavits presented by appellant went more toward proving her domicile, rather than
Woodson’s residence or actual place of abode.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the letter from the
Department of Finance and Administration because it was in an unsworn format and lacked
a proper foundation. She contends that the trial court recognized the necessity of having a
witness’s sworn testimony. Appellant argues that, although she would have thought the error
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was harmless in light of the fact that the letter indicates that from September 25, 1998, until
August 4, 2000, she had a Lee County address, the trial court interpreted it incorrectly.
Appellant objected to the letter from the Department of Finance and Administration
as follows: “Your Honor, over my objections, again, I think 90% of their evidence is in
improper format, but I understand at this late date it may be hard to get it in proper format.”
Although appellant raised an objection, the objection not only lacked specificity, it appears
to have been withdrawn in the same breath that it was made. Error may not be predicated
upon a ruling admitting evidence unless there is a timely, specific objection. Bohannan v.
Underwood, 300 Ark. 110, 776 S.W.2d 827 (1989). Accordingly, appellant’s final point is
not preserved for our review.
Affirmed.
V AUGHT and C RABTREE, JJ., agree.
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